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ABSTRACT 
The primary objective of this thesis is to examine the efficiency and welfare effects on 
Korean manufacturing of an increase in competition from foreign firms. The Korean 
case is of interest because it represents an experience with liberalisation of a protected 
manufacturing sector in a small open economy. In the study, the imperfectly 
competitive nature of Korea's manufacturing sector is explicitly incorporated into the 
model. 
The analysis focuses first on the effects of an increase in foreign competition on 
domestic monopoly power, X-efficiency and national welfare. The market 
concentration of Korean manufacturing industry remained high throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s. The evidence suggests that financial subsidies to industry accelerated the 
level of market concentration, and that protection, especially through import quotas, 
was associated with high levels of X-inefficiency. The analysis also indicates that, in a 
small open economy, a rise in foreign competition has positive welfare effects, even 
when the economy is characterised by oligopoly and scale economies. 
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1 Introduction 
Pareto optimality is guaranteed in a perfectly competitive market. Economic efficiency 
is less attainable, however, in markets characterised by imperfect competition. This 
thesis deals with industrial policies and the welfare economics of foreign competition, 
in a small open economy with an imperfectly competitive market structure. 
Increasing economic efficiency (and hence welfare) is an important objective of 
industry policy. Most government action has some effects on the industrial sector of the 
economy. The meaning of industrial policy in this thesis, following the Commission of 
the European Communities' (l 992a) definition, is the effective implementation of all 
those policies which impinge on the structural adjustment of industry with a view to 
promoting competitiveness. Among these policies competition policy -- intended to 
facilitate effective competition to promote efficiency and economic growth -- is an 
important aspect. I 
Industry policy aimed at increasing competition from abroad, as well as among 
domestic firms, is especially important for a small open economy operating in the world 
market (Katics et al. 1994; Ferguson 1994; EPAC 1992; Caves 1990; Krugman 1990). 
Many studies of developed countries have concluded that the positive effects of an 
increase in competition from foreign firms in an imperfectly competitive market can 
also be obtained in a small, open, developing economy. In the case of developing 
countries, however, little research has been done, and hence there is little empirical 
evidence to support this view (Bhagwati 1988). 
In the absence of competitive pressure, an imperfectly competitive firm will fail 
to achieve allocative efficiency in output markets and may relax its cost minimising 
efforts, resulting in X-inefficiency. The prices set in imperfectly competitive markets 
send distorted signals about the value of different goods and services because they do 
not reflect accurately the social cost of production. If an imperfectly competitive firm is 
forced to lower its monopolistic price to competitive levels, efficiency of resource 
Other industry policy measures include regional policy to influence the spatial location of industry, 
innovation policy to influence the technology used by firms and trade policies designed to protect 
specific firms and industries (Ferguson et al. 1994). 
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allocation will increase and waste of resources will also to decrease in the firm and in 
the society. 
One advantage of free competition is that it can prevent imperfectly competitive 
firms from exerting their monopoly power to set prices above marginal cost and reduce 
output in the market. A benefit of cross-frontier trade is that competition with foreign 
producers decreases the possibility of the misallocation of resources because it 
constrains the monopoly power of domestic firms (Cowling et al. 1976; Jacquemin 
1980; Waterson 1984; Harris 1988). There is a large volume of empirical work showing 
that international trade in developed countries reinforces the competitive structure of an 
economy (Esposito et al. 1971; Pugel 1978, 1980; Geroski et al. 1981; De Ghellinck et 
al. 1988). A negative relationship between exports and domestic market power, 
although not so straightforward, has also been found (Lyon 1981; Stalhammer 1991). 
A rise in competition also pressures imperfectly competitive firms to minimise 
production costs. In a perfectly competitive market, X-inefficiency will not occur. In 
spite of some contrary views (Corden 1974; Martin 1978), most economists agree that 
international competition can also positively affect national welfare by increasing X-
efficiency (Martin and Pages 1983; Frantz 1988; Vousden et al. 1993). In the face of 
intensifying competition from overseas, an imperfectly competitive firm is under 
pressure to reduce organisational slack and keep costs to a minimum. Although most 
research effort has been concentrated on allocative efficiency and its impact on market 
performance in developed countries, X-inefficiency may be a more important source of 
welfare loss in developing countries (Bergsman 1974). This is because, in general, 
developing countries are more likely to have more imperfectly competitive market 
structures associated with protection. If protection from foreign competition induces 
inefficiency among managers and workers, there will be an additional welfare cost over 
and above the standard deadweight cost of protection. 
It has been argued that competition is not a goal but a discipline to ensure that 
market participants provide their goods and services as skilfully and cheaply as possible 
(Stigler 1982; Williamson 1968; Stiglitz 1981). In the case of an oligopoly market with 
economies of scale, the implications of an increase in competition from abroad are 
controversial, particularly in developing countries (Greer 1989; Rodrik 1988). The 
widely held belief that competition increases welfare is based on the assumption that 
competition is feasible, which ordinarily requires non-decreasing returns to scale. The 
3 
outcome is less clear in the context of an imperfectly competitive market with 
economies of scale. Some new international trade theorists argue the need for strategic 
trade and industry policy coupled with trade liberalisation in an imperfectly competitive 
market (Katrak1977; Krugman 1984; Brander and Spencer 1981, 1985). Although 
strategic trade policy has received much criticism (Chapter 6) and empirical study 
confirms that trade liberalisation can bring sizeable welfare gains in developed 
countries (Harris 1984; Horstmann et al. 1986), in developing countries, the 
consequences of an increase in foreign competition in an imperfectly competitive 
market coupled with economies of scale are less well understood and further empirical 
evidence is needed (Roberts et al. 1991). 
Korea, a resource-poor, small open economy, has adopted trade-oriented 
economic development strategies over the last three decades (Koo 1991; Lee 1986). The 
ratio of trade (exports and imports) to GNP has increased continuously until the early 
1980s (Appendix 1.1). In spite of the weakly declining trend in the ratio in the 1980s, 
the average ratio of trade to GNP increased from 59 per cent in the 1970s to 77 per cent 
in the 1980s. Over the same period, Korea's industrial markets remained highly 
uncompetitive (Lee et al. 1984; Lee et al. 1990). Oligopolies have been prevalent in 
Korea. The share of shipments of oligopolies in Korean manufacturing is estimated to 
have been 35.1 per cent in 1970, 50. 6 per cent in 1980 and 40.2 per cent in 1987 
(Chapter 3). 
Korean manufacturing industry is experiencing rapid change in its economic 
environment as it moves from protection to liberalisation (Young 1992, 1990). In 
Korea, conscious efforts to liberalise imports were made during two periods: 1965-67 
and 1978-90 (Chapter 3; Kim 1993). The first episode of import liberalisation primarily 
involved a loosening of quantitative restrictions (QRs), whereas the second episode 
took the form of both a loosening of QRs and a reduction of tariffs. The overall degree 
of liberalisation, measured by averaging the degree of liberalisation in terms of tariffs 
and that from QRs, rose considerably from 35.8 per cent in 1965 to 59.0 per cent in 
1967. The overall degree of liberalisation did not change much between 1968 and 1977 
but increased continuously afterward, from 61.5 per cent in 1978 to 87.6 per cent in 
1990. 
Given the interest in the effects of increased foreign competition on markets in 
developing countries, the changing economic environment in Korean manufacturing 
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industry provides fertile ground for exploring industrial policy issues. The objective of 
this thesis is to examine empirically, using data on Korean manufacturing industry, the 
effects of and potential for an increase in competition, particularly from overseas. 
Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 examines how a higher overall level of competition increases allocative and 
X-efficiency in an imperfectly competitive market. The chapter also deals with the 
controversy surrounding trade liberalisation in markets characterised by oligopoly and 
economies of scale, particularly in a small open developing economy. 
Chapter 3 describes the highly concentrated and oligopolistic market structure of 
Korean manufacturing markets in the 1970s and 1980s. Traditional market 
concentration indexes are criticised as ignoring competition from foreign firms. The 
chapter sets out a market concentration index that reflects the effects of international 
trade. Because a high ratio of trade dependence is another important characteristic of 
Korean manufacturing, the trade-adjusted three-firm concentration index (ACR3) is 
calculated for the four-digit level of KSIC industry classifications for 197 4 and 1986. 
Chapter 4 investigates whether the hypothesis of import discipline can be 
applied to the case of Korean manufacturing. The Korean government intervened 
significantly in the market in the early years of development to restrict imports. Its 
policy of intervention in the financial sector in the 1970s has been the subject of much 
study (Kim 1993; Kim 1991), unlike the interventionist strategies adopted by other 
developing countries. In the early 1980s, government policy moved towards a policy of 
deregulation and trade liberalisation. The main objective of the chapter is to test 
whether imports constrained the domestic market power of Korean manufacturing in the 
mid 1970s and in the 1980s. The chapter analyses the relationship between the policy of 
government intervention and industrial concentration. 
Chapter 5 looks at how an imperfectly competitive market structure and trade 
protection increase X-inefficiency. According to international trade theory and 
industrial organisation theory, a quantitative restriction yields a larger welfare loss than 
tariff protection because the former confers sustainable monopoly power on imperfectly 
competitive firms in the domestic market. These theories are examined in the context of 
a small open economy which has continued to be imperfectly competitive, Korean 
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manufacturing industry. Based on a combination of international and industrial 
organisation theories, the chapter tests empirically whether a higher level of import 
quotas results in higher X-inefficiency. In addition, the relationship between direct trade 
protection and X-efficiency in the mid 1970s and in the 1980s is analysed for the case 
of Korean industry . 
Although allocative efficiency and X-efficiency are desirable consequences of 
an increase in competition, the conflicting effects of competition and economies of 
scale under an oligopoly also need to be considered. Although some groups (for 
example, consumers and the government) will benefit from increased foreign 
competition, other groups (for example, producers) may not. As economies of scale are 
an important determinant of market concentration (Chapter 4), contributing to a high 
ratio of oligopoly (Chapter 3), the net effect and policy implications for industry of an 
increase in foreign competition need to be examined. Based on a sample of 34 
oligopolistic industries, Chapter 6 employs partial equilibrium analysis to estimate the 
net national welfare effect of trade liberalisation. 
Chapter 7 contains a summary of the results of previous chapters and makes 
some recommendations for policy. 
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APPENDIX 1.1: RATIO OF TRADE TO GNP RATIO IN KOREA :1967-90 (%) 
Exports1 Imports1 GNP Exports Imports Trade 
(Millions of (Millions of (Billions of /GNP2 /GNP2 /GNP 
US dollars) US dollars) US dollars, 
Current 
1967 320.2 996.2 4.3 13.6 22.4 36.0 
1968 455.4 1,462.9 5.2 14.7 25.9 40.6 
1969 622.5 1,823.6 6.6 15.4 26.0 41.4 
1970 839.2 1,984.0 8.1 15.0 24.0 39.0 
1971 1,067.6 2,394.3 9.5 16.1 26.5 42.6 
1972 1,624.1 2,522.0 10.7 20.6 25.6 46.2 
1973 3,225.0 4,240.3 13.5 30.0 33.6 63.6 
1974 4,460.4 6,851.8 18.8 28.4 40.3 68.7 
1975 5,081.0 7,274.4 20.9 28.2 38.4 66.6 
1976 7,715.3 8,773.6 28.7 32.0 34.6 66.6 
1977 10,046.5 10,810.5 36.8 32.7 34.0 66.7 
1978 12,710.6 14,971.9 51.5 30.6 34.9 65.5 
1979 15,055.5 20,338.6 61.5 27.7 36.6 64.3 
1980 17,504.9 22,291.7 60.5 34.7 45.9 80.6 
1981 21,253.8 26,131.4 66.8 37.7 47.2 84.9 
1982 21,853.4 24,250.8 71.3 35.7 42.7 78.4 
1983 24,445.1 26,192.2 79.5 36.5 40.4 76.9 
1984 29,244.9 30,631.4 87.0 37.0 40.5 77.5 
1985 30,283.1 31,135.7 89.7 35.8 38.0 73.8 
1986 34,714.5 31,583.9 102.8 40.0 36.9 76.9 
1987 47,280.8 41,019.8 128.9 42.5 36.6 79.1 
1988 60,696.4 51,810.6 172.8 40.5 33.5 74.0 
1989 62,377.2 61,464.8 211.2 34.7 32.7 67.4 
1990 65,015.7 69,843.7 237.9 32.2 33.5 65.7 
Notes: 1. Clearance basis. 
2. Adjustments are based on changes in basic statistics. 
Source: Major Statistics, various issues, Economic Planning Board, Korea. 
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2 Efficiency and Welfare in an 
Imperfectly Competitive Market 
Of the many goals that might be attributed to a policy of competition, a primary one is to 
raise allocative and production efficiency and national welfare through an increase in 
competition from foreign firms. I As countries restructure -- particularly small open 
developing economies - the issue of whether increased competition is more appropriate 
than protection in an imperfectly competitive market has increasingly come under 
scrutiny.2 It is commonly believed that free trade, based on comparative advantage 
between countries, increases welfare in a perfectly competitive market with constant 
returns to scale (Samuelson 1962; Bhagwati 1968; Dixit and Norman 1980). In reality, 
however, the assumption that markets are perfectly competitive is open to question. 
This chapter focuses on how a rise in competition, particularly through trans-
border trade, can improve national welfare in an imperfectly competitive market by 
increasing allocative efficiency in output markets and reducing X-inefficiency in 
production costs. 
Imperfectly Competitive Markets 
The main distinction between a perfectly and an imperfectly competitive market lies in 
firms' pricing behaviour. When the market power (monopoly power) of a firm is such 
that it can charge more for a good than would be the case under competition (marginal 
1 Greer (1989), for example, considers the goals of competition to be increasing economic efficiency 
(allocation, production and innovation efficiencies) and consumer welfare, and promoting 
competition, fair conduct, equitable distribution and other political-social objectives. 
2 Foreign competition refers to international trade rather than foreign direct investment or international 
technology agreements. As is the case in Japan, in Korea joint ventures serve as a means of admitting 
foreign capital and securing foreign technology without turning loose a major new competitive threat 
on Korean product markets. The competitive significance of direct investment is thus less than the 
number of foreign-affiliated enterprises operating in the country would suggest. 
8 
cost), the market is called imperfectly competitive (Kreps 1991; Carlton et al. 1990; 
Varian 1984).3 
The demand curve for an individual producer in an imperfectly competitive 
market slopes downward, and the amount of output that the firm is able to sell will 
depend on the price that it sets. In a perfectly competitive market, firms are price-takers; 
the price of a good is given and equal to marginal revenue. Under imperfect competition 
the price of a good is not necessarily equal to marginal revenue; firms are aware that they 
can influence the price of products, and that they can sell a larger quantity of goods only 
by lowering their prices. 
The cost function of a firm also depends on the quantity of goods it produces. To 
maximise profits, a firm needs to set prices such that marginal revenue equals marginal 
cost.4 If marginal revenue is greater (smaller) than marginal cost, increased production 
results in greater profit (loss). Here, marginal revenue is the outcome of the following 
forces: first, an increase in revenue with each unit of output sold; and second, a decrease 
in revenue when prices have to be reduced in order to sell the increased level of output.5 
There are two representative theories relating imperfectly competitive markets to 
international trade and industrial organisation: the oligopoly market theory, and the 
monopolistic competition theory. The former is based on the assumption of 
homogeneous goods and the latter on the assumption of imperfect substitution between 
goods. 
The Oligopoly Model 
In an oligopoly, there are only a few firms in the industry producing homogeneous 
goods. These firms believe that the outcome of their decisions depends crucially on the 
3 Whether a firm's high profit rate in concentrated industry is mainly due to market power is debatable. 
4 
5 
Demsetz (1973) argues that high profit rates for monopolistic firms reflects their efficiency. Market 
power in a differentiated product market may originate from the exclusive use of certain inputs, 
better access to distribution, better product quality, or brand strength. In general, however, 
advantages in quality and brand are a consequence of efficient management and innovation. 
The second order condition for profit maximisation is that the slope of marginal revenue be less than 
the slope of marginal cost. This will be true if the marginal revenue function has a negative slope and 
marginal cost has a positive slope, a horizontal slope, or a less negative slope than the marginal 
revenue function. It is generally assumed that one of these holds. 
The condition of marginal revenue equalling marginal cost applies in the case of a perfectly 
competitive firm as well. However, marginal revenue gained from selling one more unit in a perfectly 
competitive market is only equal to the market price, since a firm's output decision has no impact on 
market price. 
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decisions taken by one or more other identifiable sellers. Thus, each firm has to guess 
(conjecture) what the response of other firms to its own decisions on output or price will 
be. Conjectural variation provides a unified framework for describing firm behaviour in 
an oligopoly (Waterson 1984). If there are n firms, and each firm's output is qi, then total 
output (Q) is: 
(2.1) 
The inverse demand function for homogeneous goods is: 
p = </>(Q), </>' < 0. (2.2) 
Each firm is assumed to have a conjectural variation, namely the response of all other 
rivals' output to its own output qi. The conjectural variation is defined as: 
(2.3) 
If the firm's cost function is C(Q), the profit maximising condition of a given firm in an 
imperfectly competitive industry will be: 
maxP(Q)qi -C(Q). (2.4) 
From (2.4 ), the first order condition for profit maximisation is: 
</>(Q) +qi</>' (Q)[l + Q] = ~Ci ' 
uqi 
(2.5) 
where the value of the conjectural variation ( Q) is zero for Cournot, -1 for Bertrand as 
well as competitive industry, and (Q -1) in the case of market share collusion and 
qi 
monopolies. Equation (2.5) indicates that the profit maximising condition for firms in 
oligopoly is marginal revenue equals marginal cost. 
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Monopolistic Competition Model 
The demand curve for the monopolistic firm is assumed to depend only on the price set 
by the monopolist. However, under monopolistic competition, it is assumed that several 
monopolists, with differentiated products, compete in setting prices and output levels. 
This product differentiation also distinguishes monopolistic competition from the 
perfectly competitive market. 
The monopolistic model is based on the assumptions of product differentiation 
and Bertrand price competition (Krugman and Obstfeld 1991).6 In contrast to the 
oligopoly model, the monopolistic competition model provides simple and clean 
answers: with free entry/exit of firms, equilibrium E is the tangent of the (long-run) 
average cost (LRAC) and demand curve (Figure 2.1). This point alone satisfies both 
conditions: marginal revenue equals marginal cost; and price equals average cost. If, 
when in equilibrium, firms have downward sloping demand, the point of tangency 
indicates a less than efficient scale of production. Although firms are producing at 
excess capacity (Q - Q*), consumers benefit from the wide variety of products 
available. This conclusion has been challenged, however, on the grounds that the 
argument may not hold when advertising and selling costs are explicitly taken into 
account (Demsetz 1964). 
Economic Reasons for Imperfect Competition 
Many factors contribute to imperfectly competitive market conditions. Both legal 
restrictions (licences or patents) and economic barriers to entry can keep firms out of an 
industry. Although barriers to entry can be defined in many ways (Bain 1956; Carlton 
and Perloff 1990), there are a few main ones. 
First, economies of scale in production, which require a large capital expenditure 
and an absolute cost advantage, are an important barrier to entry. When the costs 
associated with entry are high, a potential entrant faces substantial losses if unsuccessful. 
6 A better distribution channel is usually the result either of better management or of legal barriers. The 
contestable market model also assumes Bertrand conjectural variation and unrestricted entry and exit. 
However, the concepts in this model were largely employed for multiproduct firms (Baumol, Panzar 
and Willig 1982). 
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In an economies of scale industry, strategic behaviour by established firms (for example, 
vigorous price competition) may be used to prevent new entry. 
Product differentiation is a second barrier to entry. Product differentiation exists 
when the products of different firms in the same industry are not perfect substitutes for 
each other. When consumers view differentiated products in an industry as imperfect 
substitutes, a firm with a dominant product can raise the price of its product above that of 
its competitors without losing sales. Product differentiation activities are aimed at 
influencing the demand conditions for the firm's product. Advertising, attention to style, 
and research and development are the major strategies available to a firm hoping to 
differentiate its product from others (Needham 1970). 
FIGURE 2.1: EQUILIBRIUM IN THE MARKET WITH MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 
Price 
LRAC 
Demand 
Q* Q Quantity 
The third main entry barrier is the absence or abuse of anti-trust policy; even 
where anti-trust legislation does exist, it is rarely a serious bar to mergers or colluding 
firms. In addition, the industrial policies of many developing countries have typically 
been biased toward restricting entry, mainly by means of discriminatory licensing and 
financial arrangements (Rodrik 1988). This strategy has been made possible by the 
traditional concentration of industrial power in the hands of a minority in many of these 
countries. If the capital market is underdeveloped, investment funds will tend to be 
'1 
! 
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exploited by small interest groups; this constitutes another barrier to entry related to 
capital expenditure. 
National Welfare, Allocative Efficiency and Imperfect Competition 
National Welfare 
National (social) welfare is measured as the sum of producer and consumer surplus 
(Harberger 1971; Waterson 1984). If the competitive demand price for a given unit 
equals the value of that unit to the consumer, consumer surplus (CS) is defined as:7 
~ 
CS = f D(P)dP, (2.6) 
p 
where P is equilibrium price and D(P) is the demand curve in the market. If the 
competitive supply price for a given unit measures the value of that unit to the supplier, 
producer surplus (PS) indicates supernormal profits or rents accruing to scarce resources. 
PS is defined as: 
PS=P·Q-C (2.7) 
where Q is output (sales) and C is total cost of production. Following the Kaldor-Hicks 
criterion, we consider a policy to be worthwhile if the sum of consumer surplus and 
producer surplus satisfies the following equation:8 
a·CS+(l- a)-PS;;:: 0 (2.8) 
where a is welfare weight. Although the choice of welfare weight in practice can be 
determined by the goal of the policy, it is usual practice in economics to assume that the 
7 The concepts of equivalent and compensating variations are useful in dealing with the reduction in 
welfare brought about by increases in prices. However, Willig (1976) showed that if the benefits 
obtained from consuming a good are a relatively small part of the consumer's budget, and if the 
income elasticity is not too large, then both measures may well be approximated by the concept of 
consumer surplus. 
8 Tariff income can be regarded as an aspect of national welfare (Rodrik: 1988). 
13 
weight for consumer surplus and producer surplus are equal (a= 1/2).9 Therefore, if a 
policy results in a more competitive environment and motivates a firm to produce its 
product efficiently so as to satisfy the condition indicated by equation (2.8), the policy 
will increase national welfare. 
Market Equilibrium, Allocative Efficiency and Welfare under Perfect Competition 
The consequences of imperfect competition are that prices are higher and output lower 
than would be the case under perfect competition.IO In an imperfectly competitive 
market, the equilibrium price and output are always Pareto inefficient. 
One of the greatest advantages of a competitive market is that it forces firms to 
keep costs down: to produce at the lowest total average cost curve. If there is no market 
distortion and the price mechanism is functioning well, market equilibrium has two 
important implications for resource allocation and welfare. These are demonstrated in 
Figure 2.2. 
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FIGURE 2.2: MARKET EQUILIBRIUM, ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY AND WELFARE 
Price 
p 
s 
Q1--~~~~~~~---~~~~~~~~~~-
Co n sump ti on Q* 
The current US merger guidelines give more weight to adverse market power consequences than to 
the production efficiencies that might result from a horizontal merger (Besanko et al. 1993). 
10 Net profits are not always guaranteed by setting price above marginal cost in a downward sloping 
demand curve market. When there are large fixed costs, profit may be zero even if price exceeds 
marginal cost. If average costs are greater than marginal costs, profit may be negative. Demsetz 
(1973) argued that a high profit rate earned by a firm in concentrated industries is due to managerial 
as well as technological efficiency rather than market power. 
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First, market equilibrium (E) shows the point of most efficient resource 
allocation. The short-run supply curve in a perfectly competitive market is a marginal 
cost curve above the average variable cost of production. The minimum necessary 
condition for production in a competitive market is that revenue will exceed avoidable 
costs. That is, as long as price (marginal revenue) is greater than average variable cost, a 
firm will supply along the marginal cost curve. At equilibrium point E, the market price 
(P*) is equal to the marginal cost (MC), indicating that the value of the goods produced 
is equal to the opportunity cost of the resources used. 
Second, market equilibrium at price P* and output Q* represents the optimal 
price and quantity at which social welfare is maximised. As the demand curve reflects 
the marginal benefits (value) of consumption, PEP* indicates consumer surplus; and as 
the supply curve reflects the marginal costs of production, P* ES is producer surplus. The 
equilibrium of P* and Q* shows the point at which the sum of consumer and producer 
surplus is maximised. Until output reaches Q*, the marginal effect of one more unit of 
consumption (output) increases national welfare; output above Q* reduces national 
welfare. 
Welfare Costs of Market Power 
Assuming that all firms, regardless of the structure of the market in which they operate, 
have constant costs (Figure 2.3), average total cost (LRATC) will equal marginal cost 
(LRMC). 
In a perfectly competitive market, consumer surplus, defined as consumers' total 
benefits (OPCQc) minus the amount consumers are willing to pay for consumption 
(0 Pc C Qc ), is PC pc. In contrast, consumer surplus in an imperfectly competitive 
market is PAPM. This is because price increases (from pc to PM) and output decreases 
(from Qc to QM) compared with the perfectly competitive market. 
Market power thus reduces Marshall's measure of consumer surplus by an 
amount equal to pM AC pc. If the area pM AB pc is monopoly profit that has been 
transferred from consumers to producers, then the net loss to welfare (deadweight loss) 
attributable to imperfect competition is ABc.11 
11 It can also be argued that if the profit of a monopoly is obtained through rent seeking activities, the 
cost of rent seeking should be regarded as a welfare loss (Krueger 1974; Posner 1975). 
15 
ABC indicates the area of allocative inefficiency, since price (AQM) exceeds 
marginal cost (BQM) at output QM. At the point of equilibrium for the imperfectly 
competitive market (QM), the market is allocatively inefficient: the market is not 
allocating sufficient resources to production of the good. The drawback or costs of 
monopoly power are thus a relatively high price for a lower than desirable output, and a 
mix of goods that does not accurately reflect consumer demand. To achieve efficient 
resource allocation, more resources would need to be allocated to the production of the 
good (see Appendix 2.1 for a summary of empirical studies on the welfare effects of 
monopoly). 
FIGURE 2.3: WELFARE COSTS OF MARKET POWER 
Price 
0 
Although the analysis has been simplified by assuming constant costs, the essential 
conclusion is unaffected. The extent of the welfare reduction depends on the price 
elasticity of demand for the product and on the difference between monopoly and 
competitive prices. It can be argued that price discrimination will correct distortion 
(increase allocative efficiency) caused by a monopoly (McKenzie 1951). If the 
monopolist can fully segregate his market based on the correct demand curve, he will 
expand output from the restricted position (QM) to the socially optimum point (Qc). 
However, the price discrimination approach is not necessarily the best solution to 
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allocative inefficiency because transactional costs ( a cost for identifying the true 
demand curve, for example) may be greater than the corresponding increase in allocative 
efficiency (Williamson 1987). 
Domestic Market Power and Protection 
As noted earlier, if price exceeds marginal cost, then allocative inefficiency and Pareto 
inefficiency occur. The price-cost margin is widely accepted as an index of market 
power (Lerner 1934 ). 
While it has been demonstrated that import competition generally limits market 
power, the influence of exports on domestic competition is ambiguous (Jacquemin 1982; 
Lyon 1981; Pugel 1980). In a perfectly competitive market, the price-cost margin will be 
zero regardless of the threat of imports. In an imperfectly competitive market with 
imports, the price-cost margin will be driven to zero by the presence of competition from 
imports, which restrain the market power of domestic firms. 
Figure 2.4 demonstrates how imports (homogeneous with domestic goods) can 
reduce domestic monopoly power in a small, open economy, depending on the domestic 
firm's cost function and the level of import tariffs. If the cost function of a domestic 
monopoly is higher than MC1 , the domestic firm cannot enjoy a complete monopoly. 
For instance, a monopoly with a cost function of MC3 will produce Q2 , and hence the 
price of the good it produces will be P3 in an autarky. However, if the world price is P*, 
the monopoly will have to accept that price and adopt the same behaviour as competitive 
firms. Thus output from the domestic firm will be Q1 , and Q4 - Q1 will be imported. 
The new price in the domestic market will then be P* ( = P1 ); which is lower than the 
autarky price( P3 ). In addition, if the marginal cost is MC2 , the monopoly is prevented 
from exploiting fully the monopoly price, P2 • Similarly, the level of domestic tariffs is 
also important, as import prices are influenced by tariff levels. 
If the Cournot-Nash assumption is not allowed, the results may prove to be 
positive. Under the Cournot-Nash assumption, foreign firms do not react at all to 
changes in a domestic firm's output. The relationship between imports and domestic 
market power is not negative, however, if domestic firms act to maintain their market 
shares in the belief that only foreign firms exhibit perfectly collusive behaviour (Urata 
1984). If, on the other hand, domestic firms believe that all rivals (domestic and foreign) 
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follow perfect collusion, then imports will not affect the price-cost margin. If domestic 
producers are themselves agents for competing imports or have direct control over 
imports (as is the case with multinational firms), then imports will no longer act as a 
restraint on market power. The results of many empirical tests suggest that large-scale 
imports by developed countries do in fact act to restrict market power in the home 
market (Lyon 1981). 
FIGURE 2.4: FOREIGN IMPORTS AND DOMESTIC MARKET POWER 
Price 
MR 
Output 
Predicting the effects of exporting on domestic competition is much less 
straightforward, and depends in large part on the ability of firms within an industry to 
isolate national markets from each other (Pugel 1980). Assuming a small open economy 
with a perfectly elastic demand for exports (Krugman et al. 1991), the volume of exports 
will then depend on the level of the domestic firm's (marginal) costs and the international 
price of the good. Exporting is likely to constrain the price-cost margin in integrated 
national markets as long as the marginal cost is not decreasing. If dumping is not 
allowed, an exporting domestic monopoly will become a price-taker in a competitive 
world market, and competition will constrain the domestic monopolist to adopt 
competitive behaviour. Like a competitive industry, a monopolist will produce until 
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marginal cost equals marginal revenue (world price). It will sell Q2 to the domestic 
market and export Q3 - Q2 , as shown in Figure 2.5. 
FIGURE 2.5: EXPORTS AND DOMESTIC COMPETITION 
Price 
Q3 Output 
If a domestic industry is highly concentrated and price discrimination is possible, 
a monopoly will sell only quantity Q1 at price PM to the domestic market, and export Q3 
- Q1• Hence the possibility of exporting increases the possibility of domestic 
misallocation of resources (through an increase in the price-cost margin) under a 
monopoly (Jacquemin 1982). If the demand elasticity of the world market is more elastic 
and dumping is allowed, dumping increases total profit but may depress the weighted 
average price-cost margin from domestic sales and exports (Pugel 1980). However, 
exporting may also increase a firm's production capacity, thereby allowing it to produce 
on a more efficient scale; in this sense, exporting may have a positive effect on a firm's 
profitability (Cowling 1976). 
Competition and X - Efficiency 
It is commonly believed that monopolists do not operate as efficiently as competitive 
firms (Leibenstein 1966). Leibenstein and Maital (1994) showed, based on 
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organisational learning and game theory, the persistence of X-inefficiency even when its 
existence and causes are recognised and when everyone involved stands to gain from its 
reduction or removal. In a perfectly competitive market, in which the market price of 
goods reflects the efficiency of firms, a firm knows that it can improve its production 
efficiency if its production costs are high relative to the equilibrium price. It is difficult 
for a firm operating in an imperfectly competitive market to monitor its own efficiency, 
as market price fails to reflect efficiency in this market. 
Neoclassical Theory and X-Ejficiency 
In neoclassical economic theory, a firm is assumed to maximise output for a given level 
of inputs; or to minimise costs for a given level of output. The thick line (Q) in the upper 
part of Figure 2.6 shows maximum output for any given level of inputs. All 
combinations of inputs occur on the average total cost (ATC) line, satisfying the cost 
minimisation assumption (Figure 2.6, lower part). Since output is assumed to be 
maximised according to the firm's given cost function, the level of output will 
automatically be known if the quantity and quality of inputs and technology are known. 
Under these conditions, firms are assumed to be internally efficient. 
However, the theory of X-efficiency suggests that firms do not necessarily 
produce according to their production function. The theory attempts to incorporate to a 
greater extent the psychological basis of a worker's efforts, as well as how the individual 
is affected by the surrounding group. In particular, an imperfectly competitive firm may 
not achieve maximum output for a given cost, or minimise costs at a given output, 
because of lack of competition. 
Figure 2.6 also shows the production function (upper part) and the cost function 
(lower part) under X-efficiency. As seen in the upper part of Figure 2.6, a firm may 
produce at point A in the shaded area of production possibilities, rather than producing 
the maximum possible output, C (Q* ), for a given input, X~. Alternatively, the firm may 
use more than the minimum input, X2 , by ( X~ -X2 ) to produce a given output, Q1• From 
the cost minimising aspect, this implies that the firm's costs (A') are above the minimum 
level (B'). In Figure 2.6 (lower part), a firm producing a given output, Q1, needs to 
produce at point B to achieve minimum cost. However, as X-inefficient firms use more 
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than the minimum level of inputs, their average total costs will be higher (ATC') than the 
optimum (ATC). 
FIGURE 2.6: X-INEFFICIENCY, PRODUCTION AND COST FUNCTION 
Q* Output 
Cost 
Output 
X- Efficiency and Allocative Efficiency 
In an imperfectly competitive environment, a firm with an observed long-run marginal 
cost function of (LRATC2=LRMC2 ) will produce the level of output shown by Q1 in 
Figure 2. 7, where marginal revenue (MR) is equal to marginal cost and price is P1• In 
this case, the allocative inefficiency represented by deadweight loss will be abc. 
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However, the observed marginal cost function is not necessarily at the minimum 
level in an imperfectly competitive market. If we take X-inefficiency into account, the 
minimum possible long-run marginal cost function ( LRATC1 = LRMC1 ) will be lower 
than the observed long-run marginal cost. The actual deadweight loss, therefore, is ade 
(abc + bcde). In addition, the rectangleP3bd P4 represents unnecessary costs. 
FIGURE 2.7: ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY AND X-EFFICIENCY 
Price 
Quantity 
Some theoretical conditions need to be present for X-inefficiency to exist 
(Leibenstein 1966; Frantz 1988). The first is that labour contracts are incomplete: while 
the payment portion of the labour contract is clearly spelled out, performance is not. The 
second condition is that the production function is not completely specified or known. 
Thus firms do not always know in advance the quantity of output that will be produced 
from given inputs and input ratios. 
Third, the motivation of management to produce or obtain inputs at the minimum 
possible cost is not equal. While X-efficiency theory does not disallow rational 
behaviour, it is assumed that rational decision-making behaviour will not always be 
exhibited. 
Fourth, firms tend to imitate rather than compete with other firms. Their costs are 
then influenced by the performance of other firms or the level of costs in the industry. 
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The shape of the average total cost curve becomes a thick band, rather than a thin line, 
with the cost of producing a certain level of output varying within this band according to 
managers' or workers' motivation to reduce inefficiency and the pressure to compete with 
other firms. On the other hand, an increase in knowledge about efficient production 
methods will shift the entire average total cost curve downwards. 
Costs of Protection 
Many economists have stated that protection induces organisational slack and increases 
the likelihood of X-inefficiency (Corden 1970, 1974; Bergsman 1974; Martin 1978; 
Vousden 1991; Vousden et al. 1993). Their main argument is that, under protection, 
firms do not try to reduce production costs. 
Corden (1970, 1974) using a partial equilibrium framework, demonstrated how 
tariffs can reduce managerial effort in the import-competing sector.12 Corden assumed 
that income effects predominate over substitution effects, that an increase in tariffs raises 
profits and that leisure is not an inferior good. Efficiency is assumed to depend on 
managerial effort, the cost of this effort being forgone leisure. Without any restrictions 
on trade, the equilibrium is found at E in Figure 2.8, where the indifference curve I is at a 
tangent to the profit curve orr. At the equilibrium, profits are 0 P, produced by 
managerial effort OL. 
When tariffs increase or are newly imposed, the profit curve can be expected to 
shift from orr to o7f. The new equilibrium becomes E', with managerial effort of OL' 
and profit of OP'. Compared to the initial equilibrium, E, managerial effort has decreased 
by OL - OL', increasing X-inefficiency to the new equilibrium, E'. 
In principle, the new equilibrium will lie to the left of the initial equilibrium, as 
long as the substitution effects of effort are large enough to dominate over the income 
effects. However, a backward bending labour supply curve is commonly assumed in 
economics. It has been shown that protection increases X-inefficiency even without the 
assumption of a backward bending labour supply (Vousden 1991). 
Although protection results in managerial slack and a rise in X-inefficiency, the 
effects of protection on welfare are still controversial. If the costs arising from X-
l2 Similar results were obtained using a general equilibrium framework (Martin 1978). 
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inefficiency are borne by managers, there is no additional social cost other than 
deadweight loss, as reduced effort translates into extra leisure. In certain situations, 
however, a tariff-induced increase in X-inefficiency may still result in welfare losses 
(Martin 1978). In a second-best world with income and commodity taxes, the social 
opportunity cost of leisure will be greater than the private opportunity cost. Managerial 
effort involves a large social benefit which is not reflected in private benefit, in that it 
creates jobs for others. We should also consider the dynamic aspects of the issue: the 
need for managers to keep abreast of modern technology, to be flexible and to maintain 
the capacity to introduce new ideas and technology to improve the plant's long-run 
growth prospects. 
FIGURE 2.8: PROTECTION AND X-INEFFICIENCY 
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Some economists have criticised the theory of X-efficiency. Stigler ( 197 6) argued 
that firms always achieve the constrained objective function. He explained differences in 
output between firms as being a result of structure, utility functions, transaction costs and 
other circumstances. 
Critics also attack the assumption that individuals are not fully rational decision 
makers. According to this argument, laziness of workers is not necessarily a cause of X-
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inefficiency but a component of the welfare: leisure argument.13 This criticism is based 
on the view that laziness is not slack but leisure. Rising costs resulting from a reduction 
in effort as workers pursue leisure should be attributed not to inefficiency, but to rational 
behaviour by employees since leisure is a rational worker's preference. If leisure is a 
benefit of monopoly power, the firm will, by definition, always be on the production 
frontier, minimising avoidable costs. In such a situation, only allocative inefficiency can 
exist. 
The leisure argument is not, however, robust (Frantz 1992). If leisure is a benefit 
of monopoly power and all profits become leisure, a per-unit subsidy on output (which 
would result in an increase in output) could increase allocative efficiency (consumer 
surplus) and welfare (leisure). The benefits of a subsidy could thus over-ride its cost, 
contradicting to the traditional criticism of subsidy in a monopolistic market. Although 
leisure is a legitimate concept in understanding firm behaviour, Leibenstein assumed that 
individuals are at least capable of making, ex ante and ex post, avoidable errors 
(including unnecessary laziness, inappropriate behaviour and habitual actions). 
Imperfect Competition Coupled with Scale Economies, Protection and Welfare 
In evaluating the structure of an industry, economies of scale give rise to a difficult 
trade-off between competition and efficiency.14 The analyses above are mainly based on 
market equilibrium within the neoclassical paradigm. Economies of scale would imply a 
market in disequilibrium. There is no perfect solution, and a compromise may be 
necessary. 
When fixed costs are high enough to force average costs to decline, then the first 
condition of efficiency, that price equals marginal cost, means that the firm will suffer a 
net loss, assuming that marginal cost is independent of quantity produced. Figure 2.9 
shows the incongruity of a firm's profit-maximising behaviour and economic efficiency. 
Efficiency requires that price equals marginal cost. However, because of fixed costs, 
l3 A variation on this is that higher costs are due to rent-seeking and should be regarded as unavoidable 
(see Frantz 1992). 
14 Another trade-off in income distribution between producer and consumer surplus is the Williamson 
trade-off. This chapter focuses instead, though, on whether national welfare will increase or decrease 
when government policy or market structure changes. 
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marginal cost (MC) is below average cost (AC), and the economically efficient output 
level Q* results in the firm suffering a loss equal to fixed cost. If marginal cost increases 
according to the quantity produced, the loss will be producer surplus minus fixed costs. 
FIGURE 2.9: ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 
Price 
d 
Q' Quantity 
As part of its policy for resolving the incongruity between a firm's profit 
maximising behaviour and economic efficiency, the government may nationalise the 
firm and ensure that price is equal to marginal cost, with a compensating measure 
(subsidy from taxes) to allow for losses resulting from marginal cost pricing. This is one 
way of achieving efficient resource allocation (as price equals marginal cost) and income 
distribution: as the effect on consumer surplus is maximised at Q*, any point other than 
the equilibrium will reduce consumer plus producer surplus. However, X-inefficiency 
tends to occur in an imperfectly competitive industry or public enterprise. The empirical 
literature shows that, in general, private firms are more efficient than public corporations, 
even among industries with high fixed costs, such as electricity, water and railroads 
(Weimer 1992). 
Alternatively, if entry/exit is unrestricted and without cost, then price will fall to 
average cost: there will be no net profits. As noted with the monopolistic competition 
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model, scale economies are sacrificed when the number of firms operating in a market is 
increased in order to foster competition. In terms of resource allocation, this is a second 
best choice. With free entry/exit of firms, the number of firms entering a market need not 
equal the socially desirable number. Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) showed that in a 
monopolistically competitive market, free entry can result in too little entry relative to 
the social optimum. It has been demonstrated that in general the number of firms at the 
free-entry equilibrium exceeds the optimal number of firms for maximising welfare 
( Mankiw and Whinston 1986; Suzumura et al. 1987). 
One justification for encouraging a more monopolistic structure is that this helps 
achieve scale economies, which can be exploited more fully when there are fewer firms 
in the market. Figure 2.10 shows how scale economies can improve national welfare as 
a perfectly competitive market becomes monopolistic. It is assumed that marginal costs 
are constant (thus the supply curve is horizontal). 
FIGURE 2.10: ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND NATIONAL WELFARE 
Price 
MC( supply) 
Q Q' Quantity 
If there are no economies of scale in an imperfectly competitive market (constant 
costs are the same as in a competitive market}, imperfect competition will result in a loss 
of national welfare (abc). However, if the monopolistic firm can combine scale 
economies with a declining average cost (AC}, it may be able to lower its prices from P' 
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to P" and increase output from Q to Q'. If the scale effect is large enough, then producer 
surplus (profit= P"a'JH) will be greater than the fall in consumer surplus (a'b'c). In such 
a case the net social welfare or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency will increase and hence a 
noncompetitive market structure may be preferable. Following Williamson (1968), who 
demonstrated that modest cost savings and an increase in national welfare could be 
achieved by exploiting economies of scale, some economists believe that social welfare 
will be enhanced by protecting incumbent firms from the threat of potential entry 
(Weizsacker 1980; Besanko et al. 1993).15 
This does not mean that a monopolistic market structure is the optimum 
(Cockerill 1977; Stigler 1982; Waterson 1984). Economies of scale cannot always justify 
the restriction of competition, as inefficient resource allocation will exist as long as the 
monopolistic firm's price exceeds marginal cost. Monopoly profits are often accrued 
through unnecessary rent-seeking behaviour among firms. These profits cannot be 
regarded as constituting social welfare (Krueger 1974; Posner 1975). Lack of 
competition also results in X-inefficiency, while market power brings about a welfare 
loss (Leibenstein 1966). 
Increasing foreign competition, with free entry and exit of inefficient domestic 
firms, can provide an alternative solution to the problem of a trade-off between 
competition and efficiency in an industry with increasing returns to scale, for the 
following reasons. First, foreign firms provide additional competition. When domestic 
firms are motivated to compete, then X-inefficiency can be expected to decrease. If the 
domestic firms that survive increased competition have the same technology as foreign 
firms, they will be able to exploit scale economies, as the number of domestic firms 
operating in the market will have declined. They will not be able to enjoy full monopoly 
power, however. Trade in an imperfectly competitive market (intra-industry trade) also 
raises consumer welfare by increasing the quantity and variety of products available 
(Dixit and Stiglitz 1977).16 Trade liberalisation in an imperfectly competitive market is 
controversial, with some economists advocating strategic trade policy based on rent 
l5 For instance, a monopoly price 20 per cent above the competitive level requires a cost reduction of 
only 4 per cent (when the absolute value of price elasticity of demand is equal to 2) for productive 
efficiency gains to offset the allocative loss. Similarly, Dasgupta et al. (1980) and Stiglitz (1981) 
argued against the widespread belief that an increase in competition will result in an increase in 
welfare. Their arguments, however, are based on scale economies achieved through R&D. 
16 Helpman et al. (1985) provided a mathematical explanation of how foreign trade in an imperfectly 
competitive market can result in welfare gain. 
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shifting between domestic and foreign firms (Katrak 1977; Brander and Spencer 1985; 
Venables 1985; Brander 1986) and others proposing a policy of protection based on 
learning-by-doing effects (Krugman 1984). Further inquiry reveals, however, that the 
results are not robust. A clear strategic trade policy prescription is not robust, since the 
nature and degree of government intervention is highly sensitive to the way in which 
each firm forms its conjectures about opponents' responses (Eaton and Grossman 1986). 
Horstmann and Markusen (1986) demonstrated that tariffs and subsidies result in the 
inefficient entry of firms. Furthermore, in the long run, when there is free entry and exit 
of firms, not all firms can enjoy net profits. 
Second, trade liberalisation gives domestic firms access to the international 
market, enforcing economies of scale. Ethier (1979) described how gaining access to a 
larger market resulted in an expansion of production scale and thus scale economies. 
Whalley with Hill (1985) demonstrated how scale economies can strengthen a country's 
trade gain. Figure 2.11 represents the market for good X. If a country exports to the 
world under downward sloping demand, D1 , then, its total market demand will be the 
horizontally summed domestic market demand and foreign market curve, D1 + Dd. 
FIGURE 2.11: ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND A DECREASE IN PROIBCTION 
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Increasing returns to scale are represented by the downward sloping average cost curve, 
ACd. It is assumed here that producers in this small country set prices according to 
average cost and exhibit monopolistic behaviour.17 
A reduction in trade barriers worldwide will give this country a larger market and 
shift the export demand curve faced by the country's suppliers from D1 to vi. The total 
quantity supplied will increase to Q2 , and the price charged by the country's suppliers 
will fall from P1 to P2 • 
The main benefit created for this country is lower prices for consumers achieved 
through economies of scale. This is represented in Figure 2.11 by Area 1. A further 
benefit to consumers is represented by Area 2 under the demand curve.18 Area 2 shows 
the benefit from increased consumption at a lower price. The lower price is made 
possible by a decrease in average cost resulting from increased output and exports. 
Significantly, the gains this country will make from reduced trade barriers in foreign 
markets accrue through more efficient production, industry rationalisation and cost 
savings.19 Harris (1984) and Wigle (1988), using Canadian data, showed how economies 
of scale increased gains in national welfare under multiple bilateral trade reform. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explained how an increase in competition can raise economic efficiency 
in an imperfectly competitive market and national welfare in an oligopoly with 
economies of scale. Competition or competitive pressure from foreign firms increases 
allocative efficiency in the output market and X-efficiency in production. Although 
controversial, the theory demonstrates that reducing protection in an imperfectly 
competitive market with economies of scale can bring about positive gains in national 
welfare. 
l7 The theory of market structure in the presence of increasing returns to scale suggests that firms' 
behaviour may in practice be different from this. With increasing returns to scale over the whole 
range of output levels, there will be a monopoly that sets a monopoly price by selecting an output 
level at which marginal revenue equals marginal cost, rather than price equals average cost as is 
assumed here. 
18 No producer effects need to be taken into account in this diagram in determining national welfare 
effects, since producers are always assumed to set prices to just cover average costs. 
19 In this case, however, there may not be any benefit to overseas countries from a reduction of trade 
barriers, as the single producer (in Canada, for example) may not keep overseas prices low at all. 
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The chapter provides the theoretical background for three empirical studies of 
Korean manufacturing industry in later chapters. Competition from abroad is regarded as 
restraining the monopoly power of domestic firms in the home market. This import 
discipline hypothesis, derived from analysis of domestic market power and protection, 
will be tested using data from Korean manufacturing. The analysis will show that 
protection increases X-inefficiency. The thesis will look at how protection, and 
quantitative restrictions in particular, can reduce competitive pressure and increase X-
inefficiency in sheltered industries. The potential national welfare gains to be made in an 
oligopoly with economies of scale will also be examined. Our description of national 
welfare and the theory of the imperfectly competitive market provide the foundation for 
formulating a model that reflects oligopolistic firms' behaviour and the welfare effect of 
increased foreign competition on individual economic behaviour. 
31 
APPENDIX 2.1: SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF 
MONOPOLY 
Author Period Country Welfare loss 
Harberger ( 19 54) 1924-8 USA 0.1 
Schwartzman (1960) 1954 USA 0.1 
Kamerschen ( 1966) 1956-61 USA 5.4-7.6 
Bell (1968) 1954 USA 0.02-0.04 
Shepherd (1970) 1960-9 USA 2.0-3.0 
Cowling and Mueller (1978) 1963-6 USA 4.0-13.1 
Masson and Shanan (1984) 1950-66 USA 2.9 
Jones and Laudadio (1978) 1965-7 Canada 3.7 
Cowling and Mueller (1978) 1968-9 UK 3.9-7.2 
Wahlroos (1984) 1970-9 Finland 0.2-0.6 
Jenny and Weber (1983) 1967-70 France 0.13-8.85 
1971-4 France 0.21 
Pezzoli (1985) 1982-3 Italy 0.4-9.4 
Funahashi (1982) 1980 Japan 0.02-3.0 
Oh (1986) 1983 Korea 1.16-6.75 
Ong'olo (1987) 1977 Kenya 0.26-4.4 
Source: Ferguson et al. (1994). 
3 The Market Structure of Korean 
Manufacturing 
Introduction 
32 
Korean manufacturing industry is generally regarded as being highly concentrated 
(Uekusa 1987; Lee et al 1990) and oligopolistic.1 
In the 1970s, the Korean government adopted an economic strategy to expand the 
scale of the economy as quickly as possible, emphasising manufacturing over agriculture 
and large-size corporations over small-size corporations. The heavy and chemical 
industries dominated by large firms received various favours, including protection and 
subsidies. 
The government's economic policy also resulted in further acceleration of 
economic concentration (Lee et al. 1986). Other side-effects of its policies were an 
oligopolistic market structure and disruption of market functions. Although new policy 
directions led to a decline in the traditional concentration ratio in the 1980s, these did not 
dramatically alter the competitive environment (Leipziger et al. 1993). 
The main objective of this chapter is to review the market structure and 
competitiveness of Korean manufacturing, as an introduction to the empirical work of 
later chapters. Following the review based on the three-firm concentration ratio, the 
concentration ratio will be recalculated taking imports and exports into account. 
Review of Competition Policy in Korean Manufacturing 
Korean Manufacturing Industry Structure 
Table 3.1 shows the composition of gross domestic product (GDP) at 1985 constant price 
in Korea between 1970 and 1990. The table shows that the share of manufacturing in 
GDP increased continuously from 13.9 per cent in 1970 to 33.6 per cent in 1990. The 
1 According to Kim (1991), over 70 per cent of all manufacturing establishments existing in 1975 were 
relatively young, less than ten years old. Only about 5 per cent of the total was existed before the 
Korean war broke out in 1950. In 1975, these young establishments employed about 63 per cent of 
total manufacturing workers and produced about 55 per cent of total manufacturing output. 
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table indicates that manufacturing is one of the largest sectors, comprising about 25.1 per 
cent of GDP throughout the period. 
The table shows that the relative importance of the agriculture, forestry and 
fishery sectors has significantly decreased while that of the service sector has 
continuously increased. Between 1970 and 1990, the ratio of the agriculture, forestry and 
fishery sector declined dramatically, from 28.2 per cent to 7.8 per cent, while that of 
services increased from 34.6 per cent to 43.7 per cent. The table also indicates that the 
share of mining and the government sector have continuously decreased over the period. 
TABLE 3.1: COMPOSITION OF GDP BY SECTOR, 1970-90 (%) 
Sector 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 
Agriculture, forestry, fishery 28.2 23.4 14.4 12.8 7.8 
Mining 2.0 1.9 1.5 1.0 0.5 
Construction 5.8 5.7 7.8 7.7 8.8 
Manufacturing 13.9 20.6 27.0 30.3 33.6 
Services 34.6 36.9 39.7 41.0 43.7 
Government 15.5 11.5 9.7 7.2 5.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Note: At 1985 constant price. 
Source: National Accounts, Bank of Korea, various issues. 
According to Sak:ong (1980), the increase in the share of manufacturing industry 
was due mainly to an expansion in the size of existing firms rather than entry of new 
firms. In 1970-77, employment and value-added in manufacturing increased 2.2 times 
and 4 times respectively, while the number of firms in the sector increased by only 11.1 
per cent. This disproportion in the size of existing firms resulted in a rise in industrial 
concentration. 
Review of Competition Policy 
From the mid 1980s, Korean industrial policy changed from industry-specific protection 
to a functional approach and liberalisation. During the development period, high 
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protection and financial subsidies were important features of Korean industrial policy.2 
In particular, government intervention increased considerably in the heavy and chemical 
industries from 1973. The heavy and chemical industries policy was designed to cope 
with decreasing comparative advantage in light industries resulting from wage increases 
and to strengthen the industrial base of the economy to enhance national security.3 
Figure 3.1 shows that both tariffs and quantitative restrictions (QRs) remained 
high until the early 1980s. The figure shows that in the 1970s quantitative restrictions 
were strengthened whereas average tariffs, obtained by averaging regular and special 
tariffs, generally decreased.4 
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FIGURE 3.1: TREND OF PROTECTION IN KOREA(%) 
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Note: Effective protection rate was for manufacturing. Average tariffs (regular and 
special tariffs) and liberalisation of QRs were for all industries. 
Data Source: Appendix 3.1 
In 1993 the average tariff rates was 7.1 per cent for finished goods, 7 per cent for intermediate inputs 
and 2.8 per cent for raw materials. 
After the withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam, the Korean government feared that the same might 
happen to Korea. 
Liberalisation of QRs is based both on the government's trade program and special laws (Kim 1987). 
In 1967 the semi-annual trade program was changed from a positive-list to a negative-list system. 
Only those items listed in the program could be imported with or without government approval under 
the positive-list system, while all items not listed were automatically approved under the negative-list 
system. According to a government proposal (White Paper of '88 Tariff Schedule Revision, MOF 
1989), the remaining QRs (mainly on agricultural imports) will be reduced to the level permitted by 
GATT BOP Article XVIII:B waiver. 
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According to Kim (1993), the overall degree of import liberalisation for Korea did not 
change for 10 years after 1967 (Appendix 3.1).5 Figure 3.1 also implies that actual 
liberalisation of both tariffs and QRs has occurred since the early 1980s. In spite of the 
general decreasing trend in the 1980s, the protection rate in Korea remained high 
compared to other major developed countries. The average tariff for Korea was 34.4 per 
cent in 1980 and 14.1 per cent in 1990. The average tariff in industrialised countries 
(USA, Japan and EC) was 8 per cent in 1980 and 5 per cent in 1990 (EPAC 1991). The 
average of the Corden (Balassa) effective protection rate for manufacturing increased 
from -4.6 per cent (-5.3 per cent) in 1975 to 21.9 per cent (26.1 per cent) in 1980 (Figure 
3.1).6 
Financial subsidies were another important measure in Korean industrial policy. 
The government intervened selectively, especially in the 1970s, in resource allocation to 
implement the heavy and chemical industries policy, which began in 1973.7 In contrast to 
the 1960s, the financial subsidy policy became more industry specific after the mid 
1970s.8 In particular, the National Investment Fund (NIF) was established in 1973 to 
support heavy and chemical industries. The fund was financed by various sources 
including banks, insurance companies and the government (through bonds). NIF 
finances were mainly used to establish industrial areas, buy domestic machinery and 
facilitate investment and exports. The government also increased its direct control over 
the banking system to finance investment in the heavy and chemical industries; the line 
between commercial and specialised banks thus became blurred, as both served as 
instruments of government credit policy. In addition, the government borrowed from 
overseas markets and guaranteed the private sector's foreign loans. 
Table 3.2 shows that financial subsidies were in general given to large firms 
rather than small and medium firms, to heavy and chemical industries rather than light 
industry, and to export oriented industry rather than import-substitution industry. 
5 
6 
7 
8 
The overall degree of import liberalisation was obtained by averaging the inverted total tariff and the 
degree of liberalisation of QRs. 
The effective protection rate can be negative if intermediate goods are highly protected. The negative 
sign of the effective protection rate in 1975 was mainly due to price control by the government, 
which affected the nominal protection rate. Thus, the small and negative effective protection rate 
resulted from distortion of the price mechanism rather than a lower level of protection. 
Industries designated as important included iron and steel, non-ferrous metal, shipbuilding, general 
machinery, chemicals, electronics, and others designated by the president. 
Until the early 1970s financial subsidy policy emphasised export activity rather than specific 
industries. 
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TABLE 3.2: RATIO OF DEBT TO TOTAL ASSETS AND AVERAGE INTEREST RATES OF 
LARGE FIRMS AND SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED FIRMS(%) 
1973-81 1982-86 1987-90 
Debt/Total Asset 
Manufacturing 40.4 31.5 27.7 
Large Firms (x1) 40.9 31.6 27.0 
Small and Medium Firms (x2) 32.7 31.3 31.4 
X1-X2 8.2 0.3 -4.4 
Heavy and chemical industry (x3) 40.7 32.2 28.2 
Light industry (x4 ) 39.8 30.3 27.0 
X3-X4 0.9 1.9 1.2 
Export industry (x5) 45.1 35.9 30.3 
Import-substitute industry (x6 ) 37.6 28.8 26.3 
X5-X6 7.5 7.1 4.0 
Average Interest Rate 
Manufacturing 13.3 14.0 13.0 
Large Firms (y1) 13.0 14.0 12.6 
Small and Medium Firms (y2 ) 14.9 14.2 14.3 
Y1-Y2 -1.9 -0.2 -1.7 
Heavy and chemical industries (y3 ) 12.1 13.5 12.7 
Light industry (y4 ) 14.9 14.9 13.5 
y3-y4 -2.8 -1.4 -0.8 
Export industry (y5 ) 12.6 12.7 12.6 
Import-substitute industry (y6 ) 14.0 14.8 13.2 
Ys-Y6 -1.4 -2.1 -0.6 
Source: Kim 1992. 
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In contrast to Taiwan, the Korean government strongly encouraged the 
establishment of large firms to take advantage of scale economies. In 1973-81, the 
difference in loan availability, measured by the ratio of debt to total assets, between large 
firms and small and medium firms was 8.2 per cent. However, loan policy changed in 
1987 in favour of small and medium firms. Until the balance of payments became 
positive in 1987, export industry was favoured both in terms of loans and average interest 
rates, defined as financial costs/(bonds+foreign loans+loans from domestic financial 
institutions). 
The leverage of heavy and chemical industries was higher than light industry. 
Considering the higher risks of heavy and chemical industries than light industry, the low 
average interest rate for heavy and chemical industries implies that interest subsidies for 
heavy and chemical industries were considerably higher than those for light industry in 
1973-90. Given the imperfect capital market, the financial subsidy for strategic industries 
or firms was a powerful policy tool. The distorted allocation of investment funds 
favoured large firms and accelerated industry concentration in Korea (see Chapter 4). 
While protection and subsidy policies were implemented, until recently the 
government failed in its attempts to enact law related to industrial organisation policy. 
After several failed attempts, the Korean government enacted the Price Stabilisation and 
Fair Trade Act in 1974. The major content of the Act was to control prices in the private 
goods market having a monopolistic or oligopolistic industry structure, to lower inflation 
after the first oil shock. Direct price controls resulted in a vicious circle of control and 
decontrol until 1980.9 The Act was also aimed at restricting collusion or conspiracy and 
unfair trade practices. However, the Act has no provisions on competition: restriction of 
unfair trade practices; restriction of monopolisation of markets through corporate 
mergers and other devices; or restriction of unreasonable international agreements 
(Uekusa 1987). 
Because of the economic recession in the late 1970s, and recognising the 
importance of constructing a balanced inter-industry structure, the government 
(Economic Planning Board) enacted the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Bill in 
9 In actuality, direct price control resulted in decreasing investment, prevalence of price discrimination, 
stagnant of productivity and increased administrative costs. Thus the government temporarily lifted 
price controls in 1979 but controlled prices again in 1980 because of an increase in prices by 
monopolists. 
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December 1980.10 The Bill emphasises an improvement in the market structure by 
promoting fair competition among businesses, enhancing the role of the market 
mechanism in allocating resources, regulating mergers, and prohibiting restraints on 
competition. To enforce the Bill, the Fair Trade Commission was established as one 
division of the Economic Planning Board. With the enactment of the Industrial 
Development Law in 1985, the government also changed its industry policy from one of 
selective intervention to one of functional intervention. After two revisions of the Bill, 
the government enacted the Fair Trade Law in 1990. The Law aims to improve market 
structure, emphasising the price mechanism. However, corrections of and warnings about 
monopolistic behaviour between 1981and1990 by the Commission were confined more 
to unfair business practices (57.6 per cent) and unreasonable international agreements 
(35.4 per cent) than to corporate combinations (6.8 per cent) and abuse of a dominant 
market power (0.3 per cent) (Appendix 3.2). 
Market Structure of Korean Manufacturing 
Overall Concentration 
Before examining the level of domestic production concentration in individual 
manufacturing industries, overall (aggregate) concentration in manufacturing will be 
reviewed briefly. Overall concentration refers to the proportion of output or sales 
accounted for by a small number of dominant firms in the manufacturing sector as a 
whole (Utton 1971). Thus it shows the relative importance of large and small firms. In 
developing countries, the level of aggregate concentration is important because it affects 
the discretionary political process to allocate resources favourably to large firms in all 
product markets. 
Table 3.3 shows that a small number of large firms, 50 to 100 in all, has 
consistently dominated the Korean manufacturing sector. The table shows that aggregate 
concentration in manufacturing in Korea increased significantly between the mid 1970s 
and early 1980s, then decreased during 1982-87. The ratios for the 50 (100) largest firms 
increased from 32.9 per cent (43.6 per cent) in 1974 to 37.5 per cent (46.8 per cent) in 
1 O The second oil shock and political instability caused by the assassination of President Park are major 
reasons for the economic recession. 
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1982. However, the ratio for the 50 (100) largest firms decreased from 37.5 per cent 
(46.8 per cent) in 1982 to 30.9 per cent (38.9 per cent) in 1987. 
The overall level of concentration seems to be higher in Korea than in the USA 
and Japan, although the difference in economy size makes direct comparison difficult. 
Table 3.3 indicates that, in 1970, the 50 largest firms' share (in terms of shipments) was 
33.8 per cent in Korea and 24 per cent in the United States. In the mid 1970s, the 100 
largest firms' share was around 44 per cent in Korea and 28 per cent in Japan. According 
to De Jong (1988) the share of the 50 (100) largest firms' share in the GDP in the EEC 
was 23.3 per cent (29.5 per cent) in 1986. 
TABLE 3.3: AGGREGAIB MANUFACTURING CONCENTRATION RATIOS BY SHIPMENT, 
1970-87: KOREA, USA, JAPAN AND TAIWAN (%)1 
Korea USA Japan Taiwan 
Top 50firms Top 100 firms Top 100 firms Top 100 firms Top 50 firms Top 100 firms 
1970 33.8 44.6 na na na na 
1972 na na 33 na na na 
1974 32.9 43.6 na na na na 
1975 na na na 28.4 15.8 21.7 
1977 35.0 44.9 33 na 15.2 22.4 
1980 na na na 27.3 16.4 21.9 
1982 37.5 46.8 33 na na na 
1987 30.9 38.9 na na na na 
Notes: 1. Data for the USA are based on value-added. 
2. 'Top 50 firms' and 'top 100 firms' denote respectively the country's largest 50 and 100 firms. 
3. na denotes that data were not available. 
Sources: Lee et al. (1986); Lee and Lee (1990); Jones (1987); Scherer et al. (1990). 
However, it is difficult to come to any normative conclusion from this 
comparison because there is reason to believe that a small open economy will exhibit a 
higher degree of aggregate concentration than a large one. If the scale of establishments, 
enterprises and groups is a function of technological and organisational economies of 
scale which vary only modestly across countries, then a small open economy will 
produce a smaller product mix. This tendency would be particularly marked in an open 
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economy such as Korea where international competition requires units of international 
scale. Figure 3.2 shows the relation between the aggregate manufacturing concentration 
ratio of the 100 largest firms and size of manufacturing industry for selected countries.11 
The figure suggests that the larger the size of manufacturing industry, the lower is 
aggregate concentration. 
FIGURE 3.2: AGGREGATE MANUFACTURING CONCENTRATION BY 100 LARGEST 
FIRMS AND SIZE OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
Aggregate Concentration 
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Notes: 1. Value of intercept and slope is 39.3 and -10.52 respectively. 
2. Horizontal figure denotes the relative size of each country compared to the USA 
(based on constant value). 
3. EC 12 includes Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Gennany(W),Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, UK. 
Data sources: Table 3.3; Ferguson et al. 1994; De Jong 1988; Leaflet from Malaysian Industrial 
Development Authority 1989. 
The aggregate concentration is higher than the slope, indicating that the aggregate 
concentration in Korea is high by international standards (Figure 3.2). The comparison 
with Taiwan, Italy and the UK (other small open economies similar in size to Korea) also 
suggests that the aggregate concentration in Korea is fairly high by international 
standards (Table 3.3). In particular, Table 3.3 shows that the aggregate concentration 
11 The average aggregate concentration ratio for each country is: UK (41 per cent in 1980, 38 per cent 
in 1989); Gennany (37.0 per cent in 1959, 45.6 per cent in 1966); Italy (29.5 per cent in 1963, 37.3 
per cent in 1967); EC12 (24 per cent in 1975, 25 per cent in 1980). 
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ratio in Korea was almost two times higher than it was in Taiwan in the 1970s. In 1977, 
the aggregate concentration ratios of the 50 largest firms were 35 per cent for Korea and 
15.2 per cent for Taiwan. In the same year the ratios of the 100 largest 100 firms were 
44.9 per cent for Korea and 22.4 per cent for Taiwan. 
The reason for the high aggregate concentration in Korean manufacturing is that 
there has been an increase in the level of diversification of large firms. In particular, the 
rapid rise of large business groups, or chaebol, seems to be related to the rise in overall 
concentration ratios (Jones 1987). 
The Chaebol 
A significant feature of Korean industrial organisation is the increasing concentration of 
economic power in the hands of large business groups, or chaebol. Concentration of 
economic power means that a group of companies and their affiliates control the major 
part of economic resources or activity in the overall economy (Lee et al. 1986). The 
characteristics of chaebol are concentration of ownership in one person or family having 
conglomerate power.12 The 30 largest groups' average ratio of mutual investment, 
defined as investment from affiliated firms/total capital of affiliated firms, was 46.5 per 
cent in 1984.13 The chaebol, though based in different industries, are bound together by a 
variety of monopolistic affiliations. 
In Korea, the share of chaebol in GDP has been consistently high (Table 3.4). 
Between 1973 and 1978, the average share of the five largest groups was 5.6 per cent. In 
the same period, the share of the largest 46 groups was 13 per cent. Table 3.4 also shows 
the share of shipments of the largest chaebol between 1973 and 1978. There is a clear 
correlation over time between aggregate concentration and the growth of chaebol. The 
chaebol's share of GDP increased rapidly in 1976 and 1977 and remained high in 1978. 
This trend is consistent with the increase in the aggregate concentration ratio (especially 
of the 50 largest firms) between 1974 and 1977 (Table 3.3). The share of chaebol 
shipments increased between 1977 and 1982 and decreased slightly between 1982 and 
12 Chaebol are distinguished from zaibatsu and keiretsu in that banks constitute the core of the latter 
groups. Although this is not the case for chaebol, they have increased their share of major banks in 
Korea since government-owned banks were privatised in 1981. 
13 The ratio declined to 31.5 per cent in 1987 due to the enforcement of the Fair Trade Law. 
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1987. The aggregate concentration ratio of the 50 and 100 largest firms followed a 
similar trend over the same period. 
In Table 3.4, the trend by share of shipments between 1977 and 1987 reveals two 
interesting features of the data. One is that the share of chaebol increased between 1977 
and 1982 and decreased afterward. In particular, the share of the five largest groups 
increased considerably, from 15.7 per cent in 1977 to 22.6 per cent in 1982. The second 
is that since 1982 a gap between the largest and smaller chaebol has started to emerge. 
Between 1982 and 1987, the share of the five largest chaebol decreased slightly, from 
22. 6 per cent to 22 per cent, while that of the 6-30 largest groups decreased from 18.1 
per cent to 15.3 per cent (Lee et al. 1990). 
TABLE 3.4: CHAEBOL'S SHARE OF GDP AND SHIPMENTS 
Share of GDP Share of Shipments 
Number 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 Average 1977 1982 1987 
of for 1973-
chaebol 78 
Top5 3.5 3.8 4.7 5.1 8.2 8.1 5.6 15.7 22.6 22.0 
Top 10 5.1 5.6 7.1 7.2 10.6 10.9 7.8 21.2 30.2 28.2 
Top20 7.1 7.8 9.8 9.4 13.3 14.0 10.2 29.3 36.6 33.9 
Top30 na na na na na na na 34.1 40.7 37.3 
Top46 9.8 10.3 12.3 12.3 16.3 17.1 13.0 na na na 
Notes: 1. The largest five groups in 1977-82 were Hyundae, Samsung, Lucky-Gold Star, Sunkyong 
and Daewoo. 
2. na denotes data were not available. 
Sources: Jones (1978); Lee at al. (1990) 
Not only has the share of chaebol in GDP remained high, their growth rates 
(based on value-added) were higher than average between 1973 and 1978 (Table 3.5). In 
this same period, the 46 largest chaebol grew at a real compound annual rate of 24.2 per 
cent, while the economy as a whole grew at 9.9 per cent, the non-agricultural economy at 
11.8 per cent and manufacturing at 17 .2 per cent. The table also shows that the larger 
groups grew much more rapidly than the smaller groups. The real compound annual 
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growth rates of the five largest groups was 31.6 per cent, compared with only 14.1 per 
cent for the smallest 25 groups. 
The chaebol represent the legacy of the Korean government's strategic industry 
policy. A comparative institutional advantage over other firms in economic organisation 
and favourable government policy are regarded as important sources of chaebol growth 
(Jones 1987).14 Chaebol are not only a natural consequence of economic growth; they 
have also proved adept at exploiting disequilibrium in the credit market (Lee et al. 1990). 
In 1975-79, the 30 largest groups acquired 355 affiliated companies (152 new 
establishment, 173 by acquisition and 30 by merger) through government favours (Lee 
1991). 
TABLE 3.5: REAL COMPOUND ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF CHAEBOL AND THE 
KOREAN ECONOMY, 1973-78 
ChaebolGroups Per cent 
1-5 31.6 
6-10 24.2 
11-20 21.2 
21-46 14.1 
1-46 24.2 
Economy 9.9 
Non-Agricultural Economy 11.8 
Manufacturing 17.2 
Source: Jones (1978). 
Chaebol can be regarded as part of a larger problem of aggregate concentration. 
Their power is such that they can distort the product market and distort - or benefit 
from exogenous distortions in -- factor markets (Jones 1987). Although chaebol 
contributed to increasing exports, their position as monopolistic or oligopolistic firms can 
14 According to Jones (1987), the pursuit of technological economies at the establishment level is not a 
major factor in the growth of chaebol. For instance, value-added shares shifted dramatically in favour 
of larger establishments during the 1960s but then remained basically unchanged during the 1970s, 
while large chaebol groups' shares rose dramatically during the 1970s. Employment and investment 
shares show a similar trend. 
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also cause organisational problems.15 The concentration of economic power in chaebol 
also has important implications for industry policy, since the industry concentration ratio 
as measured by the traditional concentration index may be biased downward. When 
individual firms are in fact operating under the umbrella of a chaebol, the traditional 
concentration index will underestimate the level of industry concentration, especially in 
industries with strong inter- and intra-industry links. 
Trends in Industrial Concentration 
The industry concentration ratio refers to concentration within an industry, and is defined 
as the proportion of total industry output produced by the industry's largest three or four 
firms (Utton 1971). The concentration ratio of the three largest firms (CR3), which is 
calculated in the Census of Manufactures, is the most commonly cited index in study of 
Korean economy. The Act Concerning Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade uses CR3 to 
define market-dominant firms. Because of the lack of other data, this study will begin by 
using CR3 to describe the market structure of Korean manufacturing between 1966 and 
1987. 
Table 3.6 compares the distribution of Korean and US manufacturing industries 
by concentration ratio. The measure is based on the proportion of industry shipments 
accounted for by the three (Korea) or four (USA) largest firms. Although Korean 
manufacturing is small compared to US manufacturing, it is more concentrated. In 
particular, the ratios of highly concentrated industries, defined as 60 :::; CR :::; 100, is much 
higher in Korea than in the USA. The ratio in Korean manufacturing increased from 51.7 
per cent in 1977 to 54.3 per cent in 1981whereas the ratio in the USA decreased from 
21.4 per cent in 1963 to 19.8 per cent in 1982. 
Trends in the average concentration ratio, weighted by value of shipments and 
based on the KSIC five-digit levels of industry classifications, are shown in Figure 3.3 
(see Appendix 3.4 for the data).16 The figure indicates that industry concentration 
15 In the early 1990s, for example, Samsung electronics company, which is one member of the Samsung 
business group, emerged as the company with the world's largest market share. 
16 In Korea, the industrial groupings most commonly used in the compilation of market concentration 
measures are those given by the Census of Manufactures based on the Korean Standard Industrial 
Classifications (KSIC). The delineation of industries in these publications is based on the concept of a 
group of principal products, determined mainly from the producer side. KSIC takes various factors 
into account, including the characteristics of goods or services, the varieties and usage of goods or 
services, the production process and technology, and organisation. The classifications include public 
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remained high over the past three decades. The simple average of three-firm 
concentration ratio (CR3) from 1966 to 1987 was 57.6 per cent, reasonably high by 
international standards. According to Unotoro (1988), the weighted average four-firms 
concentration ratio (CR4) was 43.6 per cent for US manufacturing in 1982 and 78.0 per 
cent for Japanese manufacturing in 1984.17 The average four-firm concentration ratio 
(CR4) was around 52 per cent in another small open economy, Australia, in 1982 (Caves 
et al. 1987). 
TABLE 3.6: DISTRIBUTION OF VALUE OF SHIPMENTS IN KOREA AND USA BY 
MANUFACTURING CONCENTRATION RATIO 
Concentration Ratio Korea USA1 
1977 1981 1963 1982 
80~CR~100 33.0 28.1 12.2 4.9 
60 ~CR< 80 18.7 26.2 9.2 14.9 
Subtotal 51.7 54.3 21.4 19.8 
40~CR<60 22.5 21.8 19.5 19.7 
20~CR<40 21.1 19.3 39.3 38.8 
O~CR<20 4.7 4.6 19.8 21.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Notes: 1. Based on Value-added 
2. CR3 for Korea, CR4 for the USA in five-digit level. 
3. Korean manufacturing consisted of 400 sectors in 1977 and 512 sectors in 1984; US 
manufacturing consists of 417 sectors. 
Sources: Lee et al. 1984; Caves et al. 1979; Scherer et al. 1990. 
The ratio, which stood at 54.6 per cent in 1966, increased by 7.4 percentage 
points to reach 62 per cent in 1981. The average level of concentration decreased slightly 
between 1981 and 1987, from 62 per cent in 1981 to 56.1 per cent in 1987. The fall in the 
ratio between 1974 and 1977 may have been due to the government's implementation of 
administrative activities, education and non-profit groups' activities, excluding those of women at 
home. The basic unit for the collection of data in the census is a single productive unit, such as a plant 
or factory. 
17 The weighted average four-firm concentration ratio is controversial. Uekusa (1982) showed, using a 
1963 data set, that the ratio was 35.4 per cent and 40.9 per cent in Japan and in the USA respectively. 
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price controls in monopolistic markets in 1974.18 Importantly, in view of the increase in 
both the overall concentration and chaebol over the period, industry concentration as 
measured by the traditional concentration ratio seems to have been biased downward. 
In 1977-81, industry concentration increased considerably, from 57 per cent in 
1977 to 62 per cent in 1981. The trend is consistent with the rise in the share of chaebol 
(Table 3.4) and the tendency for market structure to become more oligopolistic (Figure 
3.4 and Table 3.7). The overall degree of liberalisation decreased from 56.1 per cent in 
1973 to 55.7 per cent in 1974 and did not change significantly until 1978, when the rate 
was 61.5 per cent (Appendix 3.1). Various tax-incentives were also provided by the Tax 
Exemption and Reduction Control Law after 1975 under the heading of "Special Tax 
Treatment for Key Industries" (Appendix 3.3).19 
The decline in concentration observed since 1981 is due mainly to the 
government's policy of promoting competition and to a fall in government intervention. 
Despite widespread opposition from the public, the government has removed a large 
number of goods from its list of items requiring prior approval for import. Its aim was to 
lower the inflation rate and to correct the distorted incentive structure that had resulted 
from its earlier policy of promoting heavy and chemical industry (Yoo 1989, Chapter 4 ). 
The effect of liberalisation in the late 1970s on industry concentration began to show up 
in the early 1980s. In its 5th and 6th Five-Year Economic Plannings (1982-90), for the 
first time the government reduced protection and intervention substantially (Lee 1991). 
The enactment of the Regulation on Monopoly and Fair Trade in December 1980 also 
contributed to the trend for industry concentration to fall. 20 
18 Of course, a high level of overall concentration is not inevitably accompanied by similarly high 
levels in individual industries. For example, if the largest firms in an economy were extremely 
diversified, then it would be possible for a high overall concentration to exist side by side with low 
market concentration. 
l9 According to this system, a firm which operates in one of the listed key industrial sectors (such as 
petrochemicals, steel and iron, and machinery) and meets some qualifications (in general these 
qualifications are directly or indirectly related with the size of the firm, i.e ..... a larger firm is more 
likely to meet them) can choose one of the following three tax benefits (Kwack 1986). 
Option (1): A tax holiday of 100 per cent for the first 3 years and 50 per cent for the following 2 
years. 
Option (2): 8 per cent (10 per cent for domestically produced capital goods) tax credit for investment 
in machinery and equipment. 
Option (3): 100 per cent special depreciation rate for machinery and equipment directly employed in 
production. 
20 However, the Industrial Development Law of 1986 permitted (and possibly encouraged) mergers of 
firms. 
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Concentration is an exogenous determinant of industries' performance only in the 
short run; in the long run, concentration itself appears to be determined by technological 
factors and by the past patterns of behaviour of sellers in an industry. 
FIGURE 3.3: TRENDS IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY CONCEN1RATION, 1966-87 (%) 
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Note: CR3 was weighted by value of shipments. 
Sources: Appendix 2.2-3 and KDI database. 
According to Uekusa (1987), mergers among large enterprises, mass advertising 
and other sales promotions, chaebol's efforts to monopolise and preferential banking 
treatment in favour of big business are all important factors in concentration (see Table 
3.2). Some of the reasons for this high ratio will be examined in the next chapter by 
applying two-stage least square regression analysis. 
Commodity Market Concentration 
A country's market structure is classified as being monopolistic, duopolistic, 
oligopolistic or highly competitive according to its degree of market concentration. 
Markets group together firms whose products are close substitutes from the buyers' point 
of view while industry refers to product groups which are close substitutes from the 
suppliers' viewpoint. There is no standard rule governing the critical values for these 
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classifications. However, in Korea, the following definitions are generally accepted (Lee 
et al. 1990; EPB and KDI 1991).21 
A market is defined as being monopolistic when the concentration rate (by 
shipment value) of the country's largest firm is over 80 per cent and S1 IS2 >10.0, 
where S1 and S2 are respectively the market shares of the country's largest and second 
largest firms. 
A market is a duopoly if the concentration rate (by shipment value) of the 
country's largest and second largest firms is over 80 per cent and S1 I S2 < 5.0 and 
S3 < 5percent, where S1, S2 and S3 are, respectively, the market shares of the largest, 
second largest and third largest firms. 
A market is oligopolistic if the concentration rate (by shipment value) of the 
country's third largest firm is 60 per cent (monopoly and duopoly markets are excluded). 
A market is defined as being perfectly competitive when the concentration rate 
(by shipment value) of the country's three largest firms is less than 60 per cent. 
Figure 3.4 and Table 3.7 show trends of monopoly, duopoly, oligopoly and 
perfect competition in the commodity market in Korea in 1970-87. Figure 3.3 shows that 
an oligopolistic market structure has been the distinguishing characteristic of Korean 
manufacturing. 
There are three points worth noting with respect to these trends. First, between 
1970 and 1988, the monopolistic competition market, defined as the monopoly market 
plus the duopoly market, generally declined. The monopolistic competition market 
accounted for about 48.3 per cent of the total manufactured commodity market in terms 
of the number of commodities in 1970, or about 25 per cent in terms of the value of 
shipments. This ratio remained largely unchanged in 1977, when the aggregated share of 
the number of commodities stood at 47.8 per cent and the aggregated share of the value 
of shipments at 25.3 per cent. However, from 1977 to 1987, the combined share of the 
monopoly and duopoly markets decreased in terms both of the number of commodities 
and the value of shipments. 
2l The definition of 'monopoly', for instance, varies. A firm is regarded as a monopoly if the market 
share of the firm exceeds 25 per cent in the UK, while it is 60 per cent in Holland. In the USA, a 
much larger market share is generally required (95 per cent and 60 to 67 per cent, for example, 
depending on the situation), although this is not the only characteristic taken into account. The EC 
defines a dominant position as one conferring the ability to operate largely independently of 
competitors. Since market share is just one (important) consideration in determining dominance, the 
EC does not specify a critical market share. 
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Second, the competitive market declined from 18.5 per cent in 1970 to 17.2 per 
cent in 1977 (as measured by the number of commodities). During this period, its share 
of shipments decreased markedly, from 39.9 per cent to 26.1 per cent. Despite this 
downward trend, the competitive market ratio increased continuously from 1977 to 
1987, in terms both of commodity numbers and shipment share. 
FIGURE 3.4: COMMODITY MARKET CONCENTRATION IN KOREA, 1970-85 (%) 
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Data Sources: Lee et al. 1990; EPB and KDI 1991. 
Third, oligopolies consistently had a higher share than other market structures 
during the period 1970-87. From 1970 to 1977, the share of oligopolies increased from 
35.1 per cent to 48.6 per cent (in terms of value of shipments). Interestingly, though, the 
share of oligopolies in terms of the number of commodities did not show any significant 
change during this period. Between 1977 and 1982, the share climbed steeply, from 
34.9 per cent to 47.4 per cent. It then showed a decline in terms of shipment value 
during 1982-87, although remaining stable in terms of the number of commodities. 
Some qualifications need to be made with respect to these observations. As 
described above, price control in the monopolistic market between 1974 and 1980 under 
the Price Stabilisation and Fair Trade Act may have distorted the traditional 
concentration index (CR3). In addition, the index does not reflect the concentration of 
economic power in chaebol. It may also not show the real degree of competition since it 
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fails to reflect the impact of foreign competition. In spite of its usefulness as an index of 
market structure, the concentration ratio shows only the degree of competition among 
domestic firms without specifically taking into account the role of international trade. In 
fact, though, the role of international trade is recognised as being important to an 
understanding of market structure in an open economy (Caves 1985; Jacquemin et 
al.1980). Trade-adjusted concentration ratios will be estimated in the next section.22 
TABLE 3.7: TRENDS IN COMMODITY MARKET CONCENTRATION, 1970-87 
MonoEolx: DuoEolx: OligoEolx: ComEetition Total 
1970 
No. of commodities 442 279 495 276 1,492 
Share of commodities (%) 29.6 18.7 33.2 18.5 100 
Share of shipments (%) 8.7 16.3 35.1 39.9 100 
1977 
No. of commodities 474 279 528 264 1,545 
Share of commodities(%) 30.8 17.0 34.9 17.2 100 
Share of shipments (%) 12.7 12.6 48.6 26.1 100 
1982 
No. of commodities 533 251 1,071 405 2,260 
Share of commodities (%) 23.6 11.1 47.4 17.9 100 
Share of shipments (%) 11.4 6.6 50.6 31.4 100 
1987 
No. of commodities 533 277 1,173 655 2,638 
Share of commodities(%) 20.2 10.5 44.5 24.8 100 
Share of shipments (%) 7.8 7.7 40.2 44.3 100 
Notes: Based on the 7-digit KSIC manufactured commodity classifications. 
Monopoly is defined as CR1>80%, and Sl/S2>10.0; duopoly is CR2>80%, and S3<5.0; 
oligopoly is CR3>60% (excluding monopoly and duopoly); and competition is CR3<60%. CRi 
and Si represent the i-finn shipment concentration rate and the market share of the i th firm, 
respectively. 
Sources: Economic Planning Board of Korea and KDI 1991; Lee et al. 1986. 
22 Considering that competition is a behavioural concept, Odagiri (1994) argued that the extent of 
competition should be inferred from the performance side; that is, from an international comparison 
of the level and variance of profit rates. However the indirect nature of this inference is also subject 
to business fluctuations and international differences in accounting. 
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Trade-Adjusted Concentration Ratios 
The concentration ratio (CR) is the most widely used measure of level of absolute 
concentration (Hannah and Kay 1977)23. CR is defined as: 
n 
CRn = L Si' Q :::=; CRn :::=; 1 (3.1) 
i=l 
where S; is firm i's market share in terms of the value of shipments (or employment, 
production, value-added, assets etc.). The concentration ratio is easy to measure, and 
shows immediately the extent of large firms' control over the market. It is empirically 
popular, partly because of its ease of interpretation, but also because of the ready 
availability of data: government statistical sources in most countries provide values for 
three-digit industries.24 However, this measure of concentration can also be criticised as 
not reflecting competition between domestic and foreign firms. Concentration ratio is 
measured at the production level without taking imports and exports into account; hence, 
it may not show the true extent of competition in the market. It does not take into account 
the threat of entry; hence, even if concentration is high, the market may be contestable.25 
In addition, the concentration ratio ignores all except the X largest firms and the relative 
size variation across the X largest firms. 26 
A concentration ratio based simply on domestic output, without adjustment for 
foreign trade, may be upwardly biased. The actual level of competition in the domestic 
market may differ from that indicated by the concentration ratio if a high proportion of 
the output of an industry's largest producers is exported. 
23 For other indexes of concentration level, see Hannah and Kay (1977) and Curry and George (1983). 
24 Germany provides CR3, the UK CRS, and the US a variety of concentration indexes including CR4, 
CRS and CR20. 
25 Demsetz (1973) argued that high concentration may actually be a result of competition rather than a 
deterrent to competition. 
26 Consequently, two markets with identical shares held by the X largest firms have identical 
concentration ratios, even though one market contains more firms in total and is likely to be more 
competitive. The same concentration ratio could describe a market where there are X similarly sized 
firms or a situation close to monopoly where one firm dominates. 
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This has led to the use of the trade-adjusted n-firm concentration ratio (ACRn) 
(Utton and Morgan 1983). This can be written as: 
" L(Si -EX;) 
ACR = i=t xlOO 
" (S+/M-EX) (3.2) 
where S is sales; EX is exports; and IM is imports. Equation (3.2) shows the market share 
of n domestic firms in total domestic market size or consumption. In spite of its potential 
usefulness, lack of data often makes it difficult to obtain this trade-adjusted concentration 
ratio; in general, the export results of individual firms are not known. A solution is to 
manipulate the concentration ratio. 
The following definition for a trade-adjusted concentration ratio is recommended 
by Waterson (1984): 
ACR = Sn - CRn . EX xlOO 
n DC (3.3) 
where CRn is the traditional concentration ratio of the top n firms; Sn is sales of the top 
n firms; EX is exports; and DC is domestic consumption, defined as sales +imports -
exports. The assumptions necessary for this measure to be relevant are that large firms 
export in proportion to their size in the industry, that importers are not among the top n 
firms and that imports provide real competition. 
Comparative Analysis of 1974with1986 
Table 3.8 shows the trade-adjusted, three-firm concentration ratio (ACR3) for two-digit 
levels of KSIC industry classifications. For comparison, the traditional concentration 
ratio is also shown in the table. Originally, ACR3 was calculated for the four-digit level 
of KSIC industry classifications (Appendix 3.5-6). In the table, however, the four-digit 
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levels are aggregated to two-digit levels weighted by total domestic consumption. 
Similarly, the traditional three-firm concentration ratio (CR3) is aggregated to two-digit 
levels weighted by value of shipment. 
TABLE3.8: INDUSTRY CONCENTRATION BY TRADE-ADJUSTED CONCENTRATION 
RATIOS, 1986 AND 1974 
Industry 1986 1974 
ACR3 CR3 ACR3 CR3 
Food, beverages and tobacco 61.1 65.9 50.1 56.2 
Textile, wearing apparel and leather 24.1 37.0 47.7 52.8 
Wood and wood products 28.3 31.9 48.5 49.0 
Paper and paper products, printing and 35.2 42.4 35.6 45.3 
publishing 
Chemicals, petroleum, coal, rubber and plastic 56.0 63.9 67.2 71.9 
products 
Non-metallic mineral products 48.6 56.2 49.1 50.9 
Basic metal 59.2 74.7 42.1 65.4 
Fabricated metal products, machinery and 35.3 65.1 33.4 60.5 
equipment 
Other manufacturing 35.8 41.1 34.5 59.6 
Total industry average 45.3 57.7 50.4 58.5 
Note: Weights are value of shipments. 
The table confirms higher industry concentration of Korean manufacturing in 
terms of unadjusted concentration ratios and trade-adjusted concentration ratios than 
other countries. The average of the trade-adjusted (unadjusted) three-firm concentration 
ratio was 50.4 per cent (58.5 per cent) in 1974 and 45.3 per cent (57.5 per cent) in 1986. 
In the UK manufacturing sector, the average of the trade-adjusted (unadjusted) five-firm 
concentration ratio was 40.9 per cent (50.9 per cent) in 1973 and 35.9 per cent (50.1 per 
cent) in 1983 (Ferguson et al. 1994, derived from Department of Trade and Industry of 
UK).27 In Belgian manufacturing, the trade-adjusted four-firm concentration ratio was 
27 The formula for the calculation was a modification of equation 3.2: 
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37.4 per cent, while the unadjusted four-firm concentration ratio was 51.5 per cent in the 
1970s (Jacquemin 1980). 
The results show that adjustment reduces concentration levels. 28 In 1986, the 
average concentration ratio for total industry was 45.3 per cent by ACR3 and 57.7 per 
cent by CR3. In 1974, the figures were 50.4 per cent by ACR3 and 58.5 per cent by 
CR3.29 The traditional concentration ratio is, therefore, not directly relevant to the 
measurement of monopoly power, being a mixture of domestic market structure 
characteristics, distribution among firms of domestic turnover, and an international 
phenomenon, namely the concentration of exports (Jacquemin 1980). Another 
implication of the difference between ACR3 and CR3 is that in a small open economy, 
competition from international trade is an important policy consideration. 
Table 3.8 shows that in 1986, in terms of ACR3, the three most highly 
concentrated industries were the food, beverages and tobacco industry (61.1 per cent), 
basic metal industry (59.2 per cent) and chemicals, petroleum, coal, rubber and plastic 
products industry (56 per cent). According to Nam (1981), the nominal protection rate 
for the food, beverages and tobacco industry increased from 2.6 per cent in 1968 to 30 
per cent in 1978, while the rates for intermediate goods decreased sharply from 12 per 
cent to -0.6 per cent. By contrast, the textiles, wearing apparel and leather industry (24.1 
per cent), wood and wood products industry (28.3 per cent) and paper and paper 
products, printing and publishing industry (35.2 per cent) seem to be relatively 
competitive. 
The concentration ratio (ACR3) of some industries changed considerably during 
the period. There was a significant decline in the ratios for the textiles, wearing apparel 
and leather industry (23.6 per cent) and wood and wood products industry (20.2 per 
cent), and a significant increase in the ratios of the basic metal industry ( 17 .1 per cent) 
and food, beverages and tobacco industry (10 per cent). 
ACR5 = JM ·S xlOO 
S+---
S-EX 
28 Similar results were found in the US, British and (West) Germany automobile markets in 1986 
(Ferguson 1994). However, in Japan, the trade-adjusted 4-firm concentration ratio was higher than 
the unadjusted one in the 1980s. For example, in 1986 the adjusted and unadjusted ratios were 86 per 
cent and 89.7 per cent respectively. 
29 The fact that exports increase at a greater rate than firm size is confirmed for many countries. See 
Rapp (1976) for the case of Japan and Glejser et al. (1980) for Belgium. 
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The case of the fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment industry is 
interesting. In both years, this industry would seem to have been highly concentrated, 
with a CR3 ratio of 60.5 per cent in 1974 and 65.1 per cent in 1986. However, in terms of 
ACR3, this industry's concentration ratio was very low compared to other industries: 
only 33.4 per cent in 1974 and 35.5 per cent in 1986. 
Interestingly, the difference between ACR3 and CR3 was larger in 1986 than in 
1974. This was mainly because larger firms export a larger proportion of their output 
than small ones, and there was an increase in the amount of trade over the period. Trade 
dependency, defined as (exports+imports)/GNP, was 68.7 per cent in 1974 and 76.9 per 
cent in 1986. 
There are two important factors that increase the likelihood that concentration 
ratios will underestimate levels of monopoly power. First, in the context of the chaebol, 
if a company holds a controlling interest of less than 50 per cent in another company, and 
the two companies are disaggregated as different firms by law, then this minority 
controlling interest may give the company control over a larger proportion of total 
industry output than is indicated by CR3. Among large Korean companies, it is 
recognised that de facto if not de jure control of other companies commonly occurs (Lee 
et al. 1990; Jones 1987). 
The second factor is vertical integration of large companies. Plants carrying out 
various stages of a single production process may be listed as belonging to different 
industries, even though they operate under the umbrella of one firm. This kind of vertical 
integration has an impact on the relevant concentration ratios, and may mean that the 
parent firm can exercise considerably more influence over its market than would appear 
to be the case simply from the size of its output. Over the 1980s, the trend has been for 
vertical integration to increase in Korea (EPB and KDI 1991; Lee et al. 1990). 
Summary and Conclusion 
The chapter has shown that there is a high degree of concentration in most Korean 
manufacturing industries. Three important findings emerge from the examination of 
trends in industry concentration in the 1970s and 1980s and from our calculations of 
trade-adjusted, three-firm concentration ratios for 1974 and 1986. 
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First, Korean manufacturing is dominated by big business groups, or chaebol. 
The share (by shipments) of the 30 largest chaebol was 34.1 per cent in 1977, 40.7 per 
cent in 1982 and 37.3 per cent in 1987. Considering the high level of concentration of 
economic power in chaebol, industry concentration as measured by the traditional 
concentration index would seem to be biased downward. Market concentration ratios do 
not show linkages between firms. 
Second, Korean manufacturing was characterised by oligopoly in the 1970s and 
1980s. In particular, the strategic industry policy, known as the heavy and chemical 
industrialisation policy, accelerated industry concentration in the 1970s. Between 1970 
and 1987, the average share of the oligopolistic manufacturing market was around 43.6 
per cent (by shipment value) and 40 per cent (by number of commodities). The share 
increased dramatically between 1977 and 1982 and, despite a slight decline, remained 
high in the 1980s. Chaebol and industry concentration followed a similar trend during 
this period. 
Third, using four-digit levels of KSIC industry classifications, the average level 
of concentration by trade-adjusted three-firm concentration ratio (ACR3) was smaller 
than concentration according to the traditional three-firm concentration ratio (CR3), both 
in 1986 and 1974. Total industry average by CR3 was 57.7 per cent in 1986 and 58.5 per 
cent in 1974. By ACR3 it was around 45.3 per cent in 1986 and about 50.4 per cent in 
197 4. This suggests that the traditional measure of producer concentration is upwardly 
biased and needs to be adjusted. But the trade-adjusted concentration ratio in Korean 
manufacturing was still higher than in the UK and in Belgium. Another implication of 
the difference in the two measures is that when formulating industry policy, small open 
economies like Korea should explicitly take into account the impact on the economy of 
competition from international trade. 
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APPENDIX 3.1: ESTIMATION OF OVERALL DEGREE OF IMPORT LIBERALISATION FOR 
KOREA, 1965-1990 (%) 
Average Rate of Legal Tariffs [a/(a+b)] Degree of Overall 
Liberalisation Degree of 
ofQRs Liberalisation 
Re~ular (a)1 Total (b)2 (c) (d) (c+d)/2 
1965 49.5 52.7 (25.9)3 65.5 6.0 35.8 
1966 49.5 52.3 65.7 9.3 37.5 
1967 49.5 52.6 65.5 52.4 59.0 
1968 56.7 58.9 62.9 50.1 56.5 
1969 56.7 58.3 63.2 47.1 55.2 
1970 56.7 58.5 (18.1) 63.1 46.3 54.7 
1971 56.7 57.9 63.3 47.0 55.2 
1972 56.7 57.5 63.5 43.4 53.5 
1973 48.1 48.2 67.5 44.7 56.1 
1974 48.1 48.1 67.5 43.8 55.7 
1975 48.1 48.1(-4.6) 67.5 41.6 54.7 
1976 48.1 48.1 67.5 44.1 55.8 
1977 41.3 41.3 70.8 40.8 55.8 
1978 41.3 41.3 (11.2) 70.7 52.2 61.5 
1979 34.4 34.4 74.4 56.2 65.3 
1980 34.4 34.4 (21.9) 74.4 57.4 65.9 
1981 34.4 34.4 74.4 60.7 67.6 
1982 34.4 34.4 74.4 62.5 68.5 
1983 34.4 34.4 (19.6) 74.4 66.6 70.5 
1984 26.7 26.7 78.9 75.0 77.0 
1985 26.4 26.4 (10.7) 79.1 78.2 78.7 
1986 24.7 24.7 80.2 82.0 81.1 
1987 23.9 23.9 80.7 84.1 82.4 
1988 22.4 22.4 (0.1) 81.7 86.0 83.9 
1989 15.7 15.7 86.4 86.7 86.6 
1990 14.1 14.1 (5.8) 87.6 87.5 87.6 
Notes: 1. The average rate of regular tariffs, weighted by the value of 1975 production. 
2. Includes the average rate of special tariffs on imports in addition to regular tariffs for 1965-73. 
Figures in parentheses are Corden's effective protection rate for manufacturing. 
3. Data for 1963. 
4. Represents the degree of import liberalisation of quantitative restrictions (QRs) based on 
both trade program and special laws. 
Sources: Kim (1993); Hong (1992). 
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APPENDIX 3.2: NUMBER OF WARNINGS ON MONOPOLISTIC BEHAVIOUR ISSUED BY FAIR 
TRADE COMMISSION, 1981-901 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Abuse of Dominant 2 1 2 1 4 2 
Market Power 
Corporate 22 51 24 43 27 22 35 37 32 12 
Combination 
Unfair Business 37 37 149 135 279 417 381 419 464 274 
Practices 
Unreasonable 78 169 212 244 234 270 241 70 28 45 
International 
Agreements 
Total 137 257 387 423 542 710 661 526 524 333 
Notes: 1. Constraints on investment among big business groups (60), collusion between 
establishments (65) and restraints group competition among establishments are excluded. 
2. Figures in parentheses are percentages. 
Source: EPB and KDI (1991), taken from Fair Trade Commision. 
Total2 
12 
(0.3) 
305 
(6.8) 
2,592 
(57.6) 
1,591 
(35.4) 
4,500 
(100) 
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APPENDIX 3.3: EFFECTIVE MARGINAL TAX RATES BY SECTOR, 1973-83 (%) 
1973 1975 1978 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Processed Food, Beverages 50.6 55.1 42.8 46.7 57.1 58.6 39.5 
and Tobacco 
Textiles, Leather, Paper and 49.8 54.3 42.1 46.1 56.2 57.6 38.7 
Printing 
Construction Materials 50.3 54.6 42.8 46.5 56.6 58.1 39.7 
Chemical Products (General) 48.9 54.2 41.1 45.3 55.8 57.1 37.6 
(Special) 46.3 38.8 29.5 32.0 42.4 50.8 34.8 
Basic Metals and Metal 
Products (General) 49.0 53.2 41.9 45.5 55.0 56.4 38.1 
(Special) 46.9 38.7 31.0 32.9 42.6 50.8 35.8 
Machinery, Electrical and 
Electronic Equipment 
(General) 49.3 53.7 42.0 45.8 55.6 57.0 38.4 
(Special) 47.1 39.1 30.9 33.0 43.0 51.2 36.0 
Statutory Maximum Tax 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 38.0 33.0 
Rates 
Inflation Rates in Capital 17.0 33.7 8.2 19.4 24.3 21.5 9.7 
Goods Market (3 Year 
Moving Average) 
Note: 'General' rates are applicable to firms which are not qualified to get special tax treatment. 
'Special' rates are for qualified firms. 
Source: Kwack (1986). 
APPENDIX 3.4: SHARE OF NINE MAJOR INDUSTRIES BY KSIC MANUFACTURING 
CLASSIFICATION (%) 
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Level 2 (9) Level 3 (28) Level 4(105 Level 5 (522' 
Food, beverages and tobacco 10.7 16.2 12.8 
Textiles, wearing apparel and leather 14.3 13.3 13.4 
Wood and wood products 7.1 3.8 4.8 
Paper and paper products, printing and 7.1 5.7 6.1 
publishing 
Chemicals, petroleum, coal, rubber and 21.4 14.3 13.8 
plastic products. 
Non-metallic mineral products 10.7 6.7 7.1 
Basic metals 7.1 8.6 6.3 
Fabricated metal products, machinery and 17.9 26.7 28.7 
equipment 
Other manufacturing 8.6 5.7 6.1 
Total 100 100 100 
Notes: Level indicates the number of KSIC digits and figures in parentheses the number of 
industries in the level. Thus, there are nine industries in the two-digit KSIC level and 522 
industries in the five-digit level. 
Source: Economic Planning Board, Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey, Korea. 
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APPENDIX 3.5: INDEXES OF INDUS1RY CONCEN1RATION IN KOREAN MANUFACTURING IN 
1986 AND 1987 
Indus!!! Code CR3(1987) H(1987) CR3(1986) ACR3(1986) H(1986) 
3111 0.446 0.095 0.496 0.188 0.100 
3112 0.445 0.115 0.562 0.554 0.204 
3113 0.551 0.144 0.526 0.444 0.131 
3114 0.275 0.048 0.266 0.248 0.048 
3115 0.848 0.407 0.872 0.705 0.614 
3116 0.524 0.130 0.510 0.479 0.121 
3117 0.832 0.398 0.841 0.841 0.318 
3118 1.000 0.995 1.000 0.751 1.000 
3121 0.752 0.327 0.854 0.770 0.559 
3123 0.319 0.053 0.251 0.251 0.040 
3131 0.653 0.214 0.675 0.662 0.216 
3132 0.361 0.178 0.317 0.326 0.183 
3133 1.000 0.488 1.000 0.997 0.521 
3134 0.637 0.188 0.668 0.668 0.219 
3140 0.988 0.964 0.985 0.984 0.959 
3211 0.473 0.117 0.489 0.421 0.122 
3212 0.328 0.066 0.286 0.079 0.055 
3213 0.171 0.023 0.176 0.170 0.025 
3215 0.460 0.124 0.400 0.208 0.096 
3216 0.435 0.096 0.335 0.152 0.066 
3217 0.679 0.195 0.664 0.539 0.203 
3221 0.111 0.013 0.115 0.173 0.016 
3231 0.231 0.037 0.268 0.208 0.046 
3232 0.734 0.299 0.641 0.452 0.214 
3233 0.308 0.056 0.288 0.284 0.058 
3240 0.503 0.120 0.497 0.494 0.115 
3311 0.312 0.079 0.294 0.255 0.073 
3312 0.468 0.128 0.530 0.474 0.156 
3320 0.334 0.079 0.352 0.334 0.070 
3411 0.550 0.204 0.523 0.411 0.204 
3412 0.248 0.046 0.239 0.225 0.047 
3423 0.307 0.056 0.218 0.207 0.034 
3511 0.703 0.298 0.703 0.325 0.302 
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APPENDIX 3.5: (CONTINUED) 
Industry Code CR3(1987) H(1987) CR3(1986) ACR3(1986) H(1986) 
3512 0.625 0.247 0.642 0.487 0.270 
3513 0.468 0.098 0.489 0.300 0.105 
3514 0.986 0.558 0.985 0.890 0.385 
3515 0.856 0.465 0.861 0.870 0.484 
3516 0.538 0.150 0.543 0.510 0.150 
3521 0.605 0.321 0.518 0.470 0.124 
3522 0.293 0.075 0.315 0.287 0.091 
3523 0.729 0.319 0.731 0.705 0.319 
3530 0.887 0.328 0.897 0.768 0.332 
3551 0.808 0.298 0.814 0.562 0.302 
3610 0.547 0.146 0.605 0.322 0.174 
3620 0.702 0.424 0.761 0.528 0.410 
3691 0.395 0.091 0.309 0.255 0.059 
3692 0.683 0.228 0.689 0.684 0.237 
3693 0.340 0.089 0.337 0.337 0.092 
3694 0.849 0.368 0.800 0.660 0.334 
3711 0.814 0.522 0.837 0.409 0.338 
3712 0.753 0.379 0.761 0.586 0.310 
3713 0.466 0.147 0.488 0.369 0.152 
3721 0.976 0.800 0.975 0.713 0.726 
3723 0.586 0.316 0.586 0.699 0.316 
3724 0.596 0.273 0.401 0.269 0.082 
3811 0.580 0.157 0.540 0.392 0.156 
3812 0.211 0.031 0.242 0.210 0.038 
3813 0.536 0.283 0.541 0.141 0.331 
3821 0.735 0.249 0.594 0.129 0.135 
3822 0.593 0.161 0.593 0.556 0.134 
3823 0.247 0.045 0.239 0.084 0.044 
3824 0.347 0.082 0.590 0.222 0.356 
3825 0.729 0.247 0.718 0.000 0.238 
3831 0.543 0.135 0.597 0.255 0.205 
3832 0.579 0.136 0.634 0.225 0.169 
3833 0.425 0.081 0.516 0.512 0.128 
3841 0.757 0.230 0.863 0.728 0.339 
63 
APPENDIX 3.5: (CONTINUED) 
Industry Code CR3(1987) H(1987) CR3(1986) ACR3(1986) H(1986) 
3842 0.623 0.196 0.684 0.578 0.319 
3843 0.714 0.267 0.677 0.552 0.276 
3844 0.733 0.254 0.733 0.636 0.254 
3851 0.587 0.186 0.589 0.056 0.161 
3852 0.707 0.284 0.730 0.391 0.335 
3853 0.661 0.185 0.662 0.428 0.175 
3901 0.587 0.281 0.619 0.426 0.295 
3902 0.915 0.444 0.934 0.822 0.456 
3903 0.342 0.060 0.354 0.297 0.065 
3904 0.210 0.039 0.217 0.184 0.041 
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APPENDIX 3.5: (CONTINUED) 
Industry CR3(1981)H(1981)CR3(1977)H(1977)CR3(1974)ACR3(1974) H(1974)CR3(1966)H(1966) 
Code 
3111 0.832 0.443 0.834 0.264 0.976 0.816 0.803 0.994 0.587 
3112 0.678 0.284 0.813 0.289 0.758 0.731 0.218 0.960 0.815 
3113 0.535 0.132 0.327 0.069 0.241 0.153 0.046 0.739 0.246 
3114 0.216 0.031 0.340 0.070 0.289 0.279 0.050 0.369 0.066 
3115 0.803 0.360 0.838 0.665 0.814 0.742 0.289 0.495 0.184 
3116 0.478 0.116 0.481 0.161 0.486 0.451 0.103 0.405 0.106 
3117 0.831 0.420 0.883 0.404 0.615 0.615 0.163 0.253 0.088 
3118 0.998 0.362 1.000 0.457 0.876 0.363 0.316 1.000 0.521 
31213 0.781 0.418 0.714 0.347 0.897 0.635 0.431 0.746 0.241 
3122 0.208 0.032 0.150 0.030 0.192 0.190 0.036 0.426 0.099 
3131 0.572 0.175 0.559 0.168 0.605 0.594 0.239 0.454 0.092 
3132 0.278 0.145 0.223 0.106 0.466 0.466 0.266 0.199 0.044 
3133 1.000 0.518 1.000 0.509 1.000 0.993 0.521 1.000 0.519 
3134 0.596 0.180 0.787 0.298 0.656 0.656 0.182 0.537 0.161 
3140 0.984 0.950 0.908 0.856 0.447 0.446 0.094 1.000 0.343 
3211 0.513 0.129 0.456 0.120 0.504 0.432 0.126 0.514 0.142 
3216 0.567 0.167 0.809 0.337 0.617 0.528 0.172 0.996 0.766 
3217 0.681 0.245 0.679 0.223 0.790 0.790 0.280 0.368 0.085 
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APPENDIX 3.5: (CONTINUED) 
Industry CR3(1981)H(1981)CR3(1977)H(1977)CR3(1974)ACR3(1974) H(1974)CR3(1966)H(1966) 
Code 
3213 0.530 0.144 0.483 0.136 0.498 0.300 0.166 0.534 0.201 
3214 0.113 0.012 0.412 0.091 0.172 0.137 0.029 0.000 0.000 
3215 0.384 0.104 0.328 0.063 0.222 0.215 0.036 0.526 0.197 
32133 0.297 0.052 0.367 0.082 0.366 0.360 0.066 0.160 0.016 
3231 0.344 0.062 0.388 0.076 0.860 0.617 0.492 0.642 0.176 
3232 0.345 0.063 1.000 0.567 1.000 0.667 0.570 0.000 0.000 
3233 0.409 0.089 0.273 0.049 0.504 0.498 0.125 0.720 0.307 
3240 0.599 0.169 0.665 0.200 0.467 0.465 0.128 0.296 0.035 
3311 0.316 0.071 0.430 0.104 0.493 0.489 0.125 0.654 0.184 
3312 0.455 0.124 0.488 0.094 0.957 0.928 0.872 0.708 0.136 
3320 0.420 0.086 0.557 0.170 0.305 0.300 0.062 0.121 0.006 
3411 0.545 0.202 0.674 0.218 0.503 0.374 0.207 0.635 0.249 
3412 0.227 0.035 0.260 0.048 0.347 0.321 0.054 0.522 0.149 
3422 0.380 0.093 0.810 0.302 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
35111 0.645 0.213 0.996 0.910 0.672 0.277 0.312 0.448 0.098 
35112 0.566 0.146 0.773 0.479 0.672 0.529 0.312 0.448 0.098 
35114-6 0.555 0.160 0.906 0.421 0.443 0.230 0.096 0.671 0.191 
3513 0.739 0.230 0.890 0.567 0.629 0.420 0.170 0.883 0.378 
3512 0.959 0.422 0.978 0.431 0.956 0.794 0.393 0.393 0.185 
35125 0.567 0.167 0.607 0.170 0.546 0.363 0.142 0.609 0.153 
3521 0.732 0.357 0.611 0.159 0.494 0.395 0.112 0.603 0.144 
3522 0.389 0.104 0.395 0.342 0.257 0.235 0.042 0.469 0.110 
3523 0.835 0.319 0.844 0.376 0.734 0.691 0.244 0.572 0.170 
3530 0.893 0.345 0.997 0.406 0.970 0.923 0.413 1.000 1.000 
3551 0.746 0.240 0.887 0.308 0.725 0.718 0.209 0.794 0.254 
3610 0.544 0.217 0.976 0.882 0.474 0.423 0.100 0.507 0.150 
3620 0.597 0.296 0.719 0.222 0.823 0.710 0.412 0.645 0.461 
3691 0.554 0.172 0.555 0.207 0.592 0.526 0.148 0.537 0.133 
3692 0.753 0.282 0.735 0.259 0.369 0.369 0.082 0.679 0.190 
36991 0.364 0.086 0.405 0.110 0.407 0.406 0.081 0.328 0.043 
36993 0.949 0.490 1.000 0.598 0.755 0.676 0.421 0.372 0.073 
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APPENDIX 3.5: (CONTINUED) 
Industry CR3(1981)H(1981)CR3(1977)H(77) CR3(1974)ACR3(1974) H(1974)CR3(1966)H(1966) 
Code 
37101-2 0.694 0.195 0.971 0.702 0.980 0.356 0.560 0.529 0.130 
37103 0.711 0.336 0.912 0.491 0.607 0.358 0.168 0.555 0.137 
37106 0.508 0.141 0.316 0.049 0.500 0.384 0.107 0.556 0.165 
37201 0.533 0.121 0.896 0.752 0.837 0.595 0.319 0.754 0.226 
37202 0.663 0.377 0.663 0.377 0.739 0.843 0.438 0.426 0.090 
37203 0.468 0.101 0.953 0.362 0.953 0.469 0.362 0.000 0.000 
3811 0.678 0.195 0.738 0.225 0.693 0.306 0.241 0.546 0.129 
3812 0.178 0.021 0.633 0.274 0.453 0.417 0.089 0.450 0.097 
3813 0.541 0.217 0.906 0.707 0.225 0.109 0.039 0.279 0.073 
3821 0.814 0.276 0.979 0.389 0.390 0.117 0.365 0.000 0.000 
3822 0.730 0.267 0.935 0.654 0.746 0.641 0.386 0.177 0.020 
3823 0.466 0.109 0.575 0.193 0.492 0.107 0.128 0.403 0.091 
3824 0.378 0.091 0.695 0.522 0.351 0.076 0.063 0.566 0.187 
3825 0.848 0.460 0.881 0.402 0.580 0.164 0.154 0.370 0.070 
3831 0.581 0.196 0.597 0.175 0.643 0.410 0.186 0.733 0.300 
3832 0.506 0.127 0.625 0.214 0.469 0.204 0.100 0.967 0.908 
3833 0.655 0.231 0.853 0.273 0.398 0.393 0.076 0.518 0.146 
3841 0.739 0.280 0.952 0.752 0.891 0.823 0.432 0.834 0.431 
3842 0.948 0.827 1.000 0.897 0.980 0.406 0.922 0.768 0.588 
3843 0.682 0.200 0.875 0.329 0.728 0.515 0.223 0.814 0.432 
3844 0.752 0.335 0.770 0.415 0.944 0.759 0.697 0.955 0.933 
3851 0.773 0.421 0.904 0.439 0.694 0.140 0.228 0.384 0.087 
3852 0.918 0.513 0.936 0.667 0.664 0.051 0.231 0.849 0.319 
3853 0.604 0.133 0.723 0.268 0.483 0.214 0.101 0.742 0.235 
3901 0.543 0.238 0.714 0.395 0.929 0.236 0.789 0.569 0.159 
3902 0.788 0.251 0.846 0.328 0.721 0.597 0.201 0.694 0.204 
3903 0.394 0.077 0.532 0.129 0.452 0.397 0.112 0.481 0.108 
39097 0.119 0.016 0.657 0.295 0.356 0.305 0.061 0.454 0.086 
Notes: Industry code is KSIC four-digit level; CR3 is three-firm concentration ratio (KDI 
database, Seoul, Korea, Korea Development Institute); His Herfindahl index (KDI database, 
Seoul, Korea, Korea Development Institute); ACR3 is trade-adjusted three-firm concentration 
ratio, calculated using CR3 and compiled from UN Trade System (IEDB, RSPAS, ANU), and 
Input- Output Table(Bank of Korea). 
4 Effects of Foreign Competition on 
Domestic Market Power 
Introduction 
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In many developed countries, it is generally accepted that imports discipline competition 
in an imperfectly competitive domestic market (Pugel 1980; Esposito and Esposito 1971; 
Jacquemin et al. 1980; Tanaka et al. 1985). However, in developing countries the 
potential effects of international trade on domestic market power have yet to be 
analysed.1 Whether an increase in foreign competition, in an imperfectly competitive 
market structure, really provides an additional avenue of enforcement of more 
competitive market behaviour and increases the efficiency of resource allocation are 
important public policy questions. 
The Korean economy is a small and open one. As a country poor in natural 
resources, Korea has pursued export-oriented policies since the implementation of its 
first economic development plan. The ratio of trade (imports plus exports) to GNP was 
68.7 per cent in 1974 and 76.9 per cent in 1986. Thus, any examination of market power 
in Korean manufacturing has been to take account of the growing role of international 
trade. 
The main objectives of this chapter are to investigate whether the hypothesis of 
import discipline is applicable to the case of Korea, and to estimate the economic factors 
behind market concentration in Korean manufacturing in the 1970s and 1980s.2 For the 
empirical analysis, 77 KSIC 4-digit levels of industries are selected for two years, 197 4 
and 1986. Cross-section analysis of data may not be appropriate if the structure of the 
market is not stable, because some firms are in disequilibrium. But, the market structure 
in Korea has remained relatively stable (Chapter 3). 
In the 1970s, Korean manufacturing was highly protected from foreign 
competition and the market mechanism was heavily distorted by government 
intervention. However, in the 1980s, liberalisation was pursued on both the domestic and 
1 
2 
De Melo and Urata (1986), Chou (1986, 1988) and Kalirajan (1993) are the exceptions. 
For a study of economic power and issues surrounding chaebol, see Lee et al. (1990). 
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foreign fronts and government intervention declined considerably. Hence, we can expect 
to find that the factors explaining market concentration changed during the 1970s and 
1980s. Another reason for comparing the 1970s with the 1980s is to allay criticism that 
analysis of a single period fails to reflect dynamic factors. 
This study differs from others in two respects. First, the industry concentration 
index used is trade-adjusted to reflect the effects of import competition on industry 
concentration in Korea's small, open manufacturing economy. Second, barriers to entry, 
particularly in the financial sector, set up by the government are included in the 
estimation model to reflect this unique feature of the Korean economy. 
The Import Discipline Hypothesis 
In general, in an imperfectly competitive market imports will reduce the price-cost 
margin and decrease domestic market concentration (Esposito and Esposito 1971; Pugel 
1980; Jacquemin et al. 1980). Greater competition from foreign producers, including the 
threat of imports, is believed to restrain the market power of domestic firms in the 
domestic market; this is known as the import discipline hypothesis. 
In a perfectly competitive market, the price-cost margin will be zero regardless of 
the threat of imports since market equilibrium price equals marginal cost. 3 In an 
imperfectly competitive market with imports, the price-cost margin will be lowered 
significantly by the presence of competition from imports so long as the price of imports 
is lower than the price set by domestic firms in the home market, and this tends to 
restrain domestic firms' market power. The threat of imports may weaken collusive 
agreements, and individual firms may cut prices in order not to lose their share of the 
domestic market to foreign firms. 
The negative relationship between imports and profitability is not always 
guaranteed, since firms' behaviour in an imperfectly competitive industry is influenced 
by many factors. Assume a static, non-cooperative, oligopolistic firm in the domestic 
market. Also assume that imports and domestic goods are perfectly substitutable and that 
3 Demsetz (1973) argued that a high profit rate earned by a firm in concentrated industries is due to 
managerial as well as technological efficiency. However, there was evidence of collusion among 
firms in Korean manufacturing (Uekusa 1987). 
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imports constitute additional competition for domestic firms and import volumes are 
exogenous.4 Domestic producer i's profit function can be written as: 
(4.1) 
where qi is firm i's output; Q is total output of domestic firms; Mis imports;f(Q+M) = P 
is the inverse domestic demand function; c is variable costs; and F is fixed costs. The 
first order conditions (FOC) for profit maximisation for each domestic firm i assuming 
internal solution, i.e., qi>O for all i is: 
(4.2) 
Some manipulation of equation (4.2) based on the Cournot-Nash type of oligopolistic 
firm ( ~Q = 1) gives us equation (4.3): 
aqi 
L. = P - c; = 11i • Q 
I p E Q+M (4.3) 
where Li is domestic Lerner index for firm i; e is absolute value of price elasticity of 
industry domestic demand (Q+M); and 7Ji is domestic firm ts share of aggregated supply 
in the domestic market ( qi ). Aggregation across the industry gives us equation Q+M 
(4.4): 
n 
PQ-Lqic; 
L= i=1 = H ( Q ) 
PQ E Q+M (4.4) 
4 Pugel (1980) obtains a similar result by differentiating domestic goods from imports in a monopoly 
model. 
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where H <=L,<qi)2) is the Herfindahl index of industry concentration. Equation (4.4) 
i Q 
seems to show the negative relationship between imports and price-cost margin. 
However, the relationship between imports and price-cost margin is not so simple. This 
is because the level of imports affects market concentration (Herfindahl index) and the 
price elasticity of demand at the same time.s As shown in equation (4.2), increasing 
imports will influence each firm i's output and total domestic firms' output (Q). 
When we specify the model for empirical analysis, therefore, we should consider 
other variables such as factors related with elasticity of demand. The market 
concentration equation and price-cost margin equation should also be analysed 
simultaneously. 
Imports can also be expected to affect market concentration (Chou 1986; De 
Melo and Urata 1986). In general, any increase in import intensity will result in a 
decrease in market concentration, as domestic firms' market share decreases with the 
foreign competition. On the other hand, if the threat of imports spurs domestic firms to a 
higher degree of defensive concentration (Jacquemin et al. 1980), or if producers are 
induced to improve their efficiency and the number of efficient producers thus rises (De 
Melo and Urata 1986), then market structure could become more concentrated as imports 
increase. 
Literature Survey 
The Case of Foreign Countries 
Traditionally, economists studying industrial organisation have ignored the potential of 
the influence of foreign trade on domestic market power. Although the threat of potential 
entry has been recognised as an important constraint on established firms' monopoly 
power, foreign competitors have rarely been considered explicitly in analysis. 
5 dL _ dH 17Q H de H d(l-17Q) 
---·---·11 ·---·----=-
dM dM e e2 Q ()M e ()M 
where 1JQ = Q ,(l-17Q) = M Q+M Q+M 
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The main research to date on the effects of foreign competition on domestic 
market structure and market power is reviewed here. Although the hypothesis that the 
threat of competition from imports motivates domestic industry to become more 
competitive can be taken as proved, the effects of exports are still disputed. 
In a departure from traditional economic research, Esposito and Esposito ( 1971) 
examined the influence of actual and potential foreign competition on variability in inter-
industry profit rates. Their regression results show that less restrictive trade policies 
encouraged domestic industries to adopt more competitive pricing behaviour. Their study 
did not, however, look explicitly at the effect of exports. 
Pugel (1978), using US data for 1967-70, also found a negative relationship 
between import competition and profitability. Pugel (1980) found that the dampening 
effect of import competition on prices was more pronounced in industries with a high 
domestic concentration. It is interesting to note that there was a positive relationship 
between market performance and exports in the United States, which Pugel presumed 
reflected the oligopolistic exploitation by US firms of foreign markets. 
However, Neumann, Bobel and Haid (1979) found that export ratios had a 
negative influence on rates of return in Germany, a result they interpreted as being due to 
increased competition. The realisation of the European Common Market, which enlarged 
the available market and increased international specialisation, gave rise to higher export 
ratios in most countries. Consequently, competitive pressure increased and profits 
decreased in Germany. 
Jacquemin et al. (1980), using a two-equation model, analysed the effects of 
foreign trade on domestic competition in 32 representative Belgian manufacturing 
industries. The export ratio exercised a negative effect on the industry concentration 
equation, supporting the hypothesis that industries characterised by a high ratio of 
exports leave room for a larger number of domestic competitors. In the equation, the ratio 
of imports was not statistically significant as a determinant of industry concentration. 
In Jacquemin et al.'s profitability equation, the export ratio proved to be an 
insignificant determinant, while import intensity was negatively related to the price-cost 
margin. One notable result was that the estimated concentration ratio did not influence 
positively the price-cost margin, and hence the structuralist view that higher market 
concentration results in higher profitability seemed not to be true for Belgian 
manufacturing. However, the interactive explanatory variable (industry concentration and 
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import rate) showed a significant negative effect on profitability. Thus Jacquemin et al. 
concluded that degree of domestic concentration might not be a reliable indicator of 
domestic market power, but that interaction between concentration and import rates 
restrained the profitability of Belgian manufacturing. 
De Melo and Urata (1986) examined the effects of Chilean trade reform on 
market structure and performance in the mid-1970s . Using a cross-sectoral simultaneous 
equations model, De Melo and Urata obtained the interesting result that import share was 
positively correlated with a excessive profit rate before trade liberalisation. This result 
suggests that care should be taken in applying the import discipline hypothesis in cases 
where a country has a large number of import quota restrictions. Another important 
finding was that trade liberalisation resulted in a large increase in market concentration 
and a big reduction in profit rates. 
Chou (1988) analysed the effects of international competition on profitability in 
Taiwan, estimating a two-equation model for' the export-oriented and domestic-oriented 
sectors. In the concentration equation, import intensity was significant and positive only 
for the export-oriented sector. Chou presumed that this meant that imports used as inputs 
in exported goods were more concentrated, particularly among the largest firms. The 
policy of protection from imports accounted for the lack of significance of the variable 
for the domestic sector. 
In the profitability equation, a structuralist view was supported only for the 
domestic sector. However, import competition did not influence profits in Taiwanese 
manufacturing. Chou explained the insignificance of import penetration in the domestic 
sector as being due to the country's policy of import control. 
Tanaka et al. (1985) examined the impact of domestic and foreign competition on 
performance in Japan. In their estimation results, import intensity did not significantly 
affect profitability, a result they attributed either to problems with the data or Japan's 
import restriction policy. Export intensity was found to be significant and positive, with 
exports seeming to enhance Japanese firms' efficiency and profitability. Tanaka et al. 
also found that concentration was an important determinant of industry profitability in 
Japanese manufacturing. 
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The Case of Korean Manufacturing 
Chang et al. (1988), following the work of Caves and Uekusa (1976), analysed the 
strategy, structure and performance of Korean business groups, chaebol. They based their 
analysis only on domestic factors (three-firm concentration ratio, advertising intensity, 
total assets, average rate of sales growth and diversification index), using traditional 
industrial organisation theory. One result of note was that concentration ratios did not 
seem to have a marked effect on profit rates. Chang et al. thought that this could be 
because the diversification of firms made it difficult to estimate market power solely 
from concentration in the main industry. 
In their analysis of market performance, Lee et al. (1986) took international 
competition into consideration. Their estimation results supported the hypothesis of 
import discipline. Coefficients of import intensity on the price-cost margin were not 
significant in 1973, were significant at the 1 percent level in 1978 and were significant 
at the 10 percent level in 1983. However, Lee et al.'s main interest was in testing the 
validity of the structuralist view for Korean manufacturing. Furthermore, they used a 
traditional concentration index with no adjustment for trade factors. 
Model Specifications and Data 
As implied by equations (4.2) and (4.4), the price-cost margin is influenced by many 
different factors in an imperfectly competitive environment. The theory suggests a cost-
based analysis of the determinants of the rate of change of domestic price, with the 
relationship between unit production cost and domestic price dependent on market 
concentration and other factors. In particular, equation (4.4) shows that there are two 
important groups of factors in an open economy: domestic market variables, and 
international trade variables. Although much of the empirical literature in developed 
countries indicates that there is no simultaneity in the determinants of price-cost margin, 
it does not exclude the possibility of simultaneity among variables (Geroski 1982; 
Kalirajan 1993). Our specification of the model assumes simultaneity between price-cost 
margin and market concentration: 
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Profitability equation: PCM= f3 + A.i ·Fi + 8; · D; + ACR + v (4.5) 
Concentration equation: ACR = a+ Yi ·Fi + (}i · v; +PCM + u (4.6) 
where PCM is price-cost margin; ACR is market concentration; and the variables Fi and 
Di(D;) represent other variables relating to foreign trade and domestic market structure, 
respectively. 
(1) Price-Cost Margin Equation 
International Trade Factors 
As noted earlier, foreign competition in the domestic market can be expected to decrease 
a domestic firm's price-cost margin. To examine the applicability of the hypothesis of 
import discipline, import intensity, calculated by dividing domestic consumption by 
imports, was used as a proxy for import competition. 
Although domestic concentration is in itself an essential determinant of market 
power, it is also necessary to consider the interaction of domestic concentration and other 
elements of market structure, especially international trade (Jacquemin 1980). Import 
competition and the uncertainty it brings about are likely to modify the reaction of rival 
firms to oligopolistic decisions; the constraining effect of import competition on market 
conduct and the performance of domestic producers will be stronger the higher the 
industrial concentration. Therefore, the effect of the interactive term ACR */MI was also 
examined. The sign of the interactive variable is then expected to be negative. 
Like import intensity, the level of tariffs on imports is also a determining factor in 
the price-cost margin. This is because any reduction in import tariffs decreases the price 
of imported goods, constituting a restricting factor on domestic firms' monopoly power 
(see Chapter 2). An effective protection rate based on the Corden method and a measure 
of the degree of liberalisation from quantitative restrictions was used to measure 
international trade restrictions. 
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The effects of export intensity can be interpreted in two ways. If domestic firms 
have difficulty in colluding effectively in the world market, the price-cost margin will be 
lower the greater the share of industry output exported (Caves 1985). The other argument 
is that the higher risks associated with exporting may induce domestic firms to export 
only if the return is higher than that on domestic sales (Khalizadeh-Shirazi 1974). Price 
discrimination between the domestic and the export market is also important. If dumping 
is not possible domestic price falls to the world price. If dumping is possible, domestic 
firms will reduce the quantities sold at home and raise the domestic price, as a result of 
flattened export demand (Jacquemin et al. 1980). In this case, dumping results in an 
increase in total profit but may depress the weighted average price-cost margin (see 
Chapter 2). 
Domestic Market Factors 
Among the theoretical possibilities, level of concentration cannot be dismissed as a factor 
in determining the price-cost margin. In equation (4.4), as the level of concentration 
increases, the elasticity of demand tends to decrease, enabling imperfectly competitive 
firms to increase their price-cost margin. Thus, level of concentration can be expected to 
have a positive sign in the model. The structuralist argument supports this view. The 
structuralist argues that the possibility of collusion among firms in a concentrated 
industry makes it easier to increase prices. However, some other industrial organisation 
economists have an opposing view of high industry profitability, known as the efficiency 
hypothesis. The efficiency hypothesis is based on the likelihood of greater efficiency 
among larger firms (Demsetz 1973). Greater efficiency leads to a high market 
concentration and greater profitability among large firms. 
Information on the price elasticity of demand is difficult to come by, and this 
variable needs to be proxied by a measurable variable to explain profitability. Industry 
growth or industry size can be used as a proxy for growth in market demand. The sign of 
this variable can be expected to be positive, since it provides, other things being equal, an 
opportunity for all firms to increase market prices and/or to reduce unit costs due to 
greater capacity utilisation (Jacquemin et al. 1980). The growth rate at time t is defined 
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as (VS1 - VS1_ 2 ) I VS1_ 2 , where VS is the value of shipments. Industry size is calculated as 
sales+ imports - exports. 
Capital intensity is included to control for normal rate of return, as the price-cost 
margin includes both normal and excess rates of return. For the empirical test, average 
variable costs are assumed to be the same as marginal costs, and the cost of capital is not 
included in the average variable costs because it is difficult to calculate. Thus, the price-
cost margin will be upwardly biased if the cost of capital is not subtracted (Fisher 1987). 
To avoid this bias, a variable for capital intensity is needed. The sign of the capital 
intensity variable can be expected to be positive. The value of depreciatable assets/total 
output has been widely used as a proxy for capital intensity (Urata 1979; Esposito and 
Esposito 1971). 
(2) Concentration Equation 
It is commonly accepted that concentration ratios are useful indices of market power. 
However, as Curry and George (1983) suggest, a concentration ratio is not an 
exogenously given variable. In addition, as noted in equation (4.4), economic theory 
suggests the simultaneity of market structure and performance. This is mainly because 
the price-cost margin equation is derived from an equilibrium condition for profit 
maximisation. Thus, here we assume the existence of a bidirectional causality between 
concentration and market performance. 
International Trade Factors 
As noted in section two, any increase in import intensity tends to decrease domestic 
market concentration, since imports provide additional competition for domestic firms. 
The variables used to proxy import competition in the concentration equation are the 
same as those used in the price-cost margin equation. 
In general, an increase in exporting will decrease domestic market concentration. 
The existence of foreign markets presents an opportunity for domestic producers to sell 
their products overseas. Sales in foreign markets tend to relax the constraints of a small 
domestic market and allow a larger number of firms to operate. However, if export 
expansion results in a rapid reduction in average costs due to the presence of scale 
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economies, it may result in a positive relationship between export intensity and market 
concentration (Chou 1988). Export intensity is defined here as exports divided by sales. 
Domestic Market Factors 
Economies of scale, which enable relatively large firms to operate at lower average costs 
than smaller firms, increase market concentration. The effects of economies of scale 
depend on optimal plant size and the industry. Due to difficulties in measuring 
economies of scale, they are often estimated on the basis of minimum efficient scale. The 
larger the minimum efficient scale of the plants, the smaller the number of firms that can 
efficiently supply the market. In the present study, following Comanor et al. (1967) and 
Caves et al. ( 197 6), minimum efficient scale is defined as the average size of large plants 
accounting for 50 per cent of industry output. Comanor et al. (1967) argue that this 
measure is more closely related to Bain's engineering estimates of minimum efficient 
scale than to the Florence median. 6 
Product differentiation is another major barrier to entry of a new firm (Bain 
1968). Product differentiation fosters concentration through the development of a 
premium image that gives leverage in price competition in the market. Comanor and 
Wilson ( 1967) used the ratio of advertising to sales as a proxy for product differentiation. 
Here, the index of intra-industry trade will be used to proxy product differentiation, 
because of the close relationship between the two (Grubel et al. 1975; Krugman et al. 
1991). 
Another important barrier to entry, particularly for firms in developing countries, 
is government intervention in the market. Most research on market concentration has 
focused on developed countries, and so government intervention in developing countries 
has largely been ignored. If the market mechanism is severely distorted by government 
policy, this exogenous variable could influence domestic market concentration, and thus 
should be included among entry barriers. Thus the Law of Proportionate Effect or 
6 The Florence median is a hypothetical plant of a size such that half of an industry's output or 
employment comes from plants larger than it and half from ones smaller. The basic logic for using it 
is that the observed distribution of plant sizes will be clustered in some way around the optimum size, 
so that some measure of central tendency will provide a reasonable approximation to minimum 
efficient scale (Comanor et al. 1967). 
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Gibrats' Law is not an appropriate assumption for the increase in industry concentration 
in Korea. 
As was the case in many other developing countries, the Korean government 
intervened heavily in the market in the 1960s and 1970s (Frank, Kim and Westpahl 1975; 
Kim 1993). In particular, the government played a pivotal role in allocating scarce capital 
resources during the period and, in view of the country's immature capital market, low-
interest rates for long-term bank loans and foreign loans were regarded as important 
policy measures (Kim 1992). The Korean government actively encouraged large firms to 
exploit economies of scale (mostly in the heavy and chemical industries) during the 
1970s (Korea University 1989). Government intervention in the market mechanism in 
the 1970s can be expected to have increased market concentration. Government 
intervention in Korean manufacturing is defined as an industry's share of total long-term 
bank loans divided by total fixed liabilities and/or the industry's share of total long-term 
foreign loans divided by total fixed liabilities. The analysis, however, does not include 
the effect of mergers on the concentration of industry, mainly due to data availability 
(see Chapter 3). 
Data 
Most of the variables used in the estimation are derived from Report on Mining and 
Manufacturing Survey (EPB), with some adjustment for the values of import intensity 
and export intensity. 7 The basic data for import and export intensities were compiled 
from UN Trade System (IEDB, RSPAS, ANU); adjustments were based on the Input-
Output Table (BOK) for the 4-digit level of KSIC classifications. 
The profitability variable was measured as the value of sales less the costs of 
bought-in materials and the wage bill divided by the value of sales. The measurement 
excludes capital costs and advertising expenses and hence it inflates margins in those 
industries where capital and advertising intensities are high. However, the measurement 
is easy to handle data based on the 4-digit level of industry classification and has the 
advantage of being closely related to the Lerner index. 8 
7 
8 
The data are based on establishment level. The model therefore is not applicable for the analysis of 
chaebol. The technological economies of scale of the establishment are not directly related with the 
growth of chaebol in Korea (see Chapter 2). 
The accounting rate of return on assets or on equity and Tobin's q (the ratio of a firm's stock market 
value to its replacement value) are alternative choices. However, the treatment of depreciation means 
that accounting measures may bear little resemblance to the true return. Accounting standards also do 
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A brief definition of variables is given in Table 4.1. (see Appendix 4.3 and 4.4 for 
the data). 
TABLE 4.1: DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES 
Variable Mean Definition 
1986 1974 
Tariff2 0.24(1.33' 0.44(2.06) Effective protection rate calculated by 
Corden method 
FQR 0.74(0.24; 0.35(0.26) Degree of freedom from quantitative 
restriction 
ACR3 0.43(0.26) 0.45(0.23) Trade-adjusted three-firm concentration ratio 
PCM 0.27(0.10' 0.28(0.11) (Value added - Wages )N alue of shipment 
EOSL 0.09(0.11 0.11(0.15) Shipments of large plants accounting for 
50% of total output, divided by total value of 
industry shipments 
RGR 38.5(35.5' 152.2(147.7) Change in value of shipments over three 
years(%) 
CA 0.37(0.17 0.59(1.72) Depreciable assets at end of year divided by 
output 
BANKL 0.12(0.05) 0.12(0.06) Long-term bank loans divided by industry's 
total fixed liabilities 
HT 0.45(0.30) 0.39(0.34) Intra-industry trade index: 1- IEX -!Ml 
(EX +IM) 
IM IMS 0.19(0.21 0.24(0.25) Imports divided by domestic consumption 
(Sales+ imports - exports) 
EXI 0.25(0.29) 0.22(0.25) Exports divided by sales 
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are standard deviation. 
2. Data sources are: 
(1) Hong (1992); 
(2) Kim (1988); 
(3) KDI database (Korea Development Institute); 
(4) Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey (Economic Planning Board 1988, 1976); 
(5) Financial Statement Analysis (Banlc of Korea 1974, 1989; Korea Development Bank 
1974, 1989); and 
(6) UN World Trade (IEDB, Australian National University) and Input-Output Table 
(Bank of Korea 1976, 1988) 
Source 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(4) 
(4) 
(4) 
(4) 
(6) 
(6) 
(6) 
not incorporate the real value of assets such as reputation and brand into the company account, which 
can bias profitability estimates in cross-section studies and overstate the stability of profits over time. 
It is difficult to estimate the replacement value of assets for Tobin's q. 
Statistical Results and Analysis 
Two-Stage Least Square Estimation 
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As explained above, because of simultaneity in equations (4.6) and (4.7), we estimated 
these two equations using the two-stage least-squares (2SLS) method. The independent 
variables finally selected for the profitability equation were: level of concentration 
(LACR); import intensity (UM/); export intensity (LEXI); capital intensity (LCAoun; 
and market growth (RGR). Profitability (LPCM), economies of scale (LEOS), import 
intensity (LIM/), export intensity (LEXI), product differentiation (LIIn, and long-term 
bank loans (LBANKL) were the variables selected as the determinants of concentration. 
In the final simultaneous equations, both concentration and price-cost margin equations 
are over-identified. For convenience, the results estimated by 2SLS will be compared 
with OLS results. The significance of the simultaneity bias will also be examined. 
Statistical estimation was carried out for 77 KSIC 4-digit level industries for 1986 
and 1974. The final results are shown in Table 2.2 (profitability) and Table 4.3 (market 
concentration). The coefficient of determination (R2 ) and adjusted R2 (R 2 ) are given for 
each estimated equation; t-values for the estimated coefficients are beneath in 
parentheses. Given that these are cross-section estimates, R2 and 71.2 seem to be 
satisfactory for both years. All the F-values are significant at the 1 percent level. 
All variables except for market growth rate are in logarithmic form. Thus, with 
this exception, the coefficients of variables can be interpreted as elasticities.9 Variables 
in the table display the expected sign, with some minor exceptions. 
Profitability equation 
The estimation results for profitability shown in Table 4.2. indicate that the hypothesis of 
import discipline is confirmed for Korean manufacturing. Import intensity (L/M/) was 
significant at the 1 per cent level in 1986 and at the 10 per cent level in 197 4.1° 
9 For instance, for 1986, the relationship between market growth and profitability can be expressed as 
follows: a per cent increase in RGR results in an increase in profitability of l'lPCM86 = 
0.0009*PCM (Remembering that l'llogx = l'lx IX). 
10 The low explanatory power of the equation in 1974 is mainly due to direct price regulation by the 
government. The Korean government enacted the Price Stabilisation and Fair Trade Act in 1974 for 
the purpose of eliminating the harmful effects of high industrial concentration. However, the 
government started to emphasise the free market mechanism in 1981, when it enacted the Act 
Concerning Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade. 
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Interestingly, the statistical significance of the variable increased greatly between 1974 
and 1986. 
There are two important reasons for this change. First, a reduction of trade 
restrictions and hence increased competition occurred during the period. For example, as 
shown in Table 4.1, the average effective tariff rate (Corden method) decreased from 44 
per cent in 1974 to 24 per cent in 1986, and the average freedom from quantitative 
restrictions increased from 35 per cent in 1974 to 74 per cent in 1986. Second, the 
government controlled prices directly in 1974. After the first oil shock, the government 
controlled prices on a large number of commodities in monopolistic and oligopolistic 
markets (see Chapter 2). Direct control over prices suppressed price increases and the 
generation of monopoly profits. 
The coefficient of trade-adjusted concentration ratio had a positive sign but was 
not significant. The results thus seemed to imply that the structuralist argument is not 
directly applicable to Korean manufacturing. The relationship between market structure 
and performance is complex and controversial. According to the traditional structure-
conduct-performance approach, profits are mainly influenced by the structure of a 
particular market (Mason 1939; Bain 1951 ). The traditional premise is that market 
structure is exogenously given. However, Demsetz (1973) suggested that the high profits 
of firms represent the efficiency of firms rather than market power. Transaction cost 
economists argue that firms may become large and profitable because of organisational 
economies (Williamson 1975). Ferguson et al. (1994), using a modification of the 
traditional approach, argued that performance and conduct also affects structure. 11 
The results imply that market concentration, coupled with protection, can distort 
allocative efficiency. Using the variable for interaction between import intensity and 
concentration, we also examine the way import competition restricts domestic firms' 
market power. The results reveal that the interactive variable has a negative sign as 
expected both in 1986 and 1974. The coefficient is significant at the 5 per cent level in 
1986, but not significant in 1974 (Appendix 4.1). Thus it would seem that, while in 1974 
only import intensity directly affected domestic firms' profitability, in 1986 both the 
direct influence of import intensity and the indirect influence of the interactive variable 
restricted market power. Lee et al. (1986) examined the relationship between 
11 If variability in earnings is positively related to concentration, then any positive relationship between 
profit and concentration may reflect the greater variability of profits rather than monopoly power. 
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concentration (Herfindahl index) and profitability for three years but found a positive 
relationship only in 1983. Research in the USA since the early 1970s has been 
controversial. Domowitz et al. (1986) reported that the relationship between market 
structure and profit has disappeared since 1970s, while Salinger, using import-adjusted 
concentration ratios, showed that the relationship was strengthened. Many studies in the 
UK have failed to find a positive relationship between concentration and profitability 
(Hart et al. 1980; Clarke 1984). 
In addition, modem oligopoly theory using non-cooperative game theory suggests 
that a collusive outcome may obtain in oligopolistic markets without any direct 
communication (Shapiro 1989; Tirole 1988). In the Korean context this theory of tacit 
collusion is relevant since Korean market is characterised by an oligopolistic structure 
(Chapter 3). 
All signs for the export intensity variable were positive, both in 1986 and 1974. 
However, this variable was significant (at the 5 per cent level) only in 1974. This seems 
odd since there is a strong presumption that Korean exporting was based on dumping in 
the world market in the 1970s. Economic theory suggests that if a firm in a small open 
economy dumps its products on the world market, exporting may negatively affect the 
observed average price-cost margin. Many Korean exporters were supported by 
government policies including subsidies in the 1960s and 1970s. Subsidies effectively 
reduce costs and hence increase price-cost margins. The results indicate that the effect of 
subsidies may have compensated for losses from dumping in the 1970s. 
The effects of trade on profitability in Korea are different from the case of Japan. 
According to Odagiri (1994), the profit rate in Japanese manufacturing is not affected by 
import competition but is lower in heavily exporting industries. Odagiri explained that 
the insignificant effect of imports is due to intense competition among domestic firms, 
whereas the negative effect of exports is a result of lower profitability in overseas 
markets than domestic markets.12 
12 As Odagiri admitted correctly, the effects of trade on profitability are not clear. For example, the 
lower capacity utilisation between 1982 and 1983 may have prompted firms to undertake an 
aggressive export drive. 
83 
TABLE 4.2: DETERMINANTS OF INDUS1RY PROFITABILITY, 1986 AND 1974 
constant LACR LIMI LEXI LCAOUT RGR 
OLS(1986) 
-1.23 0.022 -0.062 0.011 0.230 0.0009 
(-10.13)a (0.38) (-3.00)a (0.57) (2.79)a (0.86) 
n=77 R2 =0.17 F=272.22 
R 2 =0.11 
2SLS(1986) 
-1.20 0.008 -0.057 0.014 0.203 0.0009 
(-8.79)a (1.02) (-2.49)b (0.69) (2.47)a (0.83) 
n=77 R2 =0.14 
R 2 =0.09 
OLS(l974) 
-1.42 0.029 -0.044 0.056 -0.061 0.00005 
(-8.85)a (0.35) (-1.72)C (2.09)b (-1.44) (0.17) 
n=77 R2 =0.12 F=146.54 
R 2 =0.06 
2SLS(1974) 
-1.39 0.052 -0.041 0.058 -0.060 0.00005 
(-5.15)a (0.29) (-1.36) (2.0l)b (-1.41) (0.16) 
n=77 R2 =0.11 
R 2 =0.05 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t values. 
a: Significant at the 99 per cent level by two-tail t test. 
b: Significant at the 95 per cent level by two-tail t test. 
c: Significant at the 90 per cent level by two-tail t test. 
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The estimation results fail to support the traditional structuralist view that the 
performance of firms in any industry is determined by the structure of the market they 
operate in. The coefficients of the estimated concentration ratios were not statistically 
significant in 1986 or 1974. Similar results were obtained by Jacquemin et al. (1980) in 
another small, open economy for Belgian manufacturing. 
Capital intensity was positive and significant at the 1 per cent level in 1986. Thus, 
in 1986, the revealed price-cost margin seems to have been influenced upwardly by the 
cost of capital. However, capital intensity was negative but not significant in 1974. The 
market growth variable is not significant in 1986 or 197 4. 
The 2SLS results in Table 4.2 indicate that import intensity and capital intensity 
were important factors in profitability in 1986. This is in line with the OLS results. The 
magnitude of most variables in the 2SLS results differs little from the OLS results in 
1974. However, the 2SLS results indicate that import intensity was not a significant 
determinant of profitability in 1974. As observed in Lee at al. (1986), the growth rate of 
market did not affect profitability in Korea (see Appendix 4.1). 
Determinants of the level of concentration 
The results in Table 4.3 indicate that foreign competition strongly suppressed the level of 
industry concentration in 1986 and 1974; in both years, the coefficients for import 
intensity were negative and significant at the 1 percent level. As a proxy for import 
competition, the effective protection rate estimated by the Corden method and the 
freedom from quantitative restrictions were also included. However, the results were not 
significant, possibly because the data obtained at the 4-digit level were not reliable. 
Export intensity also showed a negative relationship with industry concentration. 
The coefficient was significant at the 1 per cent level in 197 4, but not significant in 1986. 
Thus the export market would seem to have played a role for new entrants or smaller 
firms in the mid 1970s in providing additional room for domestic firms. In actuality, in 
the early years of development, Korean exports depended greatly on small and medium 
sized firms and light industry. The pattern of exporting changed in the 1980s, with heavy 
and chemical industries dominating. Therefore, considered together with the economies 
of scale variable, the impact of overseas markets in providing room for a greater number 
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of enterprises seems to have been diluted by increased economies of scale among larger 
firms in the mid 1980s.13 
As in many other countries, economies of scale is an important explanatory 
variable for industry concentration. The coefficients for economies of scale were 
significant at the 1 per cent level, in 1986 and 1974. Moreover, the significance of 
economies of scale in 1986 increased compared to 197 4, suggesting that technological 
factors were becoming more important in determining the relative concentration levels of 
Korean manufacturing. 
Table 4.3 indicates that product differentiation was another significant barrier to 
new entry in both 1986 and 197 4. The variable was significant at the 1 per cent level of 
significance in 1986 and at the 5 per cent level in 1974. The profitability variable was not 
significant in 1986 or 1974. 
In contrast to more traditional factors, government intervention had a marked 
effect on the level of industry concentration in the early years of development in Korea. 
The government encouraged large firms to exploit economies of scale. The coefficient 
for long-term bank loans in 1974 was positive and statistically significant at the 5 per 
cent level, indicating that market concentration in the mid 1970s was positively 
influenced by government intervention in the financial market. In particular, the 
favourable flow of funds with lower interest rates for large firms in the 1970s resulted in 
concentration of industry and an inefficient allocation of resources.14 The coefficient was 
not, however, significant in 1986. The ratio of debt to total assets for large firms was 8.2 
per cent higher than that for small and medium firms in 1973-81 (Kim 1992; Chapter 3). 
In the period 1973 to 1981, the average interest rate for large firms was 1.9 per cent 
lower than that for small and medium firms. The ratio decreased to 0.3 per cent and -4.4 
per cent in 1982-86 and 1987-1990 respectively. However, the favourable interest rates 
for large firms continued in the 1980s. 
13 In 1985, the export ratios of light industry and heavy and chemical industries were 36.9 per cent and 
54.4 per cent respectively. By contrast, in 1975, these ratios were 57.4 per cent and 25.1 per cent. 
14 Caves et al. (1976) also argued that capital market discrimination in 1956-71 in favour of large firms 
in Japanese manufacturing resulted in concentration of industry. However, they did not provide any 
econometric evidences. 
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TABLE 4.3: DETERMINANTS OF INDUSTRY CONCENTRATION, 1986 AND 1974 
constant LPCM LEOS LIMI LEXI LIIT LBANK 
OLS(1986) 
-0.05 -0.023 0.362 -0.108 -0.035 0.140 0.015 
(-0.15) (-0.14) (9.00)a (-3.34)a (-1.22) (3.02)a (0.16) 
n=77 R2 =0.60 F=74.87 
R 2 =0.56 
2SLS(1986) 
-0.51 -0.340 0.364 -0.128 -0.029 0.163 0.003 
(-0.54) (-0.54) (8.77)a (-2.55)b (-0.93) (2.53)b (0.03) 
R2 =0.57 
R2 =0.54 
OLS(1974) 
-0.33 0.041 0.119 -0.146 -0.106 0.114 0.241 
(-0.91) (0.27) (2.97)a (-4.31)a (-2.73)a (2.31)b (2.27)b 
n=77 R2 =0.32 F=38.18 
R2 =0.27 
2SLS(1974) 
-0.21 0.121 0.119 -0.142 -0.109 0.111 0.247 
(-0.16) (0.13) (2.89)a (-2.50)b (-2.05)b (l.76)b (2.05)b 
R2 =0.32 
R2 =0.26 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t values. 
a: Significant at the 99 per cent level by two-tail t test, 
b: Significant at the 95 per cent level by two-tail t test, 
c: Significant at the 90 per cent level by two-tail t test. 
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Interestingly, the distortion caused by government intervention was most severe 
in the consumer goods industry (Appendix 4.2). During the period of government 
intervention in the financial market, most capital was directed to the producer goods 
industry, especially the heavy and chemical industries, in the 1970s. This may have 
meant that the relative scarcity of capital in the consumer goods industry allows only a 
few large firms access to the low interest rates of long-term bank loans. In addition to 
financial policy, the tax system was regarded as another important channel for 
government intervention (Kim 1991; Kwack 1986). However, these variables were 
excluded from our final results as they were not significant in 1986 or 197 4. 
The 2SLS results in Table 4.3 are in line with the OLS results in 1986. In both 
sets of results, economies of scale, import intensity, export intensity and product 
differentiation are important explanatory variables. The 2SLS results for 1974 are also 
consistent with OLS results, with the exception of the product differentiation variable, 
which was significant in the OLS estimation but not significant in the 2SLS results. The 
magnitudes of international trade factors (import and export intensity) in the 2SLS results 
were lower than those for the OLS results. However, the magnitudes of economies of 
scale and government intervention variables were the same. 
The Chow test was applied to test the stability (constancy) of the estimated 
parameters in the price-cost margin and concentration equations between 1974 and 1986. 
The null hypothesis of no structural change was rejected both for the concentration and 
for the price-cost margin equations.15 
Test of Simultaneity of the Equation 
Until recently, the possibility of bidirectional interaction between the profitability of an 
industry and the level of market concentration has been ignored. Although some research 
has been based on simultaneous equations, there has been no statistical testing either for 
simultaneity or for the appropriate dimensions of the simultaneous equation system 
(Kalirajan 1993). 
15 Pooled data for 1974 and 1986 are used for the calculation of the residual sum of squares for the 
restricted equation. The F -value for the price-cost margin equation is 2.68 while the critical value for 
F(6, 142) is 2.1 and 2.8 at the 5 per cent and 1 per cent level, respectively. TheF-value for the 
concentration equation is 11.59, while the critical value for F(7, 140) is 2.01and2.64 at the 5 per 
cent and 1 per cent level, respectively. 
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The statistical test employed here is the Hausman test, which compares two 
estimates of a certain parameter that are consistent and asymptotically normal if the 
model is correctly specified. The Hausman test, if applied to equations ( 4.5) and ( 4.6), is 
equivalent to estimating the following redefined equations: 
lnPCM = /3 +A· lnD; + 8; · lnF; + </J1 • lnACR + </J2 • lnACR + v (4.7) 
A 
lnACR =a+ O; · lnD; + Y; · lnF; + </J3 • lnPCM + </J4 • lnPCM + u (4.8) 
where ln PCM and ln ACR are estimated from a set of instrumental variables consisting 
of all the exogenous variables in the model. The null hypothesis of the simultaneity of 
the system is </J2 equals zero for equation (4.7) and </J4 equals zero for equation (4.8). The 
estimation results show that neither variable is statistically significant even at the 10 per 
cent level, which implies that simultaneity between profitability and concentration may 
not have been the case for Korean manufacturing in 1986 and 1974.16 Therefore, the 
OLS results do not seem to be biased in these concentration and profitability equations. 
Summary and conclusion 
We examined the links between international trade and domestic industrial organisation 
to see how imports affected domestic firms' market power in Korean manufacturing in 
1974 and 1986. Profitability and concentration equations were estimated using multiple 
regression. The results were estimated using both OLS and 2SLS methods. 
The main finding is that, in both 1974 and 1986, imports restricted domestic 
firms' market power and considerably restrained industrial concentration. An important 
policy implication is that financial subsidies for selected industries and firms accelerated 
concentration of market structure in Korea; market concentration, coupled with 
protection, distorted efficiency in resource allocation. 
16 In 1986, the t-ratios for the estimated price-cost margin and concentration were, respectively, -0.54 
and 1.10; in 1974, they were 0.09 and 0.14. 
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In 1986, both OLS and 2SLS results indicate that import intensity significantly 
constrained the price-cost margin. The OLS result for 197 4 confirmed the disciplining 
effect of imports. The hypothesis of import discipline was therefore found to be 
applicable to Korean manufacturing. Estimation results for the concentration equation 
demonstrate that import intensity significantly affected domestic industrial concentration 
in both 197 4 and 1986. Imports seem to have provided an avenue for enforcing more 
competitive market behaviour and increasing the allocative efficiency of Korean 
manufacturing. Export intensity was found to positively affect the price-cost margin in 
both 197 4 and 1986. In 197 4, both OLS and 2SLS results showed that exporting was 
profitable, possibly because of the government's export subsidy policy. This variable was 
not significant in 1986, however. The effect of export intensity on level of concentration 
was negative in both 197 4 and 1986. The role of the world market in providing room for 
domestic firms, including new and small firms, seems to have been stronger in 197 4; 
possibly, the strengthened economies of scale associated with exporting proved to be a 
barrier to entry in 1986. 
In addition, the results show that the barrier to new entry caused by government 
intervention in the financial sector in the mid 1970s was an important factor in market 
concentration in Korean manufacturing. The allocation of capital by the government 
significantly and positively influenced market concentration in the 1970s. The coefficient 
of the variable was not significant in the 1980s, when the government reduced its 
intervention. The results suggest that the government policy of intervention increased 
market concentration and distorted resource allocation. 
In contrast to the structuralist argument, the concentration variable was not 
significant in the profitability equation in either 197 4 or 1986. It would seem that while 
in 197 4 only import intensity directly affected domestic firms' profitability, in 1986 both 
the direct influence of import intensity and the indirect influence of the interactive 
variable (import intensity multiplied by concentration ratio) restricted market power. The 
results thus imply that market concentration, associated with protection, can distort 
allocative efficiency. In addition, in line with modern oligopoly theory, a high degree of 
tacit collusion is possible in a market characterised by oligopoly, like Korean 
manufacturing. 
The estimation results demonstrated that economies of scale and product 
differentiation were important factors in market concentration in both 197 4 and 1986. As 
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expected, the significance of this technical factor and product differentiation differed 
according to the year. The coefficients for economies of scale and product differentiation 
in total industry were more significant in 1986 than in 197 4. 
There are some qualifications to these results. The model did not explicitly reflect 
the concentration of economic power (chaebol), mainly due to the difficulty of obtaining 
data. Although Cournot-type competition is frequently used to explain a positive link 
between concentration and profits, this relationship is not clear if imperfectly competitive 
firms compete in Bertrand-type competition or Shumpeterian competition. Further study, 
incorporating the effects of other international linkages (foreign direct investment and 
international technology agreements, for example) is needed. Due to the difficulty of 
obtaining data, the analysis also did not include the effects of mergers on the competitive 
behaviour of firms and performance in the market. 
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APPENDIX 4.1: PROFITABILITY EQUATION WITH INTERACTIVE VARIABLE BETWEEN 
IMPORTS AND CONCENTRATION, 1986 AND 1974 
constant LACR LIMI LCRM LEXI LCAOUT RGR 
LPCM86 -1.39 -0.10 -0.012 -0.063 0.015 0.189 0.0008 
(-8.47)a (-0.20) (-3.52)a (-2.31)b (0.077) (2.38)b (0.79) 
n=77 R 2 =0.21 F=241.5 
7I2=0.14 
LPCM74 -1.47 -0.007 -0.074 -0.032 0.056 0.146 0.00003 
(-8.47)a (-0.07) (-1.51) (-0.72) (2.05)b (3.16)a (0.08) 
n=77 R 2 =0.13 F=124.8 
lP=0.05 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t values. 
LCRM is interaction variable between concentration (ACR) and import intensity (!MI). 
a: Significant at the 99 per cent level by two-tail t test. 
b: Significant at the 95 per cent level by two-tail t test. 
c: Significant at the 90 per cent level by two-tail t test. 
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APPENDIX 4.2: DETERMINANTS OF INDUSTRY CONCENTRATION IN CONSUMER GOODS 
AND PRODUCER GOODS INDUSTRIES, 1986 AND 1974 
Constant LEOS LPCM LBANKL LIIT LIMI LEXI 
Consumer goods 
LCR86 -0.26 0.356 -0.015 -0.077 0.112 -0.137 0.007 
(-0.55) (6.55)a (-0.07) (-0.63) (1.53) (-2.76)a (0.16) 
n=41 R2 =0.64 F=35.51 
lP=0.58 
LCR74 -0.42 0.099 -0.073 0.29 0.191 -0.186 -0.076 
(-0.92) (l.74)C (-0.39) (2.23)b (2.29) (-3.71)a (-1.37) 
n=41 R2 =0.44 F=21.81 
lP=0.34 
Producer goods 
LCR86 0.15 0.369 -0.251 0.278 0.143 -0.081 -0.067 
(0.28) (5.69)a (-0.86) (1.44) (2.l 9)b (-1.57) (-1.60) 
n=36 R2 =0.59 F=37.31 
lP=0.50 
LCR74 -0.31 0.130 0.213 0.082 0.077 -0.117 -0.082 
(-0.39) (2.00)C (0.56) (0.36) (1.07) (-1.88)C (-1.18) 
n=36 R2 =0.21 F=14.84 
lP=0.04 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t values. 
a: Significant at the 99 per cent level by two-tail t test. 
b: Significant at the 95 per cent level by two-tail t test. 
c: Significant at the 90 per cent level by two-tail t test. 
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APPENDIX 4.3: VALUE OF SHIPMENTS, VALUE-ADDED, PRICE-COST MARGIN, EFFECTIVE 
CORPORATE TAX, GROWTH OF INDUSTRY, ECONOMIES OF SCALE, 
CAPITAL-OUTPUT RATIO AND CAPITAL LABOUR RATIO IN 1986 
code86 Vship86 Vadd86 PCM86 TAXE86 GR86 EOSL86 CAo86 CAw86 
3111 278635 65673 0.164 0.50 0.33 0.069 0.348 16.9 
3112 907449 247368 0.226 0.50 0.23 0.070 0.217 20.5 
3113 134473 38654 0.205 0.50 0.00 0.039 0.404 7.6 
3114 869019 268703 0.208 0.50 0.85 0.005 0.299 4.9 
3115 445390 81655 0.153 0.50 0.10 0.147 0.230 29.3 
3116 530432 103835 0.160 0.50 0.29 0.072 0.266 26.0 
3117 1411248 525756 0.275 0.50 0.19 0.036 0.377 11.7 
3118 234192 60225 0.233 0.50 0.28 0.500 0.248 61.9 
3121 401271 152797 0.310 0.50 0.22 0.213 0.398 21.4 
3123 1349952 266613 0.163 0.50 0.04 0.021 0.158 21.4 
3131 544875 236701 0.391 0.50 0.18 0.069 0.278 27.8 
3132 162314 89059 0.420 0.50 0.22 0.015 0.450 8.7 
3133 292047 185501 0.598 0.50 0.27 0.313 0.538 87.5 
3134 510553 251457 0.397 0.50 0.16 0.068 0.436 19.6 
3140 1703400 1348660 0.761 0.50 0.05 0.116 0.180 28.3 
3211 3097967 1089398 0.259 0.35 0.16 0.021 0.477 14.2 
3212 3198013 1254862 0.263 0.35 0.31 0.008 0.425 8.6 
3213 725856 303093 0.264 0.35 0.51 0.006 0.364 7.0 
3215 1313396 513335 0.274 0.35 0.82 0.013 0.190 4.2 
3216 21664 9644 0.234 0.35 0.56 0.043 0.349 3.9 
3217 152232 53413 0.200 0.35 0.23 0.161 0.234 4.2 
3221 51716 31436 0.288 0.35 0.28 0.002 0.428 3.0 
3231 896033 183275 0.147 0.41 0.81 0.035 0.138 8.0 
3232 76320 8326 0.197 0.41 1.64 0.068 0.246 3.5 
3233 430194 150923 0.224 0.41 0.77 0.014 0.123 2.4 
3240 562026 229418 0.253 0.41 0.32 0.040 0.193 3.2 
3311 971500 208878 0.155 0.30 0.23 0.012 0.410 10.6 
3312 40209 13651 0.191 0.30 0.10 0.031 0.239 3.8 
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APPENDIX 4.3: (CONTINUED) 
code86 VshiE86 Vadd86 PCM86 TAXE86 GR86 EOSL86 CAo86 CAw86 
3320 477145 205703 0.259 0.30 0.20 0.037 0.381 6.0 
3411 1366426 406910 0.235 0.34 0.38 0.032 0.456 27.3 
3412 656586 198590 0.200 0.34 0.46 0.006 0.261 7.5 
3423 64616 35695 0.284 0.46 0.34 0.005 0.496 4.7 
3511 2563372 651362 0.223 0.43 0.15 0.071 0.422 71.8 
3512 379793 161697 0.324 0.43 0.20 0.033 0.630 26.3 
3513 189322 76111 0.325 0.43 0.84 0.064 0.365 21.0 
3514 539882 171276 0.266 0.43 0.14 0.243 0.926 89.6 
3515 525911 92547 0.127 0.43 0.29 0.262 0.249 28.l 
3516 323318 104269 0.291 0.43 0.32 0.113 0.141 15.2 
3521 409849 131896 0.241 0.43 0.35 0.099 0.290 16.3 
3522 1341214 762218 0.466 0.43 0.25 0.022 0.288 11.2 
3523 654066 326076 0.432 0.43 0.21 0.090 0.208 11.8 
3530 5405582 994267 0.177 0.21 0.37 0.242 0.112 137.9 
3551 703363 270955 0.323 0.21 0.28 0.118 0.235 16.1 
3610 180476 115391 0.391 0.41 0.31 0.063 0.479 4.8 
3620 697655 342639 0.365 0.41 0.34 0.067 0.582 17.8 
3691 150533 79280 0.331 0.41 0.10 0.039 0.820 10.3 
3692 1037095 389214 0.323 0.41 0.13 0.077 0.885 91.1 
3693 1220683 401330 0.241 0.41 0.42 0.007 0.439 16.8 
3694 141989 64357 0.336 0.41 0.46 0.204 0.582 18.3 
3711 133871 47118 0.271 0.34 0.26 0.090 0.354 17.6 
3712 5702166 1701132 0.250 0.34 0.17 0.046 0.405 41.9 
3713 308524 138376 0.266 0.34 0.26 0.048 0.430 8.2 
' . 
3721 512116 100343 0.155 0.34 0.33 0.245 0.344 44.9 
3723 777896 212975 0.179 0.34 0.29 0.065 0.419 16.8 
3724 27165 10568 0.229 0.34 0.36 0.031 0.297 5.3 
3811 336608 156845 0.273 0.43 0.17 0.021 0.306 4.3 
3812 157739 67625 0.257 0.43 0.61 0.019 0.272 4.3 
.. 
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APPENDIX 4.3: (CONTINUED) 
code86 Vship86 Vadd86 PCM86 TAXE86 GR86 EOSL86 CAo86 CAw86 
3813 1154585 488241 0.298 0.43 0.58 0.052 0.574 19.2 
3821 2135 1049 0.271 0.43 -0.94 0.085 0.865 12.7 
3822 402975 130000 0.204 0.43 0.57 0.114 0.370 11.0 
3823 569395 282179 0.184 0.43 0.85 0.005 0.375 7.0 
3824 747128 293491 0.257 0.43 0.24 0.014 0.330 8.8 
3825 628415 266588 0.328 0.43 1.35 0.137 0.463 16.7 
3831 920406 366880 0.277 0.43 0.48 0.037 0.315 9.4 
3832 6263932 2400542 0.302 0.40 0.57 0.015 0.212 7.9 
3833 1039233 363794 0.273 0.40 0.68 0.128 0.289 12.0 
3841 2954434 1032897 0.216 0.45 -0.01 0.075 0.517 21.0 
3842 98564 30008 0.164 0.45 0.18 0.616 0.320 10.2 
3843 4505622 1616998 0.264 0.45 0.81 0.039 0.394 18.3 
3844 190741 58073 0.208 0.45 0.16 0.215 0.505 14.9 
3851 74902 36198 0.289 0.50 1.15 0.057 0.370 5.6 
3852 240867 105129 0.268 0.50 0.41 0.041 0.404 7.0 
3853 345536 138370 0.276 0.50 0.20 0.105 0.227 5.4 
3901 159667 76889 0.336 0.43 1.45 0.130 0.145 2.9 
3902 193020 95393 0.290 0.43 0.56 0.281 0.355 5.9 
3903 292469 125812 0.275 0.43 0.48 0.027 0.226 3.9 
3904 602423 245934 0.239 0.43 0.77 0.007 0.145 1.9 
Notes: Vship86: value of shipments in 1986 (in million won) (Report on Mining and Manufacturing 
Survey, EPB); 
PCM86: price-cost margin ratio in 1986 (PCM= (value-added - wage and salaries)/sales) (Report 
on Mining and Manufacturing Survey, EPB); 
TAXE86: effective tax rate in 1986 (Kim, J.Y., 1992, The Role of Finance in Korea's 
Industrialisation, Seoul Korea, KDI); 
GR86: industry growth rate (GR=(value of shipments 1986 - value of shipments 1984)/value 
of shipments 1984) (Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey, EPB); 
EOSL86:minimum efficient scale (Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey, EPB); 
Vadd86: value-added in 1986 (in million won) (Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey, 
EPB); 
EOSL=ratio of average plant size among the largest plants producing 50 percent of industry's 
value of shipmenta and total value of shipmenta of the industry) (Report on Mining and 
Manufacturing Survey, EPB); 
CAo86: capital output ratio in 1986 (Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey, EPB); 
CAw86: capital worket ratio in 1986 (Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey, EPB). 
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APPENDIX 4.3 (CONTINUED): LONG-TERM BORROWING FROM ABROAD, LONG-TERM 
BANK LOANS, LEGAL TARIFFS, EFFECTIVE PROTECTION 
RATE (CORDEN METHOD), FREEDOM FROM QUANTITATIVE 
RESTRICTIONS, IMPORT INTENSITY AND EXPORT 
INTENSITY IN 1986 
code86 FrgnL86 BankL86 TL86 TEC85 TN86 FC86 FQR85 IMis86 EXI86 
3111 0.0018 0.0889 0.31 -0.18 0.20 0.02 0.56 1.551 0.0570 
3112 0.0000 0.0648 0.31 -0.29 -0.01 0.02 0.56 0.014 0.0122 
3113 0.0028 0.1238 0.31 -0.57 -0.06 0.02 0.56 0.128 0.3009 
3114 0.0018 0.0889 0.31 0.52 -0.13 0.02 0.56 0.064 0.0909 
3115 0.0171 0.0931 0.31 -0.03 1.03 0.02 0.56 0.236 0.0034 
3116 0.0011 0.0454 0.31 -0.39 2.08 0.02 0.56 0.063 0.0081 
3117 0.0027 0.1007 0.31 -0.20 0.06 0.02 0.56 0.001 0.0088 
3118 0.0010 0.0741 0.31 0.46 0.42 0.02 0.56 0.322 0.0291 
3121 0.0000 0.1790 0.76 0.62 0.44 0.02 0.20 0.022 0.1421 
3123 0.0007 0.0558 0.76 -1.85 -0.07 0.02 0.20 0.007 0.0001 
3131 0.0000 0.0328 0.76 -0.02 0.42 0.01 0.20 0.019 0.0063 
3132 0.0000 0.0082 0.76 -0.10 -0.04 0.01 0.20 0.004 0.0009 
3133 0.0000 0.0640 0.76 -0.21 -0.18 0.01 0.20 0.003 0.0056 
3134 0.0000 0.0804 0.76 0.25 0.16 0.01 0.20 0.000 0.0223 
3140 0.0007 0.1017 0.63 -0.22 0.25 0.02 0.09 0.001 0.0067 
3211 0.0435 0.1404 0.22 0.20 0.28 0.05 0.85 0.113 0.3012 
3212 0.0111 0.1292 0.39 0.45 0.18 0.05 0.98 0.075 0.7478 
3213 0.0031 0.3175 0.39 -0.18 0.07 0.05 0.98 0.016 0.4870 
3215 0.0061 0.1523 0.34 1.09 0.15 0.05 0.94 0.016 0.4899 
3216 0.0170 0.1017 0.34 0.54 0.10 0.05 0.94 0.435 0.6378 
3217 0.0170 0.1017 0.34 1.63 0.32 0.05 0.94 0.102 0.5594 
3221 0.0005 0.0908 0.40 0.23 -0.01 0.03 0.96 0.003 0.0034 
3231 0.0002 0.0744 0.31 -0.72 0.08 0.03 0.92 0.285 0.0214 
3232 0.0002 0.0744 0.31 -0.72 0.94 0.03 0.92 0.391 0.0835 
3233 0.0002 0.0744 0.31 -0.24 -0.07 0.03 0.92 0.003 0.7395 
3240 0.0039 0.1052 0.35 0.52 0.28 0.03 1.00 0.004 0.3843 
3311 0.0000 0.1875 0.24 -1.75 0.13 0.01 1.00 0.138 0.0759 
3312 0.0000 0.1875 0.24 -1.01 -0.12 0.01 1.00 0.141 0.1795 
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APPENDIX 4.3: (CONTINUED) 
code86FrgnL86 BankL86 TL86 TEC85 TN86 FC86 FQR85 IMis86 EXI86 
3320 0.0010 0.1516 0.32 -0.21 -0.03 0.00 0.96 0.046 0.1468 
3411 0.0045 0.1859 0.29 0.33 0.14 0.01 0.88 0.257 0.0572 
3412 0.0045 0.1859 0.29 -0.02 0.13 0.01 0.88 0.062 0.0097 
3423 0.0060 0.1093 0.11 -0.06 -0.10 0.00 1.00 0.116 0.1829 
3511 0.0077 0.1543 0.20 0.63 0.22 0.17 0.67 1.075 0.1647 
3512 0.0078 0.2074 0.20 0.59 0.54 0.17 0.67 0.300 0.0559 
3513 0.0000 0.1643 0.20 0.24 0.81 0.17 0.67 0.587 0.0710 
3514 0.0420 0.1697 0.20 -0.13 0.36 0.17 0.67 0.103 0.0330 
3515 0.0000 0.0692 0.20 1.82 0.65 0.17 0.67 0.058 0.1440 
3516 0.0243 0.0597 0.20 -0.35 0.04 0.17 0.67 0.060 0.0418 
3521 0.0000 0.0792 0.24 -0.06 0.03 0.17 0.66 0.108 0.0216 
3522 0.0025 0.1078 0.24 0.36 0.22 0.17 0.66 0.095 0.0388 
3523 0.0000 0.0255 0.24 -0.83 0.18 0.17 0.66 0.036 0.0274 
3530 0.0373 0.1278 0.13 7.75 0.44 0.16 0.54 0.155 0.0787 
3551 0.0376 0.2362 0.30 -0.33 0.06 0.01 0.93 0.044 0.6871 
3610 0.0064 0.1510 0.30 0.38 0.21 0.02 0.80 0.214 0.5829 
3620 0.0725 0.1584 0.31 -0.01 0.08 0.03 0.79 0.330 0.1628 
3691 0.0186 0.2206 0.22 -0.23 0.09 0.02 1.00 0.095 0.0273 
3692 0.0103 0.1143 0.22 0.84 0.26 0.00 1.00 0.004 0.0983 
3693 0.0428 0.0686 0.22 0.42 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.000 0.0004 
3694 0.0326 0.1525 0.22 -0.23 0.12 0.00 1.00 0.167 0.2134 
3711 0.0396 0.1630 0.21 -1.67 0.20 0.01 0.96 0.191 0.2829 
3712 0.0396 0.1630 0.21 -0.21 0.00 0.01 0.96 0.191 0.2829 
3713 0.0396 0.1630 0.21 -0.04 0.25 0.01 0.96 0.191 0.2829 
3721 0.0249 0.1165 0.26 0.24 0.16 0.01 0.89 0.452 0.0826 
3723 0.0249 0.1165 0.26 -0.42 0.26 0.01 0.89 0.452 0.0826 
3724 0.0249 0.1165 0.26 -0.37 0.16 0.01 0.89 0.452 0.0826 
3811 0.0147 0.0998 0.29 0.80 0.32 0.04 0.95 0.230 0.4440 
3812 0.0147 0.0998 0.29 0.77 0.17 0.04 0.95 0.095 0.1514 
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APPENDIX 4.3: (CONTINUED) 
code86 FrgnL86 BankL86 TL86 TEC85 TN86 FC86 FQR85 IMis86 EXI86 
3813 0.0617 0.0835 0.29 1.62 0.51 0.04 0.95 0.676 0.8381 
3821 0.0864 0.1087 0.20 0.39 0.53 0.05 0.81 3.386 0.0187 
3822 0.1482 0.0866 0.21 0.06 -0.05 0.05 0.76 0.065 0.0200 
3823 0.0202 0.1268 0.21 0.85 0.37 0.05 0.76 2.277 0.1907 
3824 0.0202 0.1268 0.21 0.25 0.17 0.05 0.76 1.277 0.2310 
3825 0.0089 0.0202 0.27 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.70 1.434 1.8198 
3831 0.0122 0.0920 0.26 -0.29 -0.14 0.07 0.61 1.066 0.2046 
3832 0.0418 0.1028 0.24 0.28 0.18 0.07 0.57 0.471 0.7410 
3833 0.0311 0.0445 0.36 -0.08 0.01 0.07 0.73 0.006 0.1848 
3841 0.0012 0.1451 0.05 0.48 0.14 0.05 0.55 0.112 0.3913 
3842 0.0460 0.0664 0.16 -4.88 3.15 0.05 1.00 0.150 0.1881 
3843 0.0471 0.1246 0.35 0.85 0.28 0.05 0.42 0.153 0.3621 
3844 0.0025 0.1599 0.43 0.91 0.28 0.05 1.00 0.123 0.1905 
3851 0.0072 0.1570 0.30 2.90 0.93 0.04 0.80 4.502 0.5282 
3852 0.0000 0.1436 0.30 0.70 0.19 0.04 0.80 0.491 0.4339 
3853 0.0000 0.1042 0.30 0.16 0.08 0.04 0.80 0.289 0.4720 
3901 0.0030 0.0932 0.34 3.34 1.32 0.04 0.69 0.236 0.4781 
3902 0.0030 0.0932 0.34 1.22 0.52 0.04 0.69 0.062 0.5440 
3903 0.0030 0.0932 0.34 0.84 0.35 0.04 0.69 0.071 0.6264 
3904 0.0030 0.0932 0.34 0.84 0.35 0.04 0.69 0.068 0.6213 
Notes: FrgnL: long-term loans from foreign country (Financial Statement Analysis, Korea Development 
Bank, 1987); 
BankL: long-term loans from bank (Financial Statement Analysis, Korea Development Bank, 
1987); 
TL: legal tariff rate (Kim, K.S., 1988, The Effect of Trade Liberalization in Korea, Seoul Korea, 
KDI); 
TEC: effective tariff rate calculated by Carden method (Hong, S.D., 1992, The Structural Change 
of Nominal and Effective Protection Rates, KDI ); 
TN: nominal tariff rate (Hong, S.D., 1992); 
FC: foreign capital ratio to total capital (FC75=(FC73+FC78)/2) (Neugent.I., 1989,Variation in 
the Size Distribution of Korean Manufacturing Establishments Across Sectors and Over Time, 
KDI); 
FQR: freedom from quota restriction ratio (Kim, K.S., 1988); 
IMis: imports to value of shipments (Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey, EPB, Input-
Output Table, BOK, compiled from UN Trade System, IDEB, ANU); 
EXI: export intensity to value of shipments (see IMis). 
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APPENDIX 4.4: VALUE OF SHIPMENTS, VALUE-ADDED, PRICE-COST MARGIN, EFFECTIVE 
CORPORATE TAX, GROWTH OF INDUSTRY, ECONOMIES OF SCALE, 
CAPITAL-OUTPUT RATIO AND CAPITAL LABOUR RATIO IN 1975 
code75 Vship75 Vadd75 PCM75 TAXE75 GR75 EOSL75 CAo75 CAw75 
3111 11849 3687 0.240 0.46695 0.42 0.041 0.21 1.84 
3112 51865 19453 0.327 0.46695 1.55 0.194 0.10 1.81 
3113 17635 6634 0.260 0.46695 0.44 0.007 0.45 0.75 
3114 58623 18537 0.227 0.46695 1.26 0.001 1.12 4.95 
3115 34425 5754 0.121 0.46695 0.81 0.012 0.29 3.18 
3116 176401 10569 0.028 0.46695 0.66 0.107 0.36 4.01 
3117 125664 41014 0.234 0.46695 0.89 0.057 0.20 0.92 
3118 108408 17366 0.151 0.46695 1.43 0.366 0.09 4.09 
31213 12160 5620 0.327 0.46695 1.14 0.076 0.25 0.47 
3122 75135 19584 0.228 0.46695 0.70 0.039 0.29 7.95 
3131 124543 50116 0.362 0.46695 1.46 0.111 0.08 1.37 
3132 77853 36237 0.400 0.46695 1.40 0.008 0.02 0.09 
3133 66678 53402 0.766 0.46695 0.72 0.485 0.14 6.39 
3134 40194 27408 0.592 0.46695 1.40 0.185 0.16 1.98 
3140 320611 234857 0.712 0.46695 2.43 0.087 0.10 1.88 
3211 574714 190303 0.250 0.47823 1.08 0.020 0.30 1.92 
3216 295973 116842 0.274 0.47823 0.07 0.013 0.53 1.78 
3217 148515 44073 0.206 0.47823 -0.24 0.071 0.05 0.09 
3213 184640 81243 0.295 0.47823 1.13 0.002 0.80 2.10 
3214 1801 800 0.235 0.47823 0.64 0.013 0.38 0.83 
3215 29208 10044 0.228 0.47823 1.40 0.082 0.15 0.64 
32133 370159 117623 0.193 0.47823 1.74 0.010 0.20 0.84 
3231 76531 30693 0.343 0.516 1.73 0.220 0.01 0.11 
3232 599 297 0.331 0.516 -0.55 0.176 0.76 0.51 
3233 27039 9099 0.230 0.516 0.23 0.024 0.20 0.78 
3240 26698 9662 0.197 0.516 1.30 0.074 0.24 0.82 
3311 240889 63583 0.197 0.46576 0.25 0.048 0.14 0.85 
3312 5306 1971 0.239 0.46576 3.85 0.042 0.12 1.03 
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code75 Vship75 Vadd75 PCM75 TAXE75 GR75 EOSL75 CAo75 CAw75 
3320 16682 7078 0.237 0.46576 1.13 0.001 0.68 1.41 
3411 126328 34703 0.208 0.51416 0.74 0.045 0.28 2.40 
3412 43463 11654 0.162 0.51416 2.04 0.003 0.13 0.78 
3422 3595 1657 0.222 0.55302 2.82 0.071 1.57 2.83 
35111 97362 34399 0.300 0.28659 4.20 0.126 0.06 1.54 
35112 27145 11037 0.323 0.28659 2.61 0.017 0.31 7.67 
35114-6 13038 3012 0.206 0.28659 1.66 0.026 0.15 1.84 
3513 152193 51048 0.282 0.28659 2.97 0.056 0.04 0.89 
3512 193560 58097 0.254 0.28659 3.15 0.108 0.34 8.19 
35125 39171 9102 0.180 0.28659 2.00 0.181 0.05 0.37 
3521 27988 10253 0.269 0.28659 1.33 0.020 0.18 1.80 
3522 155571 80814 0.407 0.28659 1.72 0.040 0.09 0.96 
3523 67271 28212 0.344 0.28659 1.10 0.155 0.09 0.84 
3530 899543 201666 0.217 0.58957 3.07 0.317 0.10 20.76 
3551 73180 24231 0.263 0.43869 1.60 0.161 0.16 1.89 
3610 9210 4468 0.248 0.28743 0.83 0.003 11.57 17.45 
3620 52670 26734 0.388 0.28743 1.59 0.113 0.32 1.82 
3691 37480 18747 0.366 0.28743 1.33 0.149 0.35 1.34 
3692 149589 73448 0.420 0.28743 1.90 0.062 0.42 8.37 
36991 29730 13949 0.321 0.28743 0.14 0.002 0.57 1.64 
36993 19251 6356 0.260 0.28743 0.14 0.413 0.24 2.58 
37101-2 11406 4577 0.287 0.26464 1.16 0.175 0.21 2.11 
37103 286955 63991 0.170 0.26464 0.41 0.107 0.53 8.89 
37106 13891 5386 0.188 0.26464 1.00 0.037 2.98 4.66. 
37201 47642 13025 0.194 0.26464 1.16 0.168 0.14 3.33 
37202 30981 6432 0.194 0.26464 1.16 0.007 0.08 1.81 
37203 2011 910 0.194 0.26464 1.16 0.086 0.38 15.25 
3811 19916 9200 0.292 0.53705 0.72 0.003 0.29 0.66 
3812 7135 2434 0.195 0.53705 0.69 0.075 0.34 1.19 
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code75 Vship75 Vadd75 PCM75 TAXE75 GR75 EOSL75 CAo75 CAw75 
3813 40249 16055 0.251 0.53705 2.78 0.003 0.12 1.04 
3821 2364 782 0.190 0.3278 0.51 0.740 0.73 1.75 
3822 30159 9118 0.210 0.3278 1.30 0.582 0.26 1.40 
3823 15184 7719 0.311 0.3278 0.19 0.028 0.54 0.99 
3824 40142 16415 0.214 0.3278 0.98 0.012 0.26 1.12 
3825 12626 2499 0.120 0.3278 0.65 0.569 0.09 0.50 
3831 41535 15379 0.252 0.3278 0.91 0.080 0.20 0.74 
3832 369262 150884 0.298 0.45861 1.25 0.016 0.12 0.71 
3833 19740 10268 0.410 0.45861 2.50 0.142 0.10 0.74 
3841 160564 52344 0.203 0.35212 7.87 0.180 1.01 14.46 
3842 20240 8286 0.294 0.35212 1.24 0.049 9.90 45.03 
3843 163339 47522 0.189 0.35212 0.81 0.074 0.26 1.89 
3844 13267 3133 0.116 0.35212 1.17 0.197 0.29 1.06 
3851 1556 725 0.225 0.56074 3.78 0.085 0.87 0.97 
3852 10221 4441 0.258 0.56074 1.38 0.128 0.24 0.66 
3853 28819 12064 0.309 0.56074 2.41 0.014 0.09 0.62 
3901 12980 5380 0.235 0.49875 9.19 0.334 0.02 0.58 
3902 8910 4523 0.340 0.49875 1.22 0.213 0.22 0.60 
3903 11230 5346 0.303 0.49875 1.37 0.051 0.17 0.58 
39097 15855 7564 0.341 0.49875 0.85 0.019 0.20 0.45 
Notes: Vship75: value of shipments in 1975 (in million won) (Report on Mining and Manufacturing 
Survey, EPB); 
PCM75 price cost margin ratio in 1975 (PCM= (value added - wage and salaries)/sales) (Report 
on Mining and Manufacturing Survey, EPB); 
TAXE75: effective tax rate in 1986 (Kim, J.Y., 1992, The Role of Finance in Korea's 
Industrialisation, Seoul Korea, KDI); 
GR75: industry growth rate (GR=( value of shipments 1975-value of shipments 1973)/value 
of shipments 1975) (Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey, EPB); 
EOSL 75:minimum efficient scale (Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey, EPB); 
Vadd75: value added in 1975 (in million won) (Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey, 
EPB); 
EOSL=ratio of average plant size among the largest plants producing 50 percent of industry's 
value of shipments and total value of shipments of the industry) (Report on Mining and 
Manufacturing Survey, EPB); 
CAo75: capital output ratio in 1975 (Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey, EPB); 
CAw75: capital worket ratio in 1975 (Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey, EPB). 
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APPENDIX 4.4 (CONTINUED): LONG-TERM BORROWING FROM ABROAD, LONG-TERM 
BANK LOANS, LEGAL TARIFFS, EFFECTIVE PROTECTION 
RATE (CORDEN METHOD), FREEDOM FROM QUANTITATIVE 
RESTRICTIONS, IMPORT INTENSITY AND EXPORT 
INTENSITY IN 1975 
code75 FrgnL75 BankL75 TL75 TEC75 TN75 FC75 FQR75 IMis75 EXI75 
3111 0.0006 0.1906 0.60 -0.281 -0.005 0.019 0.224 0.181 0.078 
3112 0.0006 0.1906 0.60 0.340 0.167 0.019 0.224 0.032 0.133 
3113 0.1227 0.1067 0.60 0.270 0.301 0.019 0.224 0.078 0.864 
3114 0.1300 0.1057 0.60 -0.585 -0.202 0.019 0.224 0.032 0.154 
3115 0.0045 0.0487 0.60 -0.440 0.130 0.019 0.224 0.095 0.012 
3116 0.0448 0.2682 0.60 0.022 0.043 0.019 0.224 0.078 0.002 
3117 0.0286 0.0805 0.60 -0.497 -0.119 0.019 0.224 0.000 0.017 
3118 0.0130 0.1039 0.60 -0.395 0.021 0.019 0.224 1.036 0.301 
31213 0.0045 0.0497 1.14 -0.222 0.210 0.019 0.000 0.001 0.139 
3122 0.0092 0.0266 1.14 2.955 0.273 0.019 0.000 0.012 0.004 
3131 0.0022 0.1002 1.14 -0.244 0.293 0.002 0.000 0.019 0.005 
3132 0.0000 0.1579 1.14 -0.247 0.073 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
3133 0.0000 0.2546 1.14 -0.234 -0.162 0.002 0.000 0.007 0.000 
3134 0.0272 0.1628 1.14 0.027 0.120 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
3140 0.0045 0.0487 0.91 -0.292 -0.208 0.018 0.000 0.001 0.011 
3211 0.2003 0.1212 0.56 -0.001 0.131 0.096 0.325 0.122 0.270 
3216 0.2003 0.1212 0.71 0.004 0.076 0.096 0.167 0.122 0.278 
3217 0.0097 0.2784 0.71 -0.325 -0.099 0.096 0.325 0.000 0.000 
3213 0.0000 0.0936 0.97 -0.381 -0.084 0.096 0.146 0.016 0.509 
3214 0.0254 0.0729 0.97 -0.228 0.012 0.096 0.146 0.210 0.184 
3215 0.0011 0.0825 0.71 0.275 0.218 0.096 0.146 0.014 0.548 
32133 0.1053 0.0936 1.00 -0.552 -0.159 0.091 0.167 0.008 0.520 
3231 0.0153 0.0638 0.71 -0.160 0.239 0.091 0.423 0.391 0.006 
3232 0.0153 0.0638 0.71 -0.160 0.239 0.091 0.423 0.394 0.214 
3233 0.0153 0.0638 0.71 -0.533 -0.153 0.091 0.423 0.010 0.133 
3240 0.0000 0.0253 0.75 1.688 0.723 0.091 0.000 0.003 0.326 
3311 0.0320 0.0851 0.40 -0.037 0.087 0.010 0.641 0.004 0.467 
3312 0.0135 0.0728 0.40 0.663 0.258 0.010 0.641 0.026 0.192 
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code75 FrgnL75 BankL75 TL75 TEC75 TN75 FC75 FQR75 IMis75 EXI75 
3320 0.0000 0.2534 0.73 0.884 0.447 0.000 0.143 0.012 0.222 
3411 0.0722 0.1314 0.56 -0.493 -0.203 0.029 0.200 0.328 0.047 
3412 0.0006 0.1914 0.56 0.348 0.057 0.029 0.200 0.082 0.019 
3422 0.0056 0.1449 0.26 -0.293 -0.244 0.004 0.545 0.098 0.189 
35111 0.2534 0.0950 0.22 -0.203 0.255 0.181 0.350 1.292 0.093 
35112 0.2534 0.0950 0.22 0.496 0.525 0.181 0.350 0.260 0.040 
35114-6 0.2534 0.0950 0.22 0.883 0.477 0.181 0.350 0.000 0.000 
3513 0.1063 0.1229 0.22 1.891 0.532 0.181 0.350 0.470 0.057 
3512 0.1345 0.0483 0.22 -0.922 -0.186 0.181 0.350 0.205 0.001 
35125 0.0148 0.0829 0.22 -0.160 -0.036 0.181 0.350 0.501 0.006 
3521 0.0005 0.0234 0.39 0.248 0.168 0.110 0.517 0.250 0.005 
3522 0.0067 0.0634 0.39 0.294 0.271 0.110 0.517 0.091 0.024 
3523 0.0000 0.0965 0.39 -0.389 -0.099 0.110 0.517 0.061 0.014 
3530 0.0385 0.0965 0.22 -2.382 0.228 0.205 0.125 0.048 0.056 
3551 0.1298 0.1746 0.58 0.375 0.287 0.017 0.529 0.005 0.542 
3610 0.0690 0.2410 0.60 -0.268 -0.056 0.019 0.643 0.069 0.425 
3620 0.0522 0.1497 0.51 -0.071 0.127 0.049 0.590 0.148 0.077 
3691 0.0049 0.1285 0.48 -0.320 -0.191 0.030 0.824 0.111 0.120 
3692 0.2708 0.0906 0.48 -0.024 0.072 0.000 0.824 0.001 0.224 
36991 0.0000 0.0726 0.48 0.112 0.125 0.000 0.824 0.002 0.018 
36993 0.0000 0.0726 0.48 -0.245 -0.016 0.000 0.824 0.103 0.113 
37101-2 0.2350 0.1155 0.36 0.165 0.075 0.014 0.671 0.406 0.307 
37103 0.2350 0.1155 0.36 17.194 0.656 0.014 0.671 0.406 0.307 
37106 0.2350 0.1155 0.36 2.441 0.309 0.014 0.671 0.406 0.307 
37201 0.0277 0.1170 0.43 1.059 0.670 0.014 0.734 0.376 0.005 
37202 0.0277 0.1170 0.43 -0.193 0.177 0.014 0.734 0.376 0.005 
37203 0.0277 0.1170 0.43 -0.663 -0.216 0.014 0.734 0.376 0.005 
3811 0.0058 0.0814 0.67 0.285 0.438 0.086 0.333 0.352 0.722 
3812 0.0000 0.2467 0.67 0.015 0.132 0.086 0.333 0.075 0.142 
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code75 FrgnL75 BankL75 TL75 TEC75 TN75 FC75 FQR75 IMis75 EXI75 
3813 0.0000 0.2425 0.67 1.647 0.742 0.086 0.333 0.926 0.129 
3821 0.0000 0.1877 0.20 -0.113 0.038 0.089 0.529 2.322 0.009 
3822 0.0232 0.0293 0.23 -0.027 0.037 0.089 0.292 0.161 0.017 
3823 0.0000 0.1747 0.24 -0.427 -0.209 0.089 0.292 3.423 0.047 
3824 0.1242 0.1637 0.24 0.096 0.172 0.089 0.292 3.363 0.072 
3825 0.1985 0.1397 0.29 -0.228 0.167 0.089 0.167 0.825 0.674 
3831 0.0025 0.0987 0.28 0.336 0.330 0.248 0.111 0.518 0.086 
3832 0.0627 0.0606 0.27 0.387 0.388 0.248 0.111 0.517 0.604 
3833 0.0062 0.0696 0.57 0.037 0.189 0.248 0.167 0.013 0.045 
3841 0.0847 0.2665 0.19 -0.178 0.074 0.101 0.667 0.063 0.242 
3842 0.0988 0.1552 0.04 1.387 0.700 0.101 1.000 0.903 0.362 
3843 0.1144 0.1299 0.48 0.926 0.499 0.101 0.211 0.408 0.016 
3844 0.0000 0.0393 0.48 0.361 0.364 0.101 1.000 0.176 0.281 
3851 0.0000 0.0306 0.40 1.442 0.731 0.129 0.279 2.419 0.389 
3852 0.0000 0.0336 0.40 5.230 0.404 0.129 0.279 0.637 0.946 
3853 0.0000 0.0336 0.40 1.246 0.777 0.129 0.279 0.396 0.685 
3901 0.0000 0.1137 0.73 0.970 0.557 0.129 0.138 0.430 0.853 
3902 0.0000 0.1137 0.73 0.410 0.298 0.129 0.138 0.063 0.697 
3903 0.0000 0.1137 0.73 -0.089 0.213 0.129 0.138 0.059 0.578 
39097 0.0000 0.1137 0.73 -0.089 0.213 0.129 0.138 0.064 0.624 
Notes: FrgnL: long-term loans from foreign country (Financial Statement Analysis, Korea Development 
Bank, 1974, 75); 
BankL: long-term loans from bank (Financial Statement Analysis, Korea Development Bank, 
1974, 75); 
TL 75: legal tariff rate (Kim, K.S., 1988, The Effect of Trade Liberalization in Korea, Seoul 
Korea, KDI); 
TEC75: effective tariff rate calculated by Carden method (Hong, S.D., 1992, The Structural 
Change <~{Nominal and Effective Protection Rates, KDI ); 
TN: nominal tariff rate (Hong, S.D., 1992); 
FC: foreign capital ratio to total capital (FC75=(FC73+FC78)/2) (Neugent. J., 1989,Variation in 
the Size Distribution of Korean Mam(facturing Establishments Across Sectors and Over Time, 
KDI); 
FQR: freedom from quota restriction ratio (Kim, K.S., 1988); 
IMis: imports to value of shipments (Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey, EPB, Input-
Output Table, BOK, compiled from UN Trade System, IDEB, ANU); 
EXI: export intensity to value of shipments (see IMis). 
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5 Imperfect Competition, Protection 
and X-Efficiency 
Introduction 
Many economists have analysed the allocative effect of market power in imperfectly 
competitive output markets. Profit maximising firms are assumed always to minimise 
their production costs. In imperfectly competitive output markets, profit maximisation 
drives a wedge between price and marginal cost and the resulting social rnisallocation of 
resources is the main concern. 
X-efficiency theory provides another way of looking at monopolistic distortions 
in imperfectly competitive rnarkets. 1 X-efficiency represents loss of efficiency in 
production.2 According to Leibenstein (1966) and Frantz (1988), the gains to be made 
from improving the allocative efficiency of an activity or sector are relatively small 
compared with the potential gains to be made from improving X-efficiency (that is, 
reducing unit costs of production).3 Bergsman (1974) reports that the welfare loss from 
X-inefficiency seems to be more serious in less developed or developing countries and is 
associated with protection (Appendix 5.1). 
Over the past three decades, Korea has pursued a policy of strong state 
intervention in the market mechanism, including trade protection (Chang 1993; Kirn 
1993). As described in Chapter 3, the market structure of Korean manufacturing industry 
has continued to be imperfectly competitive. Owing to the constraints on competition, 
both among domestic firms and from foreign firms, competition and efficiency have 
1 
2 
3 
Scherer et al. (1990) put clearly the importance of X-inefficiency, saying that 'Anyone with experience 
in real-world organisations must recognise that something resembling X-inefficiency exists'. See Frantz 
(1988) for a survey ofresearch in this area. 
The precise nature of this inefficiency was unclear to Leibenstein, who called it X-inefficiency. The 
difference between this type of economic efficiency and the neoclassical concept of economic 
efficiency is that the former does not assume internal (technical) efficiency within the firm. Some 
economists regard technical efficiency and X-efficiency as being the same (Martin and Page 1983; 
Caves et al. 1990); others treat technical inefficiency and production inefficiency as being the same 
(Caves et al. 1980). 
Following Leibenstein (1966), allocative efficiency is under 1 per cent of GNP in almost every case and 
frequently under 0.1 per cent of GNP. X-inefficiency is frequently found to increase costs by 50 to 100 
per cent. 
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recently emerged as important issues in Korea, from a private as well as a policy 
viewpoint. 
The few studies that have been done on X-inefficiency in Korea have ignored one 
important feature of the Korean economy: protection from competitive pressures, from 
domestic firms as well as from abroad. This study attempts to analyse systematically X-
inefficiency theory in conjunction with international trade theory, particularly with 
quantitative restrictions.4 
The first aim of this chapter is to investigate empirically the relative X-efficiency 
of Korean manufacturing. A second goal is to test how protection can increase X-
inefficiency in an imperfectly competitive market structure, namely Korean 
manufacturing industry. 
Theories Linking X-Efficiency and Trade Restrictions 
In the perfectly competitive and static market model, the equivalence of an import quota 
and a tariff resulting in an identical volume of imports can be derived (Dixit et al. 
1980).5 Such a tariff is called the tariff equivalent of the import quota or the implicit 
tariff. The effect of tariffs and quotas is not identical in the monopolistic framework 
(Bhagwati 1965; Itoh and Ono 1982). The major difference between tariffs and quotas in 
an imperfectly competitive market structure is that a tariff permits a perfectly elastic 
supply of imports at world price plus tariff if the importing country is small, whereas a 
quota renders the supply of imports inelastic at the level prescribed by the quota. 
Whereas tariffs increase the scope for domestic firms to use their market power, quotas 
allow domestic firms to maintain perfect monopoly power along the quota-bounded 
demand curve. 
Bloch (1974) and Caves et al. (1980) showed how tariffs can increase the market 
price (market power) of homogeneous goods in an imperfectly competitive market.6 If 
national production and consumption are both small in the world market, the national 
demand curve facing the industry is truncated by the presence of the world market 
(Figure 5.1). The marginal revenue curve will be P MABEFCD but the curve will be 
4 
5 
6 
See chapter 2 for the debate on X-efficiency theory. 
The same is true for output, price and deadweight loss. 
For a discussion of product differentiation, see Caves et al. (1980). 
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disconnected between B and £. The demand curve facing domestic producers has infinite 
elasticity at price PM (world price plus home tariffs). If domestic production costs 
exceed PM, imports will dominate the market. Similarly, the demand curve of domestic 
sellers is perfectly elastic at Px (world price net of foreign tariffs), and the curve 
between Px and PM represents demand for the product by domestic buyers exclusively. 
In this case, if the monopolist's marginal cost curve is MC, the monopolist's price will be 
fixed at PM and AB will be imported. If the marginal cost curve is MC", the monopolist 
can set the price at P x and export CD. 
FIGURE 5.1: TARIFFS AND MONOPOLY PRICE 
Price MC' 
PMi----------..---~ 
MC" 
E ~ F C .,.,,.. ______ _ D 
0 Quantity 
If the marginal cost curve of monopolistic firms (or oligopolistic firms under a 
cartel or collusion) is MC, monopoly profit is maximised by selling at price PM 
domestically and P x abroad. Of total output 0 Xr, the amount of domestic consumption 
is P MB and the amount of exports is EF. In this case, although all domestic demand is 
supplied by the domestic monopoly, the import price (including tariffs), PM, may be the 
focal point for collusion among oligopolistic firms to maximise their joint profits in the 
home market: the collusion hypothesis or the shared-asset hypothesis.? Thus a higher 
7 According to the rivalry hypothesis, however, a firm (A) in a concentrated industry is less profitable 
than a firm (B) in a less concentrated industry. If A and B have the same market share but A's industry 
is more concentrated, A's rival firms must be on average larger than B's. In terms of relative 
competitive strength, therefore, A's position is less favourable than B's. This will force A to employ 
more competitive marketing efforts, speeding up inventive activities. However, this study adopts the 
collusion hypothesis. In spite of enacting the Price Stabilisation and Fair Trade Act in 1974, most trade 
associations in Korea have organised overt or covert collusion in terms of buying raw materials and 
controlling the volume of production, the volume of investment and the level of prices (Uekusa 1987). 
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home tariff will widen the gap between PM and Px and could increase the profit 
maximising price in the imperfectly competitive domestic market. However, higher 
tariffs will become redundant if they result in an import price in excess of the optimal 
monopolist's price in the absence of trade. 
Quotas allow the monopoly to set a higher price on goods than do tariffs that 
would result in the same volume of imports. Figure 5.2 shows clearly how a monopoly 
protected by a quota can take advantage of its market power to set a higher price than 
would be possible under a tariff yielding the same volume of imports. 
In Figure 5.2, D and D' denote respectively the market demand curve and quota 
bounded demand curve (market demand net of import quotas). MR' is marginal revenue 
(MR) derived from D'. If the domestic monopoly is protected by an import quota, the 
monopoly will set the market price at P Q because the profit maximisation condition 
requires marginal cost (MC) to be equal to marginal revenue (MR'). In this case domestic 
output will be XQ and the amount AB will be imported. 
FIGURE 5.2: COMPARISON BETWEEN QUOTAS AND TARIFFS UNDER A MONOPOLY 
ce 
PQ ······························ 
p 
0 Output, Imports 
In addition, modern oligopoly theory states that any price collusion may occur without explicit 
arrangements (Shapiro 1989; Tirole 1988). Empirically, Canadian economists such as Eastman and 
Stykolt (1960) and Harris (1984) adopted the collusion hypothesis. 
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On the other hand, if the monopoly is protected by a tariff equivalent to the 
import quota, the monopoly will set the market price at PT' the only price that will 
satisfy the profit maximisation condition in this situation (AB =A 'B '). 8 
Although in each case the amount of imports is equal, the market price under the 
import quota (PQ) will be higher than that under the tariff equivalent of the import quota 
(PT) because import quotas confer on the monopoly a greater degree of market power. 
Argument 1 
X-efficiency theory starts from the assumption that more serious welfare losses flow 
from weak competitive pressure than from traditional allocative inefficiency. The theory 
is concerned with production efficiency: whether firms produce output at the lowest 
possible cost. According to Leibenstein (1966, 1976), the failure of most firms to achieve 
minimum production costs can be attributed to absence of competitive pressure. Without 
competitive pressure on profit margins, business organisations tend to become lax about 
cost control and managers to make suboptimal decisions.9 Firms operating at less than 
maximum efficiency exhibit X-inefficiency. We can expect the monopoly power of 
imperfectly competitive firms, then, to increase X-inefficiency. 
Argument 2 
In the absence of competition from foreign firms, pnce collusion can easily be 
maintained by imperfectly competitive domestic firms. This allows them to get by 
without reducing inefficiency or minimising production costs. 10 In developing countries, 
protection from foreign competition also limits domestic firms' ability to analyse and 
deal with uncertain or complex situations - a 'hothouse' effect. 
Thus we can expect, in a small open economy highly dependent on foreign trade 
like Korea, that quantitative restrictions on imports will increase the scope for X-
8 In this case marginal revenue will be PT, the CIF price of imports plus tariff. 
9 See Chapter 2 of this thesis and Frantz (1992) for discussion of the leisure argument. 
IO The welfare effect of X-incfficiency theory associated with trade protection is still arguable (Corden 
1974; Stigler 1976; Martin 1978; Vousdcn 1993). However, tariff-induced slack in the protected sector 
associated with managerial capitalism can be shown to have an additional social cost: the X-efficiency 
cost (Vousdenl993). Many papers (Vousden 1991; Vousden and Campbell 1992) find an additional 
welfare cost arising from protection-induced slack, which may reasonably be interpreted as loss due to 
X-inefficiency. 
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inefficiency and welfare loss because they support the existing imperfectly competitive 
domestic market structure. Tariffs, meanwhile, are more likely to maintain competition 
between imports and local producers than quotas, provided tariffs are not prohibitively 
high. Combining arguments 1 and 2, we can again expect greater quantitative restrictions 
associated with imperfect competition to cause higher levels of X-inefficiency. 
Literature survey 
The main research into X-inefficiency is summarised here. Note that the relationship 
between X-inefficiency and import quota restrictions in a small open economy has not 
yet been analysed systematically in the literature. 
X-inefficiency in the International Economy 
Using the Cobb-Douglas production function, Carlsson (1972) measured X-efficiency at 
plant level in 26 Swedish manufacturing industries, then analysed the determinants of 
efficiency. The study found that the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) had a strong 
positive influence on X-efficiency. According to Carlsson, this was because CR4 reflects 
economies of scale and specialisation rather than the market power of the largest firms in 
the Swedish economy. In a further exercise, the coefficient of the tariff variable was 
negative, implying that protection reduces X-efficiency in a small open economy. 
Caves and Barton (1990) estimated X-inefficiency using the frontier production 
function. The authors analysed the determinants of X-inefficiency based on US Census 
data for 1977. The results showed that increased import penetration tended to constrain 
the amount of X-inefficiency. Further analysis revealed that the constraining influence of 
imports was strongest in industries that were more concentrated than they needed to be to 
achieve scale economies at the single-plant level. Caves and Barton's study revealed one 
important limitation of measuring X-efficiency using the frontier production function, 
namely the difficulties of isolating the linkage between X-efficiency and market 
concentration. The authors showed that the amount of X-inefficiency increased with the 
number of plants in an industry, and that this in turn was inversely correlated with 
market concentration. 
Using maximum likelihood technology estimators, Tybout et al. (1991) analysed 
changes in industrial sector performance in Chile. They found there had been little 
111 
improvement in overall productivity between 1967 and 1979, a period of liberalisation in 
Chile. Tybout et al. attributed the diluted effects of trade reform on efficiency to macro 
shocks that occurred between the census years. Further analysis confirmed that a 
reduction in protection did in fact result in higher value-added and output, associated 
with a decreasing number of workers in the smallest plants. Tybout et al.'s conclusion 
supports the X-efficiency argument. 
Button and Weyman-Jones (1992) applied the Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) technique in measuring X-inefficiency. Their sample covered US and European 
financial institutions as well as government and other public services. The study revealed 
that bureaucratic or publicly administered industries are on average less efficient, have 
lower extremes of efficiency and show a wider dispersion of efficiency than privately 
owned, competitive, or weakly regulated industries. 
Kalirajan and Varagunasingh (1992), using the frontier production function 
approach, showed that measures of X-inefficiency range from 2 per cent to 24 per cent in 
the South Indian Power Loom industry. This study also distinguishes technical efficiency 
from X-efficiency. 
X-inejficiency in Korea 
Kang (1989), following Lecraw (1977), used a CES production function to estimate X-
inefficiency in Korean manufacturing in 1970-84. The results showed that the average X-
inefficiency of Korean manufacturing was around 17 .2 per cent of reported cost. 11 
Interestingly, the consumer goods industry and labour-intensive industry had relatively 
high X-inefficiency compared with technology and capital-intensive industry. Kang's 
results confirm the positive relationship between X-inefficiency and the level of industry 
concentration. The study did not, however, examine the effects on X-efficiency of 
competition from foreign firms. 
Lee (1986), using data for 51 manufacturing industries, measured technical (X-) 
efficiency for the early 1970s.12 In Lee's study, technical (X-) efficiency was defined as 
the ratio of value-added (devalued by the rate of effective protection) to input costs 
(calculated using the shadow prices of labour and capital). Lee regressed OLS and found 
11 In general, X-inefficiency is expected to be 5-10 per cent ofreported cost (Kang 1989). The figure in 
Lecraw's (1977) study on Thailand manufacturing economy was 41 per cent. 
12 Lee admitted in a footnote that technical efficiency is different from X-efficiency. 
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that technical (X-) efficiency theory could be applied to the case of Korean 
manufacturing industry. Lee chose such variables as effective protection rate, relative 
economies of scale, interest subsidies and relative capital intensity. However, Lee 
ignored the effect of scale economies on technical efficiency .13 
Yoo (1991), following Caves et al. (1990), calculated technical (X-) efficiency 
for the period 1978-88 using a stochastic frontier production function.14 Interestingly 
Yoo found that the concentration of an industry, represented by the Herfindahl index (H-
index), had a positive relationship with technical (X-) efficiency. The squared value of 
the H-index was, however, negative. According to the author, the result provided 
evidence for the hypothesis that technical (X-) efficiency is maximised in moderately 
concentrated industries. Yoo's interpretation ignores the limitation of the methodology 
pointed out earlier: statistically, the more plants there are in an industry (the less 
concentrated the market), the greater the level of X-inefficiency. 
Measuring X-efficiency 
In general, data based on firms or individual production units is the most desirable for 
the estimation of production functions.15 Although the production function for industry 
as a whole can be estimated, the interpretation of the production function is too 
comprehensive to reflect the correct real input-output relationship at the industry level 
due to the aggregation problem. In light of available data and the objective of this study, 
X-efficiency was measured in line with Caves et al. (1980) using the following equation 
(see Appendix 5.2 for derivation): 
(5.1) 
13 For example, Lee obtained profit data from Financial Statement Analysis rather than from Report on 
Mining and Manufacturing Survey, which seems to be the major data source. Consistent data 
acquisition, however, is crucial for unbiased data analysis in Korea because differences exist in industry 
classification among different data sources. 
14 Yoo also distinguished technical efficiency from X-efficiency. 
1 5 Econometric techniques for measuring X-inefficiency can be divided into parametric and 
nonparametric approaches. Subcategories of the former are parametric programming and parametric 
stochastic or composed error frontier techniques. The other one is a nonparametric approach known as 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). See Bauer (1990) for a survey of recent developments in 
econometric techniques and Seiford and Thrall (1990) for a review of DEA. 
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where the subscripts Kand J denote Korea and Japan, respectively;X1 =1; v is value-
added per person; Q is capital labour ratio; w and P is repectively shadow prices for 
labour and capital; and E is the effective protection rate.16 
Equation (5.1) measures relative X-efficiency based on a broad view of the X-
efficiency (Caves et al. 1980; Caves and Barton 1990) of Korean manufacturing 
industry, using Japanese industry as the standard for comparison. Equation (5.1) is based 
on the assumption that the price of output (materials) in Korea is the price of Japanese 
output elevated by the nominal (ad valorem) tariff. Although Bloch (1974) and Caves et 
al. (1980) indicate the likelihood that, in a concentrated economy, the level of tariff 
duties at home will have an upward influence on prices, the assumption that tariffs are 
not the only principal constraint on prices is not expected to distort our measurements of 
X-efficiency in Korean industry because of the influences of other factors on prices.17 
Data 
All the data used in this study are based on the four-digit level of the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) of manufacturing industries. Because of data availability, 
establishments, not firms, were chosen as the units of observation for cross-sectional 
data. Cross-sectional data are regarded as valuable for identifying the structural 
determinants of market equilibria (Caves at al. 1990). 
Data on value-added per worker, labour cost and capital cost were obtained from 
the Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey (published by the Economic Planning 
Board). Because data for calculating the opportunity cost of capital were not available, 
we have used the average of the proxied cost of capital, calculated as gross value-added 
minus wages/fixed tangible assets in manufacturing industries.1 8 Exclusion of corporate 
16 According to Jones (1987), both the product market and the factor market can be distorted by the 
market power of chaebol in Korea. In measuring X-efficiency in equation (5.1) allocative efficiency 
could be included, mainly due to industry-based data. We hope this does not distort seriously the 
measuring of X-efficiency. 
17 The concentration ratios of Korean manufacturing industry are on average higher than those of 
Japanese industry (Chapter 3). 
18 In a similar way, Caves et al. (1980) and Lee (1986) also calculated the shadow prices of wages and the 
cost of capital. 
114 
and personal taxes will not, we hope, distort upward the opportunity cost of capital. 
Similarly, for wages we have used actual average earnings per employee in the industry. 
The error involved in including in wages any monopoly rents that may be appropriated 
by labour is not expected to be large. 
Data on quantitative restrictions are from Kim (1988). Subsidy variables are from 
Financial Statement Analysis ( published by Bank of Korea), and effective protection 
rates are from Hong (1992). 
The adjusted three-firm concentration ratio index (ACR3) is derived from the 
data given in Chapter 2 of this thesis. ACR3 was calculated using the three-firm 
concentration ratio (CR3), available from the Korea Development Institute (KDI), and 
import and export data. Data on imports and exports were obtained from UN, 
International Trade Statistics (IEDB, ANU) adjusted by data from Input-Output Tables 
(Bank of Korea). The Herfindahl index is from the KDI database. 
Data on Japanese manufacturing industries at the four-digit level of Standard 
Industrial Classification were obtained from Census of Manufacturing (Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry of Japan). 
Mean Value of X-E.fficiency 
Table (5.1) shows estimates of relative X-efficiency and its components for 1986 and 
1975, calculated according to equation (5.6). 
The first row of Table 5.1 compares the relative X-efficiency of Korean 
manufacturing (66 industries) with corresponding Japanese manufacturing industries.19 
The comparison reveals that Korean manufacturing on average produced approximately 
79 per cent of the output of Japanese industry per one US dollar of input in 1986.2° The 
table also indicates that X-efficiency, based on Balassa's effective protection rate, 
increased from 73 per cent in 1975 to 79 per cent in 1986. When Corden's protection 
l9 Equation (5.6) was also used to estimate the relative X-efficiency of Korean industries compared to US 
industry in 1986, represented by 54 selected industries based on the 4-digit level of SITC industry 
classification. A comparison of Korean and US industry revealed the X-efficiency of Korean industry 
was 84 or 83 per cent that of US industry, depending on whether Corden's or Balassa's rate was used. 
As the two countries differ in the way industries are aggregated or even defined, the comparison was 
taken no further. For the same reason, comparison with another developing country, Taiwan, was also 
abandoned. 
20 For comparison purposes, the Korean won and Japanese yen were converted to US dollar values. 
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rate is used, X-efficiency increases even more: from 71 per cent in 1975 to 82 per cent in 
1986.21 
TABLE 5.1: MEAN VALUE OF RELATIVE X-EFFICIENCY AND ITS COMPONENTS, 1986 AND 
1975 
Variable 
X-efficiency 
Value-added(Korea)/value added (Japan) 
Effective protection rate (Balassa method) 
Input costs (Japan)/input costs (Korea)2 
1986 
0.79 (0.82)1 
0.94 
0.37 
1.29 
Mean 
1975 
0.73 (0.71)1 
0.40 
0.43 
3.31 
Notes: 1. The values in parentheses are based on Corden's effective protection rate, which was 0.2 for 
1986 and 0.44 for 1975. 
2. Adjusted for factor intensity (see equation 5.6). 
Source: Calculated from data described in this chapter. 
During the period, the average effective protection rate for selected industries, 
estimated by the Balassa (Corden) method, decreased from 43 per cent (44 per cent) to 
37 per cent (20 per cent). The ratio of input costs adjusted for factor intensity also 
decreased, from 3.31 in 1975 to 1.29 in 1986. This decrease reflects a decline in 
government regulation (intervention) in the market price mechanism and changes in 
Korea's industrial structure. Over the same period, relative value-added per worker in 
Korea compared with Japan increased significantly, from 40 per cent in 1975 to 94 per 
cent in 1986. The low value for value-added per worker in 1975 may in part be due to 
the negative effects of the first oil shock on the productivity of Korean manufacturing 
industry. Measurement error may also be a factor. There are two reasons for the high 
value-added per worker in 1986. In contrast to 197 5, the liberalisation of imports covered 
most industries by that time. The pro-competitive effect of foreign competition is likely 
to have increased value-added. In addition, in the period 1986-88, the Korean economy 
enjoyed exogeneously favourable external effects, such as an appreciation of the 
21 The average increase in the ratio of total factor productivity in manufacturing industry was 1.9 per cent 
(based on output) in 1967-88 (Kim and Hong 1992) and 7.0 per cent (based on value-added) in 1966-83 
(Kim et al. 1988). 
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Japanese yen, a low price for petroleum and low interest rates in international financial 
markets. 
The Determinants of X-Efficiency 
X-inefficiency is influenced both by the attitude of workers and by the environment of 
the industry or workplace in which it occurs. In each case, a key concept is that of 
pressure. Based on the outcomes of relative X-efficiency, this section examines the 
determinants of X-efficiency. The direct effects of trade restriction variables on X-
efficiency were analysed separately to avoid the problem of multicollinearity between 
market concentration and protection variable in estimation. 
Among environmental factors, the idea of shelter -- the extent to which business 
people are able to protect themselves from competition - is an important determinant of 
X-efficiency. As the proxies of an imperfectly competitive market structure, two 
concentration indexes were selected. The first measure is the Herfindahl-index (H-index 
), which is defined as the sum of the squared shares of each firm. In contrast to the three-
firm concentration ratio, the H-index includes all firms and squaring their respective 
market shares gives greater weight to large firms. Traditional concentration indexes, 
however, ignore foreign competition. The second measure is the trade-adjusted three-
firm concentration ratio (ACR3), which is calculated in Chapter 3 of this thesis. The 
signs of all these market concentration indexes are expected to be negative. 
Government subsidies may allow firms to be X-inefficient. If a subsidy is 
determined endogenously by government, and the government does not have full 
information about production costs, an incentive-compatible subsidy can be shown to 
reduce effort in the protected sector below its free trade level, hence yielding an 
additional cost of protection (Vousden 1991; Vousden et al. 1992). The lure of monopoly 
profits can also induce rent-seeking; firms can spend substantial amounts on obtaining, 
strengthening, and defending their monopoly positions (Krueger 1974; Posner 1975; 
Wenders 1987). Rent is a payment for any resource in excess of its opportunity cost, and 
rent-seeking may lead to inflation of some types of outlay beyond the socially optimal 
level. Government subsidies (interest subsidies and credit rationing) may, then, increase 
X-inefficiency in Korea. In a distorted financial market, success in business may depend 
on a firm's ready access to subsidised credit. In particular, foreign loans were regarded as 
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an important measure of government subsidies in Korea. The ratio of foreign debt to 
total domestic credit was 106.7 per cent in 1975 and 97.8 per cent in 1985 (Appendix 
5.3). Interest rates in the international market (Euro-dollar, 90 days) were lower than 
those in the domestic market (Appendix 5.4). We assume that government subsidies 
(FRGNL), proxied by the ratio of foreign loans to total fixed liability, will decrease X-
efficiency. 
There are two contradictory arguments on the effect of labour organisation on X-
efficiency. One is that unions increase productivity and hence X-efficiency by providing 
a communication channel for resolving grievances and reducing the costs associated with 
employee turnover (Rabban 1991; Freeman et al. 1984; Clark 1980). The collective 
voice of unions reduces worker complaints, collegial participation in organisational 
decision-making, and rivalry among employees, and promotes loyalty and cooperation. 
A contrasting argument is that labour organisation decreases X-efficiency (Brunello 
1992; Katz et al. 1987). The supporters of this argument say that seniority protection 
and work rules can reduce a plant's efficiency. The ratio of male workers (UNION) is 
used as a proxy of union membership in this study. Unions in Korea's manufacturing 
industry had a history of compliance and cooperation with management until the mid 
1980s. We can expect the sign of the variable to be positive. 
The distinguishing characteristic of modern industry is a divorce of ownership 
(shareholders) from control (managers): managerial capitalism. One problem with 
managerial capitalism is that contractual failure leads to X-inefficiency (Frantz 1988; 
Caves et al. 1990). A contract between a shareholder and a manager, though sound in 
principle, may be undermined in practice by the failure of one party to fulfill their 
obligations. Another problem with managerial capitalism is that conflicts of interest 
between shareholders and managers are common, and the divorce of ownership control 
permits managers to pursue their own interests rather than those of shareholders.22 It is in 
fact very difficult for shareholders to pin down the causes of observed deviations from 
profit maximisation because of the asymmetry of information between managers and 
owners. This is reflected in analysis of the waste arising from informational asymmetry 
between owners and managers in a hierarchical firm (Vousden et al. 1992). We assume 
here that managerial capitalism (MCAP), proxied by the ratio of incorporation in the total 
22 For instance, managers are likely to spend a lot of money on maintaining their prestige. 
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number of establishments, will increase X-inefficiency. We expect the sign of the 
variable to be negative. 
A greater number of supervisors may result in a higher level of X-inefficiency. A 
supervisor may wish to extract higher levels of effort from employees than they are 
willing to offer. A supervisor who has to put great effort into obtaining this higher level 
of performance may rather choose inertia and thereby increase X-inefficiency. The 
concept of an inert area in which an actor feels that it is difficult (costly) to shift other 
people to a new effort point forms an important part of X-inefficiency theory 
(Leibenstein 1969). The ratio of supervisory workers (ADM) is calculated by the number 
of administrative workers divided by the total number of worker. The sign of the 
coefficient is expected to be negative. 
The openness of the Korean economy to the international market has several 
implications for X-efficiency. First, exporting to the world market exposes domestic 
firms to a competitive environment, adding to pressure to increase X-efficiency. 
Exporting also gives firms access to information on productivity improvements in 
overseas markets. Again, an exporting company, because of its increased output, is in a 
position to exploit economies of scale and increase technical efficiency. In contrast, the 
firm not operating at full capacity because it only meets demand from a small domestic 
market will waste resources, and efficiency will decrease. The net export ratio (NET) is 
calculated as exports - imports/value of shipments. The variable is expected to be 
positive. 
The cost disadvantage ratio (CDR) has a truncation effect on the expected 
efficiency of industry in a small open economy (Caves et al. 1980).23 In product-
differentiated industries, Japanese-made products with a small market share have an 
advantage over similar products made in Korea because Japanese firms can usually 
produce them at a lower price. A low value for the Japanese cost disadvantage ratio, 
CDRJ, implies that small establishments have a cost disadvantage compared with large 
establishments. This, combined with the smaller scale of the Korean market, indicates 
that the (technical) efficiency of Korean industry is low. When the Korean cost 
disadvantage ratio, CDRK, is high relative to CDRJ, the reason is likely to be that scale 
economies in Korean industry are sufficient to override the effect of other countries' 
23 CDR is the ratio of value-added per worker in plants below the minimum efficiency scale (MES) to that 
above the MES. MES is defined as the average of the largest establishments' shipments (in terms of the 
number of establishments) divided by total industry shipments. 
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small market shares. That is, when scale economies are significant and the tariff wall is 
not too high to prohibit imports from Japan, Korean industry will have two properties. 
First, it will be relatively inefficient, and second it will be a truncated version of Japanese 
industry so that measured CDRK will tend to be high in spite of this inefficiency. Thus, 
following Caves et al. (1980), we can expect CDRJ to be positive but CDRK to be 
negative. The sign of the truncation effect variable (CDRK - CDR.l) can be expected to 
be negative. 
Testing the Two-group Hypothesis: The Chow Test 
As described earlier in the chapter, economic theory suggests that tighter import quota 
restrictions strengthen the market power of a domestic monopoly. We therefore expect 
the effects of imperfect competition on X-efficiency to be different for tightly protected 
and loosely protected industry groups. Before testing this proposition, though, 
econometric methodology requires that we justify our decision to divide industry into 
two groups. The most common technique for doing this is the Chow Test. 
TABLE 5.2: STATISTICS FOR TWO GROUP HYPOTHESIS TEST 
1975 1986 
Concentration indices H-index CR3 ACR3 H-index CR3 ACR3 
RSSR 11.07 11.43 5.69 7.93 8.15 6.61 
RSSU 9.45 10.07 4.79 6.5 6.57 5.32 
F-values 1.89 1.49 2.07 2.42 2.66 2.68 
Notes: 1. RSSR and RSSU denote respectively the residual sum of squares for the restricted equations 
and the residual sum of squares for the unrestricted equations. 
2. The value used to divide the two groups is QR = 24 per cent. 
The value of the quantitative restrictions ratio (QR) used to divide all 66 selected 
industries into two groups was around 24 per cent. If the ratio was higher than 24 per 
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cent an industry was classified as "tight" and otherwise as "loose" .24 The value of QR 
was selected so as to minimise the residual sum of squares for the unrestricted industries 
(RSSU) and to place roughly equal numbers of industries in each group. The rate of 
liberalisation of QRs was obtained from Kim (1988). The rates in Kim (1988) were in 
general higher than the figures published by the government, mainly due to differences 
in measurement.25 The rate of import liberalisation of QRs published by the government 
was measured in terms of the ratio of the number of automatic approval items divided by 
the total number of items, while Kim (1988) adjusted the published rate including 
restriction by special laws.26 
The results of the Chow test indicate that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 
per cent significance level in 1986 and accepted at the 5 per cent significance level in 
1975. In other words, the table shows that in 1986 industries can be divided into two 
equal groups (industries with tight and loose quantitative restrictions) but that in 1975 
they can not. 
Estimation Results 
The estimation results given in Table 5.3 show how an imperfectly competitive market 
structure, in conjunction with quantitative trade restrictions, affected X-efficiency in 
1986. Table 5.4 shows the estimated coefficients for 1975. 
24 Direct comparison between the effects of tariffs and quotas on X-efficiency for an industry was not 
undertaken, mainly due to lack of data. 
25 In 1975 (1985), the average rate of QRs for the selected 66 manufacturing industries was 62.4 per cent 
(21.2 per cent) in Kim (1988) whereas the import liberalisation ratio, measured by the number of 
automatic import approvals/total number of commodities, was 50.5 per cent (12.3 per cent). 
26 The special laws include the Law on Drug Administration, the Law on Narcotics, the Fertiliser 
Management Law, the Pesticides Control Law, the Law on Food Sanitation, etc. In Korea, the 
administration of QRs is the responsibility of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry while tariff 
administration is administered by the Ministry of Finance. 
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TABLE 5.3: DETERMINANTS OF X-EFFICIENCY IN 1986 
Independent Variable Estimation Results Based on Quota Restrictions 
--~~~~~~~~~~---.~~--~~~~~~~~-
H-index 
ACR3 
FRGNL 
MCAP 
UNION 
CDRK-CDRJ 
NEX 
Constant 
R1 
(JP) 
V Inter-industry 
R1 
Inter-industry 
F 
N 
Tight 
-1.297a 
(-3.16) 
-0.031 
(-1.18) 
-0.176a 
(-2.74) 
0.604C 
(-1.18) 
-2.281a 
(-2.44) 
0.186 
(1.28) 
0.824b 
(2.12) 
0.44 
(0.30) 
0.63 
0.28 
18.08 
30 
Loose 
-0.912b 
(-1.75) 
0.011 
(0.32) 
-0.010 
(-0.33) 
0.639b 
(1.70) 
-l.382b 
(-2.09) 
0.114C 
(1.63) 
0.592b 
(2.12) 
0.34 
(0.21) 
0.90 
0.31 
38.23 
36 
Tight 
-0.800b 
(-2.12) 
-0.023 
(-0.10) 
-0.166a 
(-2.66) 
0.727b 
(1.68) 
-l.768b 
(-2.08) 
0.263b 
(1.74) 
0.802a 
(2.49) 
0.37 
(0.21) 
0.62 
0.23 
62.05 
30 
Loose 
-0.419 
(-1.14) 
-0.008 
(-0.28) 
-0.006 
(-0.20) 
0.707b 
(2.03) 
-l.186b 
(-2.14) 
0.128b 
(1.86) 
0.594b 
(2.24) 
0.36 
(0.24) 
0.92 
0.34 
49.38 
36 
Notes 1. Levels of statistical significance (one-tailed test) are a= 1 per cent, b = 5 per cent, c= 10 per 
cent 
2. 'Tight' and 'loose' denote respectively an industry in which the quantitative restriction ratio 
was higher than 24 per cent and lower than 24 per cent. 
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The signs of most coefficients in 1986 are as expected, and the explanatory power of the 
equation (the values of R 2 and lP) is also reasonably good. The main findings of the 
estimation can be summarised as follows. 
First, the estimation results support the hypothesis that imperfect competition 
increases X-inefficiency. The signs of coefficients for all market concentration indices, 
except ACR3 in the case of a loosely quota restricted industry, are negative and 
statistically significant. In view of the scale economies and favours from government 
enjoyed by large firms, the negative relationship between market concentration and 
production efficiency strongly implies a wastage of resources and an increase in X-
inefficiency in the highly concentrated industry. Korea's imperfectly competitive market 
structure does, it seems, allow domestic firms not to minimise production costs.27 
Although X-efficiency theory emphasises the failure of monopolies to minimise costs, 
there may exist another reason for production inefficiency in an imperfectly competitive 
market. Although monopolistic firms, like their competitors, want to maximise profits by 
minimising their costs, they may in fact be hampered by a lack of information. In 
contrast to the competitive market, the market price in an imperfectly competitive market 
structure fails to deliver correct information on the extent to which monopolistic firms 
need to improve production efficiency. 
Second, interestingly enough, the estimation results also support our hypothesis 
that tighter quantitative restrictions strengthen the monopoly power of domestic firms 
and hence induce higher X-inefficiency. All the coefficients of the market concentration 
indices are significant (at the 1 per cent level for the H-index and at the 5 per cent level 
for ACR3) in the case of tightly quota restricted industry, but their significance drops (to 
the 5 per cent level for H-index , becoming insignificant for ACR3) for loosely quota 
restricted industry. The results thus confirm that tighter quantitative restrictions cause 
greater X-inefficiency because they enable imperfectly competitive firms to sustain a 
monopoly. 
27 One may argue that the direction of causation between inter-industry differences in concentration and 
inter-industry differences in efficiency may in fact be opposite to that described here because differences 
in concentration reflect the higher efficiency of larger firms (Demsetz 1973). However, as described in 
Chapter 4, government intervention has been an important factor in promoting market concentration in 
Korea. In a study showing no positive relationship between size of firms and profitability, Song (1993) 
also supported the possibility of X-inefficiency in Korean manufacturing in 1986-90. Kim et al. (1989) 
also failed to find any significant and positive relationship between industry concentration and R&D 
expenditure. 
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The coefficients of all government subsidy variables are negative for tightly 
quota restricted industries, although unfortunately not all are statistically significant. This 
may imply that this group took part in rent-seeking activities and was sheltered from 
foreign competition with a negative impact on X-efficiency. In the 1980s, many Korean 
firms (particularly the big business groups, or chaebol) are in fact known to have used 
loans to purchase real estate (especially land), nominally for productive purposes (Song 
1993). The speculative investment by large firms could cause the sign of the coefficient 
to be negative in the tightly quota restricted industry. 
The negative sign of the coefficient of MCAP implies that managerial capitalism 
led to X-inefficiency in Korea. The conflict of interests between owners and managers 
thus seems to have a negative effect on production costs and increases X-inefficiency. In 
addition, all the coefficients are significant at the 1 per cent level for tightly quota 
restricted industries but are not statistically significant for loosely quota restricted 
industries. The results therefore imply that tighter quantitative restrictions not only 
confer market power on a monopoly but also supply a shelter to managers, thereby 
increasing X-inefficiency. 
In general, union organisation seems to have increased X-efficiency in 1986 by 
providing a channel of communication between labour and management. Enterprise-
based Korean unions have generally been viewed as weak and overly cooperative with 
management, at least until the labour disputes of the late 1980s. Thus cooperation and 
wage restraint by Korean unions in 1986 were likely to increase productivity and X-
efficiency. In contrast to the case of the Korean economy, union organisation showed a 
negative relationship with X-efficiency in Japan in 1987 (Brunello 1992) and in the 
United States in the 1970s (Caves et al. 1990). 
The estimation results also reveal the truncation effect of decreased X-efficiency 
in Korea. According to Caves et al. (1980), the negative sign for CDRK is caused by the 
truncation effect. When the observed (ex post) CDRK is high, a combination of returns to 
scale and limited tariff barriers (or imports) causes the smaller tail of the distribution of 
establishments and products of Japanese firms to be truncated in the case of Korean 
industry. This occurs when Korean industry tends to be inefficient because of economies 
of scale. A similar phenomenon was observed in the case of Canada compared with the 
United States (Caves at al. 1980). 
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Exports have contributed to a reduction in X-inefficiency through economies of 
scale and a better flow of information on productivity improvements, and by creating the 
competitive pressure necessary to avoid unnecessary slack. The positive sign for net 
exports may also reflect Verdoon's law, which states the positive relationship between 
production and an increasing total factor productivity ratio. 
The analysis is, however, based on the relative X-efficiency of Korean 
manfacturing compared to Japanese manufacturing. Caves et al. (1980) showed that 
general and industry-specific differences can be divided in assessing the relative 
technical efficiency of two countries.28 vlnter-lndustry and Rinler-Industry in Table (5.3) denote 
respectively the fraction calculated due to inter-industry difference and the explanatory 
power of the regression for the inter-industry variance. In a tightly quantitative restricted 
industry in Table 5.3, for example, 63 per cent (V1nier-Indusiry) of the difference in 
measured X-efficiency was due to industry-specific influences rather than country bias. 
In this industry, 28 per cent ( RJnier-Jndustry) of the variance was explained by the 
regression. 
The estimated coefficients for 1975 are m general not significant, and the 
explanatory power of the estimation (the values of R2 and "i?.2) is weak (Table 5.4). 
Only the signs of market concentration and government subsidies are statistically 
significant, though different from the expected signs. Demsetz (1973) argues that market 
concentration results from the efficiency of large firms. According to Demsetz, large 
firms may have been more efficient than small firms in Korean manufacturing in the mid 
1970s. However, the results in Table 5.4 do not incorporate competitive pressure from 
foreign firms. Considering that highly concentrated markets protected from foreign 
competition seem to result in inefficiency (Table 5.3), the results need to be examined 
further. 
2 2 
28 52 = (JXE + R2. (JXE 
<J;E +(XE - 1)2 <J,h +(XE -1)2 
where R2 is the unadjusted coefficient of determination, <J,h is the sample variance of X-efficiency 
and XE is the sample mean of X-efficiency. The first and second terms of the equation denote 
respectively the differences that are common to all industries and the fraction of the variance 
attributable to inter-industry difference. 
TABLE 5.4: DETERMINANTS OF X-EFFICIENCY IN 1975 
Independent 
Variable 
H - index 
ACR3 
INC 
UNION 
FRGNL 
NEX 
CDRK- CDR.f 
Constant 
Rz 
(R2) 
F 
N 
0.400C 
(1.48) 
0.001 
(0.783) 
0.313 
(1.042) 
o.023a 
(2.955) 
0.023 
(1.272) 
-0.590 
(-1.304) 
0.288 
(1.293) 
0.210 
(0.130) 
28.16 
66 
Estimation Results 
0.289C 
(1.60) 
0.001 
(0.926) 
0.047 
(0.223) 
o.011c 
(1.976) 
0.013 
(0.982) 
-0.368 
(-1.156) 
0.474a 
(2.798) 
0.144 
(0.06) 
48.50 
66 
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Note: Levels of statistical significant (one-tailed test) are*** = 1 per cent,** = 5 per cent, * = 10 per cent. 
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The positive sign of the coefficient for government subsidies, proxied by the ratio 
of foreign loans to total fixed liabilities, is positive. This was not as expected. One 
explanation for the result is that the Korean government, particularly in the mid 1970s, 
reduced the transaction cost of seeking rents. Government policy ensured that rents went 
to a few designated entrepreneurs, mainly firms belonging to chaebol (Chang 1993). 
This selective credit subsidy policy may have deterred other firms from seeking rents and 
saved their rent seeking costs. In addition, the government regularly monitored the 
export rates of favoured firms (Jones et al. 1980), which may have induced them to use 
subsidies more economically.29 Another possible explanation is that the government's 
heavy and chemical industry policy of the mid 1970s accelerated a shift in the industrial 
structure toward more capital-intensive techniques of production. X-inefficiency then 
decreased because of the ease in capital-intensive industry of increasing productivity 
through the development of new technology. Kang (1989) also found low X-inefficiency 
in capital-intensive industry in Korea in 1970-84. 
The availability of credit at low interest rates in the mid 1970s in Korea seems to 
have accelerated market concentration (see Chapter 4 of this thesis). Furthermore, Lee 
(1986), using a calculated interest subsidy variable, found support for rent-seeking and 
technical (X-) efficiency in Korea in the early 1970s. The relationship between 
government subsidies and X-efficiency theory in Korea thus needs to be explored 
further. 
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 show the relationship between trade protection and X-
efficiency in Korean manufacturing industry in 1986 and 197 5. If increased competition 
among domestic firms as well as from abroad do constrain market power and increase X-
efficiency, as argued in the second section of this chapter, trade protection should reduce 
X-efficiency. Tariff and non-tariff barriers have sheltered domestic firms from foreign 
competition in Korea. Taking into account the availability of data, the following trade 
restriction variables have been chosen: 
29 Bergsman (1974) also argued that subsidies, unlike protection, can often be designed to increase 
technological efficiency: for example, they can be used to fund new equipment, labour training etc. 
ETC= Effective protection rate based on Corden's estimation; 
NT= Nominal protection rate; and 
LQR = Rate of liberalisation from quantitative restrictions. 
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Measurement of the nominal rate of protection was based on the difference between the 
domestic producer's price and the world market price for a product, while the effective 
rate of protection was calculated as the difference between domestic value-added under 
protection and value-added in world market prices. ETC and NT are expected to have 
negative coefficients and LQR to have a positive coefficient. 
The estimation results in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 show that most of the signs are as 
expected. The results support the direct and negative effects of trade restrictions on X-
efficiency. In 1986, the signs of the coefficients of the trade protection variables are all 
as predicted by X-efficiency theory. The coefficients are only significant in the cases of 
effective protection rates (Table 5.5). Trade restrictions would seem to have increased 
both the market power of domestic firms and wastage of resources in 1986. Bloch (1974) 
obtained similar results in Canada, another small open economy. If the only function of 
import tariffs is to protect domestic industry from imports, then their effect is direct 
(Caves et al. 1990). That is, increasing imports promotes greater X-efficiency, and 
imposing higher tariffs permits fewer imports. In a highly concentrated market structure, 
tariffs may also indirectly affect X-efficiency by signalling to producers the 
sustainability of decreased competitive pressure. 
TABLE 5.5: DETERMINANTS OF X-EFFICIENCY 2 IN 1986 
Variable 
ETC 
NT 
LQR 
ADM 
UNION 
FRGNL 
NEX 
CDRK - CDR.T 
Constant 
R2 
(JP) 
V lnter-indu.stry 
RJnter-industry 
F 
N 
-0.1773 
(-5.13) 
-1.1733 
(-2.62) 
0.6553 
(2.50) 
-0.014 
(-0.77) 
-0.016 
(-0.26) 
-1.218a 
(-2.66) 
0.8143 
(4.50) 
0.42 
(0.36) 
0.74 
0.32 
61.97 
66 
Notes: As for Table 5.3. 
Estimation Result 
-0.028 
(-0.28) 
-0.507 
(-0.96) 
0.638b 
(2.03) 
-0.007 
(-0.34) 
0.063 
(0.91) 
-0.985b 
(-1.79) 
0.465b 
(2.31) 
0.166 
(0.08) 
0.81 
0.13 
40.32 
66 
0.183 
(0.70) 
-0.314 
(-0.52) 
0.616b 
(1.95) 
-0.009 
(-0.43) 
0.068 
(0.99) 
-0.979b 
(-1.79) 
0.296 
(0.94) 
0.172 
(0.09) 
0.81 
0.14 
40.65 
66 
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Interestingly, the results seem to support Leibenstein's argument of inert areas 
among supervisors. The increase in the number of supervisors translates into X-
inefficiency because they tend to be lax in extracting a higher level of effort and in 
supervising the work performance of employees. The results show that, as in the case of 
Table 5.3, the cooperative relationship between labour and management increased X-
efficiency while the truncation effect reduced X-efficiency in 1986. 
The coefficients of trade protection variables, except for nominal tariffs, are 
significant at the 1 or 5 per cent significance level in 1975. The rate of effective 
protection negatively affects X-efficiency. This suggests that protection-induced slack 
results in waste in production and inefficiency. The rate of liberalisation from 
quantitative restrictions is positively related to X-efficiency because it brings about 
increased competitive pressures from foreign firms. 
The estimation results reported in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 support X-efficiency theory. 
Trade protection does result in X-inefficiency, as Carlsson (1972) showed for Swedish 
manufacturing industry. In Korea, protection from foreign competition has increased the 
monopoly power of domestic firms, resulting not only in allocative inefficiency (Chapter 
4), but also in an unnecessary waste of resources in production or X-inefficiency both in 
1975 and 1986. 
As Yoo (1991) correctly points out, it may not be fair to emphasise only the 
negative aspects of protection in the case of a country like Korea. The ultimate objective 
of protectionist policy in Korea was to promote export-led economic growth, and the net 
effect of competitive conditions on technical (X-) efficiency are less clear than the 
explanation above. Korean firms also could increase efficiency in production through the 
learning-by-doing effect while there was protection from severe foreign competition. 
Although the causality between protection and X-efficiency is not clear in 
theory, the treatment of protection as a determinant variable in the test could be justified 
since the level of protection in Korea was mainly determined by the balance of payments 
(Kim 1993).3° Partial correlations between determinant and dependent variables are also 
generally small, implying that the analysis can be justified (Appendix 5.6-7). 
30 In analysing X (technical) efficiency within a dynamic equilibrium framework, causality between X 
(technical) efficiency and allocative efficiency may be important (Kalirajan at al. 1991). However, 
many economists (Carlssonl972; Caves et al. 1990; Yoo 1991) ignored causality in their analysis of 
static cross-sectional data. 
TABLE 5.6: DETERMINANTS OF X-EFFICIENCY 2 IN 1975 
Variable 
ETC 
NT 
LQR 
ADM 
UNION 
FRGNL 
NEX 
CDRK-CDRJ 
Constant 
R2 
(R2) 
V Inter-industry 
RJnrer-industry 
F 
N 
-0.11 a 
(-2.62) 
-0.057 
(-0.13) 
0.414c 
(1.45) 
o.ona 
(3.45) 
0.020 
(1.12) 
-0.472 
(-1.04) 
0.476a 
(2.33) 
0.26 
(0.18) 
0.68 
0.18 
30.55 
66 
Notes: As for Table 5.3. 
Estimation Result 
0.006 
(0.03) 
-0.180 
(-0.37) 
0.363 
(1.19) 
o.022a 
(2.69) 
0.020 
(1.10) 
-0.401 
(-0.84) 
0.398b 
(1.86) 
0.172 
(0.09) 
0.71 
0.12 
50.44 
66 
0.409b 
(1.73) 
-0.008 
(-0.02) 
0.178 
(0.57) 
o.021a 
(2.61) 
0.021 
(1.16) 
-0.348 
(-0.74) 
0.355b 
(1.68) 
0.215 
(0.14) 
0.70 
0.15 
28.37 
66 
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Summary and conclusion 
The main objective of the analysis in this chapter has been to understand better the 
effects of market and organisational forces, particularly in conjunction with international 
trade, on the use of resources. 
Two important results have emerged. First, Korea's imperfectly competitive 
market structure contributed to X-inefficiency by reducing competitive pressure. 
Interestingly, tighter quantitative restrictions increased the level of X-inefficiency among 
highly protected industries enjoying guaranteed monopoly power. Second, further 
estimation results showed that direct trade protection, whether tariffs or quantitative 
restrictions, increased X-inefficiency. The results thus showed that both domestic 
competition and foreign competition were favourable to X-efficiency, supporting our 
hypotheses. 
One important policy implication of the results is that the effects of such non-
tariff barriers as import quotas and voluntary export restraints, as well as tariffs, need to 
be examined carefully in an imperfectly competitive market structure. Over the past two 
decades, even as international negotiation has succeeded in reducing tariffs to low levels, 
national governments have resorted to a range of direct quantitative restrictions on 
international trade. The proportion of imports subject to non-tariff barriers grew by 17 
per cent in the EC and by 22 per cent in North America in the 1980s (EPAC 1991). The 
results suggest that quantitative restrictions coupled with an imperfectly competitive 
market structure increases X-inefficiency. 
The concept of X-efficiency has had an impact in several policy areas, including 
the privatisation for public and regulated firms (Button et al. 1992). The results also 
supply a foundation of microeconomic reform of competition policy at the border. An 
increase in foreign competition is an appropriate measure to promote the X-efficiency of 
Korean firms, given the high level of market concentration. Imperfect competition, both 
among domestic firms and between domestic and foreign firms, provides a shelter for 
imperfectly competitive firms to be inefficient not only in the allocation of resources but 
also in the effort of reducing costs of production. Exposure to international competition 
could make Korean firms relatively free from X-inefficiency since competitive pressure 
forces domestic firms to try to reduce production costs. Foreign competition thus 
stimulates domestic firms to find efficient ways of producing. Removing trade 
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restrictions would also increase dynamic efficiency since it provides entrepreneurs with 
an incentive to develop new ways to export or to compete with imports. 
Empirically, the major problem with the X-inefficiency concept is that it focuses 
on a relationship that is essentially unobservable. The limitation of the above work is that 
it offers no indication as to the exact (absolute) magnitude of X-inefficiency in any 
industry, but only a relative magnitude obtained from comparison with Japanese 
industry. Further evidence, derived from non-traditional methodology, is needed before 
we can estimate the general magnitude of X-inefficiency and the roles played by 
monopoly and protection. 
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APPENDIX 5.1: X-INEFFICIENCY VERSUS ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY(% of GNP) 
Brazil Mexico Pakistan Philippines 
Net allocative cost (A) 0.3 0.3 0.5 1.0 
X-inefficiency (B) 6.8 2.2 5.4 2.6 
Total cost of protection 7.1 2.5 5.9 3.6 
(B)/(A) 22.7 7.3 10.8 26.0 
Notes 1. Allocative inefficiency denotes the unavoidable higher costs of domestic firms, or the 
difference between the minimum possible domestic cost and the internationally competitive cost. 
2. X-inefficiency includes monopoly profits, which means profits is an avoidable cost. 
Source: Rearranged from Table 1 in Bergsman (1974). 
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APPENDIX 5.2: DERIVATION OF X-EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENT 
A measure of X-efficiency used in this study at the input prices wand r is: 
AC(w,f=) · X C(X, w,r) AC(w,r) 
-----= x------
w · l + r· k w·l+r·k C(X,w,r)/X 
(A.5.1) 
where AC is average cost with respect to the minimum efficient scale of the industry; w 
and r are respectively the prices of wages and capital; w and r are the shadow prices for 
labour (L) and capital (K); and C is the minimal cost of producing actual level of output 
x net of materials costs, given prices w and r )l using the definition of value-added (V), 
the physical units of output (x) can be expressed as follows: 
v 
x=--
p-m 
(A.5.2) 
where pis price of output and m is cost of materials (calculated by multiplying the fixed 
requirement for an intermediate input per unit of output by the unit price of input). 
Substituting equation (A.5.2) into equation (A.5.1) and taking the logarithm gives us: 
log(X(x)) = log(v) +log AC- log(p- m)- log(w + r · Q) (A.5.3) 
where Q=kll is the capital-labour ratio and v= Vil is value-added per worker. 
Taking Japanese industry as a measure of comparison, equation (A.5.4) can be derived 
from equation (A.5.3):32 
31 
(A.5.4) 
The first part of the right-hand-side of equation (A.5.1) represents the divergence resulting from wrong 
input combination given the input prices (w and r) and/or technical inefficiency measured by the 
difference between real output and maximum possible output (frontier of production function). An 
industry with a small market like Korea or lack of competition may evoke a failure producing at the 
minimum level of the Jong-run average cost. The scale aspects of X-efficiency can be measured as the 
ratio of average cost at the minimum efficient scale to average cost at the actual level of output. This is 
the second part of the right-hand-side of equation (A.5.l). According to Jones (1987), both product 
market and factor market can be distorted by market power of chaehol in Korea. 
32 AC thus becomes average costs in the Japanese counterpart industry, the standard of comparison. In 
1953-87, the economic growth rate of Japan has been the fastest among five leading nations in the 
world (Odagiri 1994). In terms of real GDP, the average annual growth rate of the Japanese economy 
(6.9 per cent) was higher than the US economy (3.1 per cent), UK economy (2.4 per cent), West-
German economy (3.7 per cent) and French economy (4.1 per cent). 
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where the subscripts K and J denote Korea and Japan, respectively. Employing the 
definition of the effective rate of protection based on the collusion hypothesis, the last 
term of equation (A.5.4) can be substituted with the following equation:33 
(A.5.5) 
where E is effective protection rate. From equations (A.5.4) and (A.5.5) we have 
equation (A.5.6): 
x v w +r ·Q log( _K._) = log( i) - [log( __: _K K) + log(l + E)] 
XI VI WI + TI · QI 
(A.5.6) 
where XI= 1. 
33 When Korean product and material (tradeable) prices are lower than Japanese prices times one plus the 
relevant Korean ad valorem tariff, the measured X-efficiency will be underestimated because value 
added per worker is lower and hence greater allocative efficiency is mistaken for technical inefficiency. 
However, this strong collusion hypothesis is relaxed in analysing the determinant of X-efficiency using 
control variable such as net export. 
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APPENDIX 5.3: TREND OF FOREIGN LIABILITY (MILLIONS OF US DOLLARS,%) 
Total Foreign Liability (A) A/GNP A/Total Domestic Credit 
1962 89 3.8 21.1 
1965 206 6.9 56.0 
1970 2,277 23.7 83.2 
1975 8,457 41.8 106.7 
1980 27,170 48.2 106.9 
1985 46,762 55.9 97.8 
1987 35,538 30.0 49.4 
1989 29,371 14.4 25.2 
1990 31,699 13.1 23.4 
1991 39,135 14.5 25.2 
Source: MOF of Korea cited in Kim (1992). 
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APPENDIX 5.4: COMPARISON OF INTEREST RATES IN THE DOMESTIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL MARKETS(%) 
1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-83 1984-85 1986 
Domestic bank loan (A)1 24.4 17.4 18.0 13.8 10.0 10.0 
Curb market 54.2 40.1 41.4 30.5 24.4 23.2 
International market (B)2 7.2 7.9 9.5 13.0 9.5 6.7 
Devaluation rate (C)3 3.1 9.3 4.7 8.5 5.9 1.3 
Inflation rate (D)4 15.4 18.8 20.9 8.5 4.0 1.4 
A-B-C 14.1 0.2 3.9 -7.7 -5.4 2.0 
Real interest rate of BS -5.1 -1.6 -6.7 13.0 11.4 6.6 
Notes 1. Discount rate for commercial notes. 
2. Interest rate of Euro-dollar (90 days). 
3. Average during the period. 
4. GDP deflator. 
5. B +C-D. 
Source: Collins and Park (1988) cited in Kim (1992). 
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APPENDIX 5.5: DETERMINANTS OF X-EFFICIENCY: UNRESTRICTED INDUSTRIES (1975) 
Independent Estimation Results Based on Import Quotas 
Variable 
Tight Loose Tight Loose 
H- index -0.267 0.715b 
(-0.81) (1.82) 
ACR3 -0.054 0.358 
(-0.80) (1.28) 
INC 0.0()3C 0.001 o.omc 0.001 
(1.33) (0.42) (1.31) (0.29) 
UNION 0.584b 0.207 0.7473 -0.318 
(1.73) (0.44) (2.39) (-1.01) 
FRGNL 0.010 0.032a 0.017b 0.006 
(1.24) (2.62) (2.55) (0.66) 
NEX -0.055 0.024 -0.()54 0.006 
(-0.67) (1.06) (-0.22) (0.38) 
CDRK- CDRJ 0.068 -0.743 0.240 -0.654c 
(0.08) (-1.22) (0.35) (-1.58) 
Constant 0.166 0.314 0.043 0. 7 48 
(0.67) (0.88) (0.214) (2.61)a 
R2 0.247 0.304 0.420 0.195 
(R2) (0.05) (0.16) (0.27) (0.03) 
F 20.43 14.70 36.21 23.02 
N 30 36 30 36 
Notes: As for Table 5.3. 
APPENDIX 5.6: CORRELATION BETWEEN DEPENDENT AND DETERMINANT VARIABLES 
FOR UNRESTRICTED REGRESSION IN 1986 
H-index 
CR3 
ACR3 
INC 
UNION 
FRGNL 
NEX 
CDR 
De ree of Quota Restrictions 
Tight Loose 
-0.144 -0.040 
-0.028 -0.196 
-0.082 0.121 
-0.327 0.005 
0.255 0.225 
0.008 -0.079 
-0.014 0.398 
-0.259 -0.376 
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APPENDIX 5.7: CORRELATION BETWEEN DEPENDENT AND DETERMINANT VARIABLES 
FOR DETERMINENTS OF X-EFFICIENCY 2 IN 1975 AND IN 1986 
1975 1986 
ETC -0.180 -0.478 
ETB -0.501 -0.550 
NT 0.050 -0.037 
LQR 0.287 0.104 
ADM -0.099 -0.064 
UNION 0.119 0.119 
FRGNL 0.336 0.218 
NEX 0.098 0.206 
CDR -0.212 -0.301 
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APPENDIX 5.8: DATA SET FOR 1986 
Industry XEB862 XEC862 CDRK86 CDRJ85 NW86 
Code 
3111 0.23519 0.35049 0.1746 0.09 6202 
3114 0.58905 0.65099 0.0754 0.103 53493 
3115 0.72972 0.72972 0.0402 0.038 3584 
3116 1.98317 1.82264 0.0368 0.066 5394 
3118 0.38298 0.62813 0.0004 0.144 966 
3121 0.328 0.44163 0.0172 0.023 7668 
3123 1.29522 1.29522 0.1593 0.106 9926 
3132 0.72293 0.72887 0.0839 0.133 8622 
3133 1.77876 1.7544 0.6084 0.936 1800 
3134 0.75547 0.78454 0.1988 0.104 11495 
3212 0.40804 0.44595 0.036 0.079 157979 
3213 1.29573 1.26728 0.126 0.069 37502 
3215 1.0885 1.09014 0.027 0.171 60094 
3216 0.5667 0.59634 0.2 0.171 1992 
3217 0.39242 0.47326 0.0217 0.087 8507 
3221 0.77954 0.82756 0.1735 0.136 7335 
3231 1.60514 1.46302 0.0558 0.141 15938 
3232 0.96695 0.88134 0.15 0.118 1540 
3233 1.38123 1.34727 0.0816 0.274 21932 
3240 0.62262 0.64583 0.0283 0.159 35380 
3311 1.3743 1.3743 0.0542 0.277 30031 
3312 0.4818 0.54804 0.1486 0.078 2521 
3320 1.28384 1.20456 0.0178 0.1 31011 
3411 0.8764 1.13535 0.0441 0.101 22780 
3412 0.94129 0.97569 0.102 0.084 22810 
3423 0.96717 0.95552 0.2901 0.076 6912 
3511 0.73759 0.84513 0.0244 0.068 14983 
3512 0.81671 0.95932 0.0872 0.111 9142 
3515 0.47819 0.71031 0.0208 0.195 4535 
3516 1.74299 1.20036 0.2053 0.293 3172 
3521 0.81981 0.79468 0.0475 0.058 7380 
3522 0.47358 0.49855 0.0789 0.043 35122 
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APPENDIX 5.8: ~CONTINUEDl 
Industry XEB862 XEC862 CDRK86 CDRJ85 NW86 
Code 
3523 0.33901 0.33901 0.043 0.041 11607 
3530 0.43128 0.35045 0.0211 0.191 4380 
3551 1.2966 1.28755 0.0096 0.095 10330 
3610 0.69752 0.74809 0.0232 0.039 18266 
3620 0.88265 0.91105 0.0245 0.015 22924 
3691 1.46781 1.49571 0.082 0.081 11958 
3692 0.72147 0.84165 0.0868 0.17 9924 
3693 1.29648 1.38354 0.0481 0.081 32080 
3694 1.491 1.44762 0.0338 0.058 4571 
3713 1.08418 1.0633 0.0664 0.024 16237 
3721 1.1003 1.35695 0.0304 0.369 4148 
3724 0.43298 0.53397 0.2422 0.088 1547 
3811 0.50021 0.55489 0.0347 0.062 24314 
3812 0.94382 0.92769 0.0617 0.077 10071 
3813 0.55885 0.61994 0.0307 0.078 34973 
3821 0.40969 0.45646 0.2014 0.007 145 
3822 0.72842 0.74803 0.0257 0.029 13693 
3823 0.50803 0.56916 0.0933 0.023 30943 
3824 0.76182 0.78227 0.0658 0.057 28337 
3825 0.76409 0.79507 0.0156 0.021 18446 
3831 0.69974 0.72596 0.0263 0.039 31872 
3832 0.80206 0.83732 0.0088 0.02 171332 
3833 0.66392 0.67315 0.0054 0.007 25356 
3841 0.88497 0.93701 0.0036 0.01 72478 
3842 1.03705 1.03705 0.0261 0.12 2988 
3843 0.54219 0.60456 0.0062 0.005 98555 
3844 0.41107 0.49337 0.029 0.04 6480 
3851 0.13289 0.21114 0.0701 0.024 5061 
3852 0.92559 0.94377 0.051 0.02 14000 
3853 0.74233 0.77933 0.0191 0.036 14739 
3901 0.16725 0.20156 0.0343 0.123 8097 
3902 0.20712 0.26904 0.0078 0.008 11764 
3903 0.37562 0.41544 0.067 0.055 17407 
3904 0.44757 0.49502 0.1142 0.237 45807 
Notes: 1. XEB and XEC respectively denote X-efficiency based on Balassa's and Corden's effective 
protection rates 2. CDRK and CDRJ denote the cost disadvantage ratio in Korea and Japan 
respectively. 3. NW denotes number of workers. 4. See main text for data sources. 
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APPENDIX 5.8: ~CONTINUED2 
Industry FrgnL86 Vadd86 NT86 FQR86 ETC862 ETB862 
Code 
3111 0.18 65673 0.2 0.559 1.59 2.3695 
3114 0.18 268703 -0.134 0.559 1.4075 1.5555 
3115 1.71 81655 1.03 0.559 -1.756 -2.368 
3116 0.11 103835 2.08 0.559 0.593 0.545 
3118 0.1 60225 0.42 0.559 2.1285 3.491 
3121 0 152797 0.44 0.196 1.9325 2.602 
3123 0.07 266613 -0.065 0.196 -1.314 -1.532 
3132 0 89059 -0.039 0.196 1.095 1.104 
3133 0 185501 -0.175 0.196 0.8765 0.8645 
3134 0 251457 0.156 0.196 1.2475 1.2955 
3212 1.11 1254862 0.183 0.978 2.4645 2.6935 
3213 0.31 303093 0.067 0.978 0.8655 0.8465 
3215 0.61 513335 0.15 0.939 0.9945 0.996 
3216 1.7 9644 0.104 0.939 1.5775 1.66 
3217 1.7 53413 0.324 0.939 2.534 3.056 
3221 0.05 31436 -0.013 0.957 1.469 1.5595 
3231 0.02 183275 0.078 0.92 0.6325 0.5765 
3232 0.02 8326 0.941 0.92 0.6325 0.5765 
3233 0.02 150923 -0.065 0.92 0.8135 0.7935 
3240 0.39 229418 0.278 1 1.355 1.4055 
3311 0 208878 0.127 1 -0.62 -0.945 
3312 0 13651 -0.118 1 1.8545 2.1095 
3320 0.1 205703 -0.033 0.956 0.7935 0.7445 
3411 0.45 406910 0.136 0.88 2.095 2.714 
3412 0.45 198590 0.134 0.88 1.122 1.163 
3423 0.6 35695 -0.095 1 0.913 0.902 
3511 0.77 651362 0.224 0.666 1.6495 1.89 
3512 0.78 161697 0.544 0.666 1.721 2.0215 
3515 0 92547 0.651 0.666 2.5535 3.793 
3516 2.43 104269 0.04 0.666 0.583 0.4015 
3521 0 131896 0.034 0.664 0.8645 0.838 
3522 0.25 762218 0.215 0.664 1.1945 1.2575 
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Industry FrgnL86 Vadd86 NT86 FQR86 ETC862 ETB862 
code 
3523 0 326076 0.175 0.664 -0.542 -1.081 
3530 3.73 994267 0.436 0.535 5.8475 4.7515 
3551 3.76 270955 0.064 0.929 0.9305 0.924 
3610 0.64 115391 0.211 0.795 1.5035 1.6125 
3620 7.25 342639 0.076 0.788 1.1965 1.235 
3691 1.86 79280 0.086 1 1.105 1.126 
3692 1.03 389214 0.255 1 1.738 2.0275 
3693 4.28 401330 0.17 1 1.3925 1.486 
3694 3.26 64357 0.117 1 0.842 0.8175 
3713 3.96 138376 0.251 0.956 0.8565 0.84 
3721 2.49 100343 0.156 0.886 l.612 1.988 
3724 2.49 10568 0.155 0.886 l.612 1.988 
3811 1.47 156845 0.318 0.946 1.761 1.9535 
3812 1.47 67625 0.17 0.946 0.936 0.92 
3813 6.17 488241 0.513 0.946 l.761 1.9535 
3821 8.64 1049 0.534 0.806 1.5505 1.7275 
3822 14.82 130000 -0.045 0.762 1.133 1.1635 
3823 2.02 282179 0.366 0.762 1.5375 1.7225 
3824 2.02 293491 0.168 0.762 1.1545 1.1855 
3825 0.89 266588 0.108 0.701 1.184 1.232 
3831 1.22 366880 -0.137 0.605 1.241 1.2875 
3832 4.18 2400542 0.175 0.567 1.274 1.33 
3833 3.11 363794 0.007 0.73 1.079 1.094 
3841 0.12 1032897 0.137 0.545 1.4455 1.5305 
3842 4.6 30008 3.15 1 -4.38 -2.856 
3843 4.71 1616998 0.283 0.415 1.8125 2.021 
3844 0.25 58073 0.284 1 1.8155 2.179 
3851 0.72 36198 0.927 0.799 4.312 6.851 
3852 0 105129 0.189 0.799 1.12 1.142 
3853 0 138370 0.083 0.799 1.274 1.3375 
3901 0.3 76889 1.323 0.692 3.407 4.106 
3902 0.3 95393 0.515 0.692 2.8365 3.6845 
3903 0.3 125812 0.353 0.692 1.9385 2.144 
3904 0.3 245934 0.353 0.692 1.9385 2.144 
Note: 1. FrgnL: Foreign loan{Total fixed liability; Vadd: Value added (million won); NT: Rate of 
nominal tariff; FQR: Freedom from quantitative restriction; ETC: Effective protection rate 
(Corden's estimation); ETB: Effective protection rate (Balassa's estimation). 
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Industry Estab85 Incorp85 Male85 Female85 EadmiM8 EadmiF85 
Code 5 
3111 75 53 3559 2344 1557 562 
3114 1239 161 9044 24896 2536 984 
3115 67 27 3458 1205 1027 382 
3116 238 39 4252 1366 1069 275 
3118 3 2 707 131 254 53 
3121 132 55 5069 2740 1684 1165 
3123 153 72 7086 1639 2724 867 
3132 908 56 7991 1708 2040 421 
3133 4 4 1747 342 392 69 
3134 41 30 8216 1924 5503 564 
3212 2281 377 48977 101137 10515 5604 
3213 546 122 21517 9621 3652 1658 
3215 1636 153 18022 39620 4602 3073 
3216 56 19 681 1044 178 65 
3217 135 27 4188 4121 699 263 
3221 806 6 4218 4803 307 422 
3231 216 63 9620 3338 1624 613 
3232 35 9 649 640 119 54 
3233 540 95 10737 7347 1843 1010 
3240 460 71 16445 14945 3360 1243 
3311 1297 196 24173 7215 4242 1660 
3312 125 11 2091 655 237 109 
3320 1050 67 22508 6612 2958 1010 
3411 308 111 17656 3405 3998 963 
3412 731 149 15479 5428 3036 1334 
3423 278 15 3770 1860 458 365 
3511 297 71 11939 2024 3395 791 
3512 189 114 6808 804 2018 522 
3515 49 24 4062 399 832 127 
3516 28 23 1877 445 724 147 
3521 66 38 5619 677 2626 540 
3522 276 213 16671 11987 11093 2872 
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Industry Estab85 Incorp85 Male85 Female85 EadmiM85 EadmiF85 
Code 
3523 102 55 5725 5766 2968 2603 
3530 17 15 4549 358 1669 259 
3551 55 13 8595 1480 1256 269 
3610 302 45 7983 8977 1486 656 
3620 221 79 15538 5014 2803 902 
3691 221 82 6592 3583 1222 319 
3692 64 49 9677 769 2487 364 
3693 1459 215 25347 3859 6153 1136 
3694 83 29 3227 711 760 155 
3713 234 48 12089 1555 1696 483 
3721 51 22 3943 248 902 185 
3724 76 5 1356 203 210 90 
3811 542 79 16231 5336 2373 842 
3812 302 52 6860 1537 1171 440 
3813 725 209 29526 2590 5530 1725 
3821 10 2 153 37 41 14 
3822 254 37 8668 1287 1694 452 
3823 981 111 22522 2255 3547 1393 
3824 882 127 23611 2479 5075 1511 
3825 116 60 8456 7997 4070 1055 
3831 514 182 22725 6295 6629 1677 
3832 1017 337 59202 69447 25105 6621 
3833 291 49 13567 5986 2996 744 
3841 474 96 79775 4703 16780 2799 
3842 32 12 4384 322 1124 219 
3843 832 190 71859 9852 18449 3010 
3844 113 17 4622 1045 915 242 
3851 129 32 2366 2253 778 293 
3852 179 42 6691 4587 1128 488 
3853 147 51 6592 8743 1644 688 
3901 253 63 4745 2081 603 431 
3902 58 13 7162 3033 750 222 
3903 275 69 8184 7400 1528 720 
3904 509 115 9813 24684 2328 1570 
Note: 1. Estab: Number of total establishment; Incorp: Number of incorportation; Male: Number 
of male worker; Female: Number of female workers; EadmiM: Number of employed male 
administrative workers; EadmiF: Number of employed female administrative workers. 
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Industry XEB75 XEC75 CDRK75 CDRJ75 NW75 
Code 
3111 0.42924 0.56494 0.594 0.134 1706 
3112 0.53333 0.64419 0.04 0.106 3985 
3113 0.98258 0.93889 0.229 0.182 9496 
3114 0.77097 0.76659 0.107 0.075 20954 
3115 0.13593 0.26113 0.032 0.044 2934 
3116 0.44834 0.45483 0.066 0.244 13137 
31213 0.98676 1.01048 0.014 0.017 1728 
3122 0.80912 0.91946 0.095 0.09 3588 
3131 0.54035 0.52532 0.082 0.014 8576 
3132 0.98079 0.92611 0.095 0.096 13051 
3134 l.00059 1.01195 0.123 0.049 3870 
3211 1.55291 1.6175 0.022 0.105 101313 
3216 0.24576 0.31408 0.107 0.044 11318 
3217 0.88154 0.85033 0.06 0.053 73921 
3213 1.31237 1.24688 0.066 0.075 8423 
3214 1.04022 1.03114 0.039 0.075 93350 
3215 0.47436 0.56323 0.036 0.049 29487 
32201-5 1.31238 1.1823 0.023 0.1 152055 
3231 0.68852 0.67371 0.014 0.138 9254 
3232 0.81179 0.79434 0.75 0.118 338 
3233 0.79405 0.75033 0.167 0.293 9970 
3240 0.08887 0.12344 0.044 0.027 11200 
3311 1.06958 1.14135 0.008 0.073 37191 
3312 0.3221 0.37207 0.089 0.076 2958 
3320 0.29507 0.35541 0.041 0.071 10018 
3412 0.78476 0.78252 0.118 0.057 10899 
3422 0.28814 0.39052 0.085 0.073 2688 
35112 0.92738 1.08577 0.066 0.042 3772 
3513 0.58408 0.67578 0.022 0.109 12627 
3512 0.38174 1.05983 0.05 0.052 9681 
35125 1.01106 0.8312 0.109 0.127 4521 
3521 0.48481 0.50382 0.049 0.03 3470 
Notes: As for Appendix 5.8. 
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Industry XEB75 XEC75 CDRK75 CDRJ75 NW75 
Code 
3522 0.29239 0.32895 0.048 0.029 22471 
3523 0.48602 0.38743 0.023 0.031 9102 
3551 0.77852 0.757 0.011 0.062 7969 
3610 0.77497 0.73011 0.034 0.022 7259 
3620 1.17037 1.11727 0.03 0.009 11973 
3691 0.88789 0.92419 0.029 0.05 12142 
36991 0.61271 0.63158 0.019 0.05 12625 
36993 0.80557 0.90159 0.044 0.1 2442 
37103 1.95466 0.21428 0.014 0.128 20173 
37106 0.88276 0.96488 0.068 0.071 6584 
37201 0.94506 l.30615 0.103 0.462 3607 
37203 0.25603 0.35385 0.106 0.079 693 
3811 0.68872 0.67524 0.04 0.186 9887 
3812 1.06895 0.9758 0.122 0.166 2555 
3813 0.596 0.58434 0.045 0.056 10258 
3821 0.42505 0.43512 0.017 0.183 754 
3822 0.51521 0.51148 0.021 0.015 6451 
3823 1.07204 1.05346 0.079 0.02 5989 
3824 0.37009 0.39307 0.061 0.045 15538 
3825 0.7912 0.73656 0.028 0.015 2655 
3831 0.97492 0.93805 0.035 0.014 10967 
3832 0.33725 0.38786 0.038 0.016 94147 
3833 0.37323 0.38841 0.047 0.007 5555 
3841 1.22066 1.20171 0.003 0.006 22489 
3842 2.99923 0.82929 0.011 0.096 3806 
3843 0.34893 0.50167 0.025 0.004 20900 
3844 0.44485 0.49138 0.058 0.049 4103 
3851 0.11951 0.18032 0.361 0.039 1078 
3852 0.3452 0.38851 0.049 0.012 4482 
3853 0.30135 0.35279 0.115 0.021 8291 
3901 0.19778 0.27567 0.021 0.078 3777 
3902 0.46659 0.48331 0.037 0.011 4325 
3903 0.47131 0.51309 0.07 0.063 5141 
39097 0.46345 0.50453 0.17 0.081 6249 
Notes: As for Appendix 5.8. 
149 
APPENDIX 5.9: ~CONTINUED) 
Industry FrgnL75 Vadd75 TN74 FQR74 ETC752 ETB752 
Code 
3111 0.06 3687 -0.005 0.224 1.183 1.557 
3112 0.06 19453 0.167 0.224 1.436 1.735 
3113 12.27 6634 0.301 0.224 0.967 0.924 
3114 13 18537 -0.202 0.224 0.881 0.876 
3115 0.45 5754 0.13 0.224 4.261 8.186 
3116 4.48 10569 0.043 0.224 1.106 1.122 
31213 0.45 5620 0.21 0 1.04 1.065 
3122 0.92 19584 0.273 0 0.88 -7.477 
3131 0.22 50116 0.293 0 0.845 0.822 
3132 0 36237 0.073 0 0.7 0.661 
3134 2.72 27408 0.12 0 1.057 1.069 
3211 20.03 190303 0.131 0.325 1.142 1.19 
3216 20.03 116842 -0.084 0.146 2.416 3.087 
3217 0.97 44073 0.012 0.146 0.805 0.777 
3213 0 81243 0.218 0.146 0.762 0.724 
3214 2.54 800 0.076 0.167 0.917 0.909 
3215 ().} 1 10044 -0.099 0.325 1.676 1.99 
32201-5 10.53 117623 -0.159 0.167 0.626 0.564 
3231 1.53 30693 0.239 0.423 0.977 0.956 
3232 1.53 297 0.239 0.423 0.977 0.956 
3233 1.53 9099 -0.153 0.423 0.727 0.687 
3240 0 9662 0.723 0 4.185 5.813 
3311 3.2 63583 0.087 0.641 1.073 1.145 
3312 1.35 1971 0.258 0.641 l.451 1.676 
3320 0 7078 0.447 0.143 1.744 2.1 
3412 0.06 11654 0.057 0.2 1.051 l.048 
3422 0.56 1657 -0.244 0.545 1.296 1.757 
35112 25.34 11037 0.525 0.35 l.578 1.848 
3513 10.63 51048 0.532 0.35 4.293 4.967 
3512 13.45 58097 -0.186 0.35 1.641 4.555 
35125 1.48 9102 -0.036 0.35 0.683 0.562 
3521 0.05 10253 0.168 0.517 1.161 1.206 
Notes: As for Appendix 5.8. 
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Industry FrgnL75 Vadd75 TN74 FQR74 ETC752 ETB752 
Code 
3522 0.67 80814 0.271 0.517 1.368 1.539 
3523 0 28212 -0.099 0.517 0.562 0.448 
3551 12.98 24231 0.287 0.529 1.538 1.495 
3610 6.9 4468 -0.056 0.643 0.752 0.708 
3620 5.22 26734 0.127 0.59 0.827 0.789 
3691 0.49 18747 -0.191 0.824 0.991 1.031 
36991 0 13949 0.125 0.824 1.315 1.356 
36993 0 6356 -0.016 0.824 1.045 1.169 
37103 23.5 63991 0.656 0.671 9.122 -7.522 
37106 23.5 5386 0.309 0.671 1.312 1.434 
37201 2.77 13025 0.67 0.734 2.451 3.388 
37203 2.77 910 -0.216 0.734 2.451 3.388 
3811 0.58 9200 0.438 0.333 0.946 0.927 
3812 0 2434 0.132 0.333 0.723 0.66 
3813 0 16055 0.742 0.333 0.946 0.927 
3821 0 782 ().()38 0.529 1.161 1.189 
3822 2.32 9118 0.037 0.292 1.036 1.029 
3823 0 7719 -0.209 0.292 0.808 0.794 
3824 12.42 16415 0.172 0.292 1.627 1.728 
3825 19.85 2499 0.167 0.167 0.782 0.728 
3831 0.25 15379 0.33 0.111 0.807 0.776 
3832 6.27 150884 0.388 0.111 1.676 1.928 
3833 0.62 10268 0.189 0.167 1.488 1.549 
3841 8.47 52344 0.074 0.667 0.902 0.888 
3842 9.88 8286 0.7 1 -1.724 0.277 
3843 11.44 47522 0.499 0.211 2.053 2.951 
3844 0 3133 0.364 1.434 1.584 
3851 () 725 0.731 0.279 2.708 4.085 
3852 () 4441 0.404 0.279 1.614 1.817 
3853 0 12064 0.777 0.279 1.813 2.123 
3901 0 5380 0.557 0.138 2.325 3.24 
3902 0 4523 0.298 0.138 1.186 1.228 
3903 0 5346 0.213 0.138 1.247 1.357 
39097 0 7564 0.213 0.138 1.247 1.357 
Notes: As for Appendix 5.8. 
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Industry Estab75 Tncorp75 Male75 Female75 EadmiM75 EadmiF75 
Code 
3111 23 11 1133 580 343 111 
3112 72 12 2663 847 641 231 
3113 105 52 3768 5521 996 573 
3114 432 102 7927 13702 2256 519 
3115 90 19 2162 711 639 94 
3116 743 38 11165 1151 1742 227 
31213 27 7 2903 662 484 140 
3122 89 40 3077 364 1199 238 
3131 47 36 5564 3039 1916 446 
3132 1107 48 11680 1031 3174 278 
3134 25 11 3110 756 2445 393 
3211 413 166 28610 76542 8245 2712 
3216 301 48 3845 8416 775 322 
3217 737 179 20463 57413 4785 2083 
3213 83 24 3548 5113 774 229 
3214 1260 166 26984 89996 5114 1898 
3215 262 72 12347 17153 2448 724 
32201-5 1004 35 9924 16622 1506 518 
3231 52 23 7443 3422 1301 292 
3232 6 3 201 156 49 11 
3233 92 41 6043 4996 772 281 
3240 192 27 6219 6436 1112 322 
3311 1021 77 27145 10530 4552 1061 
3312 124 13 1709 1793 195 68 
3320 553 31 8772 1670 1003 179 
3412 231 62 8261 2954 1597 405 
3422 43 7 1523 1576 185 56 
35112 72 38 3422 394 641 143 
3513 169 63 10390 2569 2301 484 
3512 46 32 7003 1249 1539 291 
35125 30 21 2144 903 477 94 
3521 57 19 2977 587 897 149 
Notes: As for Appendix 5.8. 
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Industry Estab75 Incorp75 Male75 Female75 EadmiM75 EadmiF75 
Code 
3522 192 119 12791 9972 7697 1756 
3523 78 17 4457 4911 1807 2041 
3551 28 10 6887 1356 1444 265 
3610 290 16 3925 2703 476 96 
3620 108 36 9352 3307 1402 409 
3691 206 42 6050 3401 1050 189 
36991 765 45 9623 838 1644 212 
36993 21 8 2121 252 495 54 
37103 66 39 20464 610 3292 432 
37106 150 29 6498 479 726 181 
37201 35 15 3532 254 669 106 
37203 29 7 641 80 124 29 
3811 318 31 8565 1881 763 164 
3812 96 10 2397 278 268 78 
3813 294 65 10219 711 1963 292 
3821 34 3 740 28 78 17 
3822 177 13 6004 560 543 151 
3823 209 28 5799 346 626 177 
3824 561 71 15226 1316 1984 427 
3825 30 14 1142 1822 249 99 
3831 164 59 7470 3700 1522 345 
3832 359 249 32578 73149 9980 3305 
3833 56 18 4168 1846 790 209 
3841 239 35 22184 1035 4395 599 
3842 19 9 3773 146 547 58 
3843 176 55 21706 1881 5183 832 
3844 87 9 3486 547 453 94 
3851 73 30 3053 1246 568 222 
3852 40 15 3098 1544 284 93 
3853 82 42 5494 3678 1098 283 
3901 58 10 2372 1650 202 80 
3902 30 10 2950 1611 393 105 
3903 93 28 3130 2448 453 153 
39097 70 29 2812 3838 608 278 
Notes: As for Appendix 5.8. 
6 Implications of Increased Foreign 
Competition in an Oligopoly 
Introduction 
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An important issue in the industrial organisation of an economy is how to improve 
efficiency (and hence welfare). Economists' main recommendation in this area has been 
for governments to promote competition on the grounds that perfect competition 
guarantees Pareto optimality. Earlier chapters of this thesis consistently showed that 
competition from foreign firms, as well as among domestic firms, has increased 
allocative efficiency (Chapter 4) and X-efficiency (Chapter 5) in Korea, a small open 
developing country. 
However, in the case of an oligopoly with economies of scale, the effects on 
welfare of an increase in competition from abroad are less clear, both theoretically and 
empirically. 1 Some economists have argued that, in the case of an imperfectly 
competitive industry, an increase in competition will have negative effects on national 
welfare (Katrak 1977; Krugman 1984; Brander and Spencer 1985), and that 
consequently governments need to formulate appropriate trade and industry strategies. 
Other economists suggest that the positive effects of increased foreign competition can 
be proved theoretically (Helpman and Krugman 1985; Markusen 1981). The lack of 
evidence on the welfare effect of a rise in competition from abroad in an oligopoly with 
economies of scale points to the need for further empirical study (Rodrik 1988; Roberts 
et al. 1991). 
The adoption of an export-oriented strategy of economic development has made 
the Korean economy highly dependent on foreign trade. In the 1970s, the average rates 
of exports and imports to GNP were 26 per cent and 33 per cent respectively. In the 
1980s, export intensity increased to 38 per cent and import intensity to 40 per cent. 
During these years Korean manufacturing industry was characterised by an 
oligopolistic structure. Between 1970 and 1987, the average share of oligopoly in 
manufacturing industry, expressed in terms of value of shipment and commodity 
1 Refer to Richardson (1988, 1992) for excelJcnt surveys of the literature. 
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numbers, was about 44 per cent and 40 per cent respectively (Chapter 3). As already 
noted in Chapter 4, economies of scale were an important feature of Korean 
manufacturing in the 1970s and in the 1980s. Korea's trade and industry policy changed 
considerably in the 1980s (Kim 1993), from heavy intervention in the market 
mechanism (through, for example, protection policy) to liberalisation (by reducing 
barriers to foreign firms, for instance, or promoting competition among domestic 
producers). Korea thus provides a good case study of the effects of increased foreign 
competition on welfare and efficiency in an oligopoly with economies of scale. 
The main objectives of this chapter are to evaluate the effects of a rise in foreign 
competition (a relaxation of quotas) on national welfare and resource allocation, and to 
examine the implications for Korean manufacturing. A partial equilibrium approach 
using simulation methodology is adopted for 34 selected oligopolistic industries in the 
KSIC five-digit level of industrial classification. In contrast to previous research, the 
study deals with the fact that the number of firms must be an integer.2 This is especially 
relevant in study of Korean manufacturing because the number of firms in most 
industries is small. The partial equilibrium approach has a second advantage over 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, namely that the problem of judgment in 
obtaining elasticities of demand and price can be avoided. 
Controversy Surrounding the Effects of Liberalisation on National Welfare 
Trade Gains in a Perfectly Competitive Market 
Text books on international trade, based on the assumption of a perfectly competitive 
market structure coupled with production technology of constant returns to scale, 
suggest that trade and investment patterns are determined by comparative advantage 
among countries and that the creation of free markets is the best way of exploiting 
comparative advantage (Dixit and Norman 1980). The cost of protection is also 
explained convincingly by Corden (1974). According to these authors, free trade results 
in production efficiency gains, made through the substitution of cheaper imports for 
more expensive domestic production, and consumption efficiency gains associated with 
the expansion of consumption that occurs when prices fall. As Figure 6.1 shows, given 
world price ratio P* and the absence of domestic distortions such as tariffs, taxes and 
2 Rodrik (1988) also argued that the number of firms must be an integer. 
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subsidies, the community indifference curve under free trade, UF, will be higher (and 
hence national welfare will be higher) than under autarky, UA. The difference between 
the two community indifference curves, UF -UA, denotes an increase in national 
welfare. An increase in national welfare is obtained through free trade, by exporting 
goodX (amount of X-XF) and importing good Y (amount ofYF -Y). 
FIGURE 6.1: 1RADE GAINS UNDER PERFECT COMPETITION 
x 
Notes: P* and C* are world price ratio and social consumption under free trade 
respectively. P\md Care autarky price ratio and social consumption respectively. 
The Oligopoly 
The effects of an increase 111 foreign competition in an oligopolistic market with 
economies of scale is controversial, especially in developing countries (Rodrik 1988). 
Krugman (1987) also argued, assuming market imperfections, that where there is an 
industry learning curve which gives rise to economies of scale temporary protection and 
government assistance may be permanently able to shift comparative advantage. The 
following equation shows how a reallocation of resources will affect welfare in an 
oligopoly (see Appendix 6.1 for the derivation). 
where: E is expenditure function 
W is welfare index 
P;is domestic price of good i 
P;* is world price of good i 
M; is net imports of good i 
C;is average cost per unit of good i 
Qis aggregation of each firm's output= L,.q; 
n; is number of firms producing good i 
q)s each firm's output of good i 
AC 8; = --' = scale economy variable 
MC; 
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Each of the three terms on the right-hand side of equation (6.1) corresponds to a 
particular source of market imperfection. The first term represents the desirability of 
expanding net imports (that is, expanding consumption or reducing production) of a 
protected commodity.3 Thus, as long as the world price is lower than the domestic price, 
distortion produced by protection should decrease. 
The second term describes the large profits of oligopolists who are sheltered by 
protection or entry barriers. Note that for trade liberalization to be welfare-enhancing on 
this account, total output in such industries must increase so long as average cost is 
lower than price. The reasoning is that, ceteris paribus, reallocation of resources to 
sectors making large profits is desirable. This is in conflict with the thinking expressed 
in the first term. 
The third term captures the effects of economies of scale. In industries with 
increasing returns to scale ( 8; > 1 ), an expansion of average firm output is needed to 
decrease average costs and realise the rationalisation effect of trade liberalisation. This 
is another point of conflict between the three terms. Although exploitation of economies 
of scale is possible through trade liberalisation, there is no guarantee that these gains 
will be realized. To say that rationalization in the manufacturing sector is sufficient for 
gains from trade to be made is not to say that this will occur in response to free trade, 
particularily in developing countries (Rodrik 1988). 
3 This means implicitly a reduction in domestic output. 
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The conflict between the three elements described above becomes less sharp if 
exit and entry of firms is unrestricted and costless. If the efficiency effects of one (or 
two) of the tenn(s) on the right-hand side of equation (6.1) offset the negative effects of 
the other(s), then there could be a net increase in national welfare. Roberts and Tybout 
(1991) showed that national welfare can increase when the number of firms is fixed 
endogeneously. The basic arguments are as follows. 
We consider the market for a particular good, dropping the subscript i for 
convenience. We assume that there is perfect substitution among domestic goods but 
imperfect substitution between domestic and imported goods.4 Domestic firms are 
assumed to have a linear demand schedule and to conduct business based on Cournot 
conjectural variation but no conjectural variation from foreign firms. It is assumed that 
each firm} has constant but different marginal costs, MCj, as well as fixed costs (F). 
Thus, total costs (TC) are: 
TC=F+c7 ·MC J J J J (6.2) 
In equation (6.2), Fj is assumed to be fixed with respect to the production of the firm 
but variable in that capital goods giving rise to fixed costs can be sold to other 
industries without loss of resale. 5 
The first-order conditions of profit maximisation for the industry require that 
marginal revenue be equal to marginal costs. 6 
4 
5 
6 
n 
nP(Q, r) + QPQ(Q, r) = L, MCj (6.3) 
An assumption of homogeneity between domestic and imported goods is preferable (see footnote 3). 
However, for convenience, we adopt Robert and Tybout's homogeneous assumption. 
Although this is a strong assumption, it has been adopted by many economists (Rodrik 1988; Roberts et 
al. 1991). 
The first order conditions for firm j arc: 
Equation (6.3) can also be expressed in terms of the average concept; that is, the first order conditions 
of profit maximisation for the industry requires that average marginal revenue in the industry be equal 
to average marginal costs. Thus: 
Q "°'MC P+-·PQ(Q,r)= L..J--1 • 
n j n 
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where: n is number of firms in the industry 
Pis inverse demand function (PQ < 0) 
Q is domestic supply= L,qj 
r is exposure to world markets (quantitative restraints, tariffs, and real 
exchange rates) 
cj is constant marginal costs of firm j. 
The number of firms operating in a market depends not only on first-order 
conditions being satisfied but also on the condition that production is profitable; that is, 
revenue must exceed costs, including fixed costs. If we assume that the exit and entry of 
firms is unrestricted and costless, the number of firms in the industry will be determined 
endogeneously.7 At equilibrium, the plant with the highest costs (plant n) will cover 
costs, and all potential fim1s not yet in the market will anticipate losses upon entry. 
Although the firm with the highest costs may make a profit, the newly entering firm 
will incur a loss due to entry costs, including the fixed capital requirement. This is 
called the integer constraint. If plants are sorted in order of increasing average costs 
(total costs divided by output), the additional equilibrium condition becomes: 
TCn p TCn+I 
--< <--
qn qn+I 
(6.4) 
where n+ 1 denotes one potential new entry added ton incumbent firms in the industry. 
Free exit and entry of firms strengthens the rationalisation effect of an increase 
in foreign competition. If foreign competition shifts industry demand inward, with or 
without an increase in elasticity, then P will fall and firms with high costs will incur 
losses and exit, resulting in a drop in both n and L,MC1. In the initial equilibrium (6.4), 
P;;::: TCn . Thus before price adjusts the exit of firm will lower nP more than it reduces 
qn 
L MCj. To restore equilibrium, Q must contract more and P fall less than would 
happen if exit were not allowed (equation 6.3). In short, the efficiency effects are 
stronger than in the case of a fixed number of firms since high-cost firms exit and the 
remaining firms face less contractionary pressure. By the same logic, if trade 
7 Markets are contestable where the costs facing new entrants are similar to those of firms already in 
the market and where a firm leaving the market is able to salvage its capital costs, minus depreciation 
(hence there are no sunk costs) (Baumol 1982). 
159 
restrictions shift the demand curve outward, firms with high operating costs will be 
attracted to the industry (Eastman and Stykolt 1966). 
Review of Empirical Studies 
Much of the empirical work on trade liberalization seems to show that the existence of 
domestic oligopoly or monopoly does not per se negate the argument for liberalization. 
There can be a pro-competitive effect in which the monopoly power of firms is reduced 
when foreign producers enter their markets. There may also be additional gain to 
consumers as a wider range of differentiated products becomes available. Such benefits 
are not guaranteed, however, and in some cases do not eventuate. The major empirical 
work is summarised below (see Appendix 6.2 for a broader empirical survey). 
Harris (1984) employed a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with 
both competitive and noncompetitive sectors, and free entry and exit in all sectors. In 
the model, world markets were integrated and domestic firms were assumed to produce 
goods which were imperfect substitutes for foreign goods. The numerical results were 
striking. When all industries were perfectly competitive and production exhibited 
constant returns to scale, in Canada unilateral free trade yielded a zero welfare gain and 
multiple-bilateral free trade a welfare gain of about 2.4 per cent of GNP. In the case of 
non-competitive firms, the welfare gain increased dramatically: to 8.6 per cent of GNP 
in the case of multiple-bilateral free trade. Harris concluded that much of the additional 
welfare gain could be attributed to the exit of firms in protected industries. 
Baldwin and Krugman (1986) developed a model designed to imitate 
competition between the US and Japan in a high-technology industry (manufacture of 
16K RAM chips). Their contribution was to capture the dynamics of the integration of 
intervention and competition in a situation in which firms first compete to establish the 
pre-emptive capacity or R&D necessary to build a product, and subsequently compete 
over price (in Bertrand fashion) or over market share. The authors simulated 
numerically the effects of policy in models with free entry of firms. They argued that 
production was less efficient in Japan than in the US and that Japanese industry was 
therefore in need of government aid. They also found that intervention in the home 
market nonetheless had more costs than benefits for Japan. 
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Rodrik (1988), using simulation methodology and a partial equilibrium 
approach, addressed the important question of trade policies in developing countries at a 
time when the Uruguay Round of GA TT was examining the issue of liberalization in 
developing countries. Rodrik's work provides a particularly good treatment of trade 
policy under imperfect competition, based on a very straightforward yet flexible model 
of firm and industry behaviour. 8 He showed that trade liberalisation increased national 
welfare in three oligopolies with economies of scale in Turkey. 
Gunasekera and Tyers (1990) and De Melo and Roland-Holst (1991) adopted a 
COE model to estimate the effects on Korean manufacturing of trade liberalization. 
Gnuasekera and Tyers' results, based on a 1980 data set, indicated that trade 
liberalization would provide substantial benefits (of about 7% of GDP) to the Korean 
economy. De Melo and Roland-Holst, using a 1982 data set, compared the estimation 
results for constant and increasing returns to scale. Under constant returns to scale 
across the board, welfare gains were estimated at 1 % of GDP. Under increasing returns 
to scale in three industrial sectors, the gains ranged from - 0.5% to 10% of GDP, 
depending on the assumptions made about price-setting behaviour and profit levels 
under protection.9 
Much of the research described above ignores the integer problem, mainly 
because the estimations are based on monopolistic competition theory. The 
monopolistic competition model assumes free entry and exit of firms. The model also 
assumes that price equals average cost, whereby the number of firms in equilibrium is 
drived. Because of the condition that price equals average cost the drived number of 
firms is not necessarily an integer. However, the number of firms should be an integer. 
The models, and particularly CGE models based on monopolistic competition 
and the Armington assumption, contain some contradictions in logic. First, models tend 
to ignore the integer problem. Most CGE models assume that in the process of trade 
liberalisation new entry will drive net profit in a protected industry to zero. According 
to the Armington assumption that domestic and imported goods are different, there is no 
reason to suppose that the domestic producer's profit will be zero with import 
8 For example, the model reflects the behaviour of the sensible firm. A sensible firm will keep on 
producing and marketing a product until the extra revenue it earns from selling another unit just covers 
the extra cost of producing it: MR equals MC. This equality represents a realistic level of mark-up 
pricing. 
9 Of seven sectors, threen - consumer goods, producer goods and heavy industry - are assumed to have 
increasing returns to scale. 
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liberalization. As we11, Korea's economic environment differs from that of other 
developing countries. New entry has been hindered by government policy (Chapter 3). 
The integer constraint applied in this study thus provides a more realistic approach for 
evaluating welfare effects in Korea. The effects of trade liberalisation on welfare, in the 
general equilibrium model, are highly dependent on cross elasticities of goods 
(Vousden 1990). In reality, the accurate estimation of cross elasticities of goods is 
difficult. The Armington assumption also ignores the terms of trade effect. 
Model of Trade Liberalisation in an Oligopoly 
Rodrik (1988), following Dixit (1985) and Vanables et al. (1986), suggested a 
simulation model for partial equilibrium analysis. The model explicitly permits 
oligopolistic behaviour by developing the Lerner formula to allow for a variety of 
conjectural variations. 10 The simulation methodology adopted here follows Rodrik 
( 1988), with the following differences. The tested industries are selected not arbitrarily 
but on the basis of theory. In view of the importance of the symmetry assumption, the 
number of firms is calculated by equivalent numbers using the Herfindahl indexes. In 
addition, this study tested for a wider range of oligopolies in Korean manufacturing. 
Supply 
We assume that there are n identical firms in domestic oligopoly and homogeneous 
goods (M) are imported. Each domestic firm is regarded as having the same cost 
function. The cost of producing a good consists of a fixed cost, F, and a constant 
marginal cost, c .11 If q is the production of a representative firm in the home market, 
then the firm's total production costs will be F + cq. The representative firm tries to 
maximize its profits (TI) through its choice of q: 
10 
11 
As discussed by Friedman(1983), the conjectural variation has some shortcomings. However, in the 
absence of a logically superior and practically manageable alternative, many economists use the 
conjectural variation model for policy analysis. 
This is the simplest and most widely employed representation of increasing returns technology. The 
constant marginal cost assumption implies that the domestic market is segmented from the world 
market. However if marginal cost is dependent on production levels, the home country's policies will 
affect not only the home but also the foreign market (Krugman1984). 
162 
max TI = qP( nq + M) - [ F + cq] (6.5) 
If fixed cost F is positive there are increasing returns to scale, since average costs 
decline as output increases. In equilibrium, a representative firm equates marginal 
revenue with marginal costs: 
P( nq + M) + qP' ( nq + M )[ 1 +n ] = c 
d(nq + M) 
where 1 + n = ----
dq 
(6.6) 
This familiar equality between marginal revenue and marginal cost reveals a realistic 
level of mark-up pricing. After some algebraic manipulation we obtain the following 
equation: 
(P-c) r](l+Q) 
P e 
= r]E(1 + Q) 
where r] = q 
nq+M, 
e =elasticity of demand, 
E =inverse (positive) elasticity of demand, and 
n =conjectural variation. 
(6.7) 
In an imperfectly competitive industry, the first issue of interest is interaction 
between firms. n is the fim1's conjecture of the output response of all other suppliers to 
a unit change in its own output. At one extreme, Q will be -1 for perfectly competitive 
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firms; imperfect competition plays no role, and firms are independent. At the other 
extreme Q will be n-1 for monopolist or perfectly collusive firms. 
An important intermediate degree of imperfect competition is called Coumot 
competition. Cournot competition emerges when each firm perceives as given the 
output of its rivals and then decides on its own optimal output. The parameter Q is thus 
zero in Cournot competition. The test here is based on Cournot-style competition 
among domestic firms but no conjectural variation between domestic and foreign firms. 
Demand 
Following a representative model, it is assumed that consumer preference for two 
perfectly substitutable goods - the good produced in the home country and an imported 
good - are the same.12 Consumption or total market output ( Q ) equals domestic output 
(nq ) plus imports ( M ), and this quantity alone detem1ines the price.13 This is because 
consumers are unwilling to pay more for one firm's product than for another's. We 
assume that all individuals' utility functions are the same. 
U(Q) = _1 _kQl-E 
1-E (6.8) 
The utility-maximizing first-order condition gives us the constant elasticity of inverse 
demand function: 14 
12 
13 
14 
We can therefore apply the Lerner fonnula to the demand curve faced by each finn. 
If goods are perfect substitutes and sold in similar quantities, a consumer's indifference curve for the 
goods is a straight line with a slope of -1. The consumer's utility, and hence the consumer demand 
curve, depends only on the sum of the output of the two goods. 
In spite of some theoretical controversy, for simplicity the model is based on the assumption of 
constant elasticity of demand. 
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= k(nq + M)-E (6.9) 
Thus far, then, if we know M, n (]Fl), c, E and Q, we can calculate price from 
equation (6.7) and q from equation (6.9) (see Appendix 6.3 for the computer solution 
algorithm). 
Free entry/exit equilibrium 
If exit and entry of firms is unrestricted and costless, the number of domestic firms is 
fixed endogeneously. One more equation is thus needed to determine the equilibrium 
number of finns: 
( P - c )q = F (6.10) 
Under our technological assumptions, average cost is the sum of a constant variable ( c ) 
and fixed costs ( F ). In the simulation, the data on initial levels of the price-cost margin 
and output are taken to reveal F indirectly. 
A reduction in profit from one equilibrium to the next is then a signal for firms 
to exit until a pair of P and q can be found such that the incumbents make non-negative 
profits. The integer constraint on the number of firms implies that a substantial level of 
profits is in fact compatible with free exit and entry (Rodrik 1988). 
Welfare Change in Partial Equilibrium 
Under the constant elasticity demand curve of equation (6.8), change in surplus of 
consumer (CS) is 
b.CS = 1: E (P' Q' -PQ) .15 
15 Cs= rQ PdQ- PQ Jo 
f Q E 
= Jo (kQf 'dQ - PQ 
(6.11) 
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where P' and Q' are new equilibrium price and domestic supply, and P and Q are initial 
price and domestic consumption in the base year. 
Change in producer surplus (PS) is simply the sum of changes in domestic firms' 
profits: 
N 
6 PS= L,n[(P -c)q' -F] (6.12) 
n=l 
where q' is the fim1's output, p' is price at the new equilibrium, and Fis fixed costs. 
Assuming that the government auctions import licences to importers in a 
competitive market, change in government budget surplus (GS) is: 
6GS = (P' -P*)6M. (6.13) 
where P' is new price in the domestic market and P* is world market price (assumed to 
be fixed). 
The welfare effects of policy changes are derived from the effects of policy on 
consumer surplus, producer gain, and government revenue. If we assume that these are 
of equal social value (Chapter 2), then the total welfare effect of a policy will be the 
sum of its effects in these three areas. 16 The results shown in this chapter are expressed 
as percentage change in base consumption. Thus, results for the three national welfare 
components are divided by the value of consumption in the base year. 
1 6 
E E 
= PQ (because? = kQ- , ) 
(1- £) 
Grinols (1987) decomposed a country's welfare change into four welfare-theoretical terms: 
consumption gains from trade, production gains from trade, revenues and rents from trade 
intervention, and traditional changes in the country's terms of trade due to non-competitive trade 
intervention. 
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Calibration: Data and Parameters 
The first criterion in selecting firms was that they have a m1mmum three-firm 
concentration ratio of 60 per cent. Price elasticity of demand was also considered. 
Industries whose price elasticity of demand was less than one were excluded since this 
meant that their marginal revenue would be negative. 17 To test the type of firm 
behaviour described by Cournot, the number of firms had to be at least two. In view of 
our model being dependent on the assumption that size of each firm is equal, the 
equivalent number of equal sized firms was recalculated using the Herfindahl index.18 
This brought the number of firms in most industries to three or four. Finally, 34 
industries were selected from the 510 listed at five-digit Korean Standard Industrial 
Classification (KSIC) level (Table 6.1). 19 Of the selected industries, four were from the 
food, beverages and tobacco industry, two were from the textile, wearing apparel and 
leather industry, seven were from the chemicals, petroleum, coal, rubber and plastic 
products industry, two were from the glass and glass product industry, seven were from 
the basic metal industry, and twelve were from the fabricated metal products, machinery 
and equipment industry. 
Calibration of the simulation model required data on production, consumption 
and trade in the base year, 1986. In this year, the Korean economy achieved a relative 
balance in its cmn-ent account and other macroeconomic indicators.20 
17 Remembering that MR = p( 1-1 IE). 
18 In the USA, the Department of Justice uses a variant of the Herfindahl index, squaring the percentage 
share of the market to derive indices for its merger guidelines. 
19 This is the most disaggregated industry level in Korea. 
20 The current account surplus stood at around 4% of GNP and the CPI at 2.7 % in 1986. 
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TABLE 6.1: INITIAL DATA AND PARAMETERS SIMULATION 
lndusty Code Number of Firms Elasticity PCM Protection rates 
Food, Beverages and 31152 4 1.068 0.234 1.947 
Tobacco 31175 3 1.635 0.204 0.541 
31214 4 1.696 0.147 1.170 
31226 3 1.540 0.216 0.591 
Textile,Wearing Apparel 32322 3 2.393 0.139 0.480 
and Leather 32334 3 1.538 0.217 0.186 
.....-.-...-.-.-.-.-......-.-.-...· ............. <Ym ..... ~ ... -.-.-.-.-...-.-...-.-.-.-.-....-.-.-.-~ ... -..-..-.-... -.-............... -~ ........ ....-~~ 
Chemicals, Petroleum, 35122 3 1.170 0.285 1.650 
Coal, Rubber and 35142 3 1.502 0.222 0.129 
Plastic Products 35143 3 1.258 0.265 0.418 
35154 3 2.952 0.113 0.886 
35213 4 1.777 0.141 0.291 
35296 3 2.652 0.126 0.414 
35298 3 2.031 0.164 0.022 
~.-.................. ........,., ....... ~.-
Glass and Glass Products 36207 3 1.457 0.229 0.128 
36943 3 1.186 0.281 0.095 
................. -.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.~~-~...,,... .............. ..,.. ............................. .......,.... . ....-.... -. 
Basic Metals 37121 3 1.192 0.280 0.115 
37122 4 1.553 0.161 0.126 
37131 3 1 .497 0.223 0.068 
37212 3 l.568 0.213 0.450 
37214 3 1.694 0.197 1.700 
37222 3 3.604 0.092 0.465 
37224 4 1.208 0.207 0.201 
.... .._._ .................... ....._......_. .... _._._._._._._ ..... _. ...... _. ....... _._._._._._._.._._._._.,._._..._,.........._~-·--"-.._.._.._._._._._..._._._._._ .................................. .........._.._. .......... ._....._....._._.._._.._._. _ ,,~_._._...._...._._.._ 
Fabricated Metal, 38252 4 1.365 0.183 0.052 
Machinery and 38253 3 1.378 0.242 0.276 
Equipment 38261 3 1.556 0.214 0.116 
38265 4 1.040 0.240 0.231 
38323 3 1.218 0.274 0.109 
38391 4 1.068 0.234 0.022 
38431 3 1.300 0.256 0.450 
38442 3 1.392 0.239 0.514 
38523 4 1.717 0.146 0.163 
38527 3 1.571 0.212 0.180 
38546 3 1.335 0.250 0.196 
38547 3 1.203 0.277 0.196 
Notes: 1. Number of firms and elasticities of demand are calculated using the Herfindahl index and 
equation (5.7) respectively. 
2. PCMs, defined as (Value-added - Wages)/Sales, are from Report on Mining and 
Manufacturing Survey (EPB); nominal protection rates in 1985 are from Hong (1992). 
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Data on domestic production and the price-cost margin ratio (PCM) were taken 
from Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey (EPB 1988). The price-cost margin 
ratio was calculated by dividing the difference between value-added and wages by the 
value of shipments. To obtain domestic consumption in the base year, domestic 
production was adjusted by imports and exports. Data on constant marginal costs and 
elasticities of demand data are expressed through equation (6.7). The simple average of 
the elasticitity of demand for selected industries was found to be 1.59.21 Detailed data 
on nominal protection rates in 1985 were obtained from Hong (1992). 
Results and Anlaysis 
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 show the results of a 10 per cent increase in import quotas for the 34 
selected industries. 22 The figure of 10 per cent was chosen mainly for purposes of 
comparison with Rodrik's (1988) results for Turkey. The test based on the collusive 
case is not reported here because the revealed elasticity of demand is unreasonably high 
(6.85 for cameras, 4.32 for gas ranges and 4.32 for passenger cars, for example).23 In 
addition, the assumption of Cournot type competition is shown to be valid both 
theoretically (Kreps et al. 1983) and empirically (Haskel et al. 1994). 
Fixed Number of Firms Case 
A relaxation of quotas in many oligopolies with a fixed number of firms seems to have 
increased national welfare moderately (Table 6.2); an increase in the consumer surplus 
and government surplus offsets the loss of producer surplus. Althogether 25 industries 
out of the 34 industries experience a rise in national welfare. The simple average 
21 
22 
23 
Kang (1988) assumed that the weighted average of the elasticity of demand in Korean manufacturing 
was 1.5 or 2.0. 
After the Korean war, the government relied heavily on quantitative restrictions (QR) rather than 
tariffs because the domestic currency (won) was overvalued in the face of inflation. Import 
liberalisation from QR made a big progress in the second half of 1967 as the government 
reformulated the semiannual trade program in the form or a negative list system, under which all 
items could be imported except those items listed in the program. The rate, however, did not change 
considerably until the second half of 1981. The rate of QR, measured by the number of commodity 
items in the trade program announced by the government and restricted by special laws divided by 
the number of total commodity items, was 62.4 per cent in 1975 and 21.2 per cent in 1985 (sec 
Appendixes 5.5 and 5.6). 
In Rodrik's study, collusive firms' elasticity of demand was four in the case of automobile, and six in 
the case of electrical appliances. 
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welfare effects for all 34 industries is 1.3 per cent. The range of gains is between 0.11 
per cent (manufactures of essential oils and related products) and 6.89 per cent 
(communication wire and cable insulation industry) over base year consumption. 
Interestingly, the table indicates that the biggest welfare effect was found in the food, 
beverages and tobacco industry. The simple average of the welfare effect in this 
industry is 3.12 per cent. National welfare gains in the motor vehicle industry are 2.92 
per cent in Korea, higher than the figure of 2.6 per cent recorded by Rodrik (1988) in 
Turkey. 
However, nine of the 34 industries experienced negative welfare effects. The 
range of losses is between 0.08 per cent and 2.97 per cent, and is mainly attributable to 
losses of producers outweighing the gains made by consumers. Losses (2.97 per cent) 
were most evident in the heavy metal plates and metal sheets industries, which 
experienced a significant decline in both output and price. 
With a 10 per cent increase in import quotas and a fixed number of firms, the 
output of all firms decreases. If there is a large number of incumbent firms in the 
industry, the drop in output experienced by each firm is greater than that in industries 
with a small number of firms; in a crowded industry, output is more sensitive to 
imports. The explanation for the decline in output in an oligopolistic market is found in 
the firms' elasticity of market demand, degree of cartelisation and initial share of 
domestic output (Buffie and Spiller 1986), and not in the standard result for a perfectly 
competitive market that output falls consistently as import quotas rise. 
Prices also decrease, though not always by the same proportion as output. As 
prices fall, consumer surplus is always affected positively. Though output declines, 
total consumption including imports does not. A decrease in price along with an 
increase in consumption makes consumer surplus positive and producer surplus 
significantly negative. Most of the subtotals shown in the table are thus negative. When 
we add quota rents paid by government to the subtotals, the total effect is usually 
positive. 
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TABLE6.2: WELFARE EFFECTS OF LIBERALISATION WHEN NUMBER OF FIRMS 
IS FIXED(% CHANGE COMPARED WITH BASE YEAR) 
Code Output Price cs PS Subtotal GS Total 
31152 -6.82 -2.88 3.08 -4.28 -1.20 6.32 5.12 
31175 -6.44 -2.41 1.68 -3.57 -1.89 3.27 1.38 
31214 -8.08 -1.66 0.33 -2.72 -2.38 5.23 2.84 
31226 -5.50 -2.59 3.32 -3.64 -0.32 3.46 3.14 
32322 -6.51 -1.54 1.36 -2.35 -0.99 3.09 2.10 
32334 -5.80 -2.59 2.80 -3.70 -0.90 1.31 0.41 
35122 -5.52 -3.68 3.75 -5.05 -1.30 5.86 4.56 
35142 -6.48 -2.67 1.51 -3.93 -2.43 0.88 -1.55 
35143 -5.31 -3.35 4.59 -4.58 0.01 2.61 2.62 
35154 -7.21 -1.22 0.78 -1.95 -1.16 4.58 3.41 
35213 -7.53 -1.57 1.11 -2.51 -1.40 2.10 0.69 
35296 -6.17 -1.37 1.46 -2.06 -0.60 2.79 2.19 
35298 -5.26 -1.86 2.70 -2.63 0.08 0.03 0.11 
36207 -6.58 -2.77 1.21 -4.09 -2.88 0.86 -2.02 
36943 -5.15 -3.61 5.75 -4.87 0.88 0.51 1.39 
37121 -6.00 -3.59 1.41 -5.05 -3.64 0.67 -2.97 
37122 -6.93 -1.83 2.15 -2.82 -0.67 0.94 0.27 
37131 -5.55 -2.68 3.32 -3.77 -0.45 0.37 -0.08 
37212 -6.01 -2.53 2.39 -3.66 -l.26 2.85 1.59 
37214 -5.20 -2.3 3.44 -3.20 0.24 6.07 6.31 
37222 -4.77 -0.98 1.61 -1.37 0.24 3.08 3.32 
37224 -6.81 -2.47 3.07 -3.71 -0.64 1.43 0.79 
38252 -7.63 -2.14 0.50 -3.37 -2.87 0.28 -2.59 
38253 -6.12 -2.97 2.11 -4.27 -2.15 1.87 -0.29 
38261 -6.11 -2.56 2.21 -3.71 -1.50 0.78 -0.72 
38265 -6.80 -2.98 3.04 -4.41 -1.37 1.58 0.21 
38323 -5.35 -3.48 4.62 -4.76 -0.13 0.63 0.50 
38391 -6.26 -2.88 11.12 -4.16 6.96 -0.07 6.89 
38431 -5.29 -3.2 4.53 -4.39 0.14 2.78 2.92 
38442 -5.49 -2.94 3.66 -4.09 -0.43 3.10 2.67 
38523 -8.30 -1.64 0.04 -2.71 -2.67 1.24 -1.43 
38527 -6.81 -2.53 1.02 -3.80 -2.78 1.27 -1.51 
38546 -5.61 -3. l 3.45 -4.33 -0.87 1.33 0.46 
38547 -5.50 -3.54 3.92 -4.87 -0.95 1.28 0.34 
Notes: 1. The figures in the columns denote percentage change in output, price, consumer surplus (CS), 
producer surplus (PS) and government surplus (GS) compared to the base year. 
2. The subtotal column denotes the aggregated effect of CS and PS. The last column of the table 
indicates national welfare effect. 
3. See Table 6.1 and Appendix 6.4 for industry names. 
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Exit and Entry of Firms is Unrestricted and Without Cost 
If exit and entry of firms is unrestricted and without cost, the national welfare effect of 
an increase in foreign competition is bigger than in the case of a fixed number of firms. 
The average welfare effect for the 34 industries was 4.1 per cent over base year 
consumption (Table 6.3), compared with 1.3 per cent for a fixed number of firms 
(Table 6.2). It seems, then, that when the exit and entry of firms is unrestricted and 
costless, a rise in foreign competition brings about an increase in national welfare in an 
oligopolistic market. As in the case of a fixed number of firms, the food, beverages and 
tobacco industry experienced the largest average welfare effect (6.03 per cent). 
Coupled with the increase in producer surplus, the increase in government 
surplus, resulting mainly from an increase in the gap between domestic and world 
prices, enlarged the total effects positively. 
Using CGE methodology, Gunasekera and Tyers (1990) concluded that a 7 per 
cent increase in GNP could be realized through trade liberalisation (tariff reduction) in 
Korea. De Melo and Roland-Holst reported that the effect of liberalization (tariff 
reduction) on welfare in industry with increasing returns to scale could be as much as 
10 times greater than in industry with constant returns to scale. Our results also suggest 
that trade liberalisation (increasing import quotas) could have a sizable effect on 
national welfare in Korean oligopoly industry, ranging from 0.1 per cent to 10.35 per 
cent. 
In contrast with the fixed number of firms in equilibrium, if inefficient firms are 
allowed to exit from the market, most subtotals for consumer and producer surplus 
become positive (Table 6.3): the increase in producer surplus is large enough to 
compensate for the loss of consumer surplus. The number of negatively affected 
industries is insignificant. As Rodrik (1988) found earlier, the main reason for the 
increase in producer surplus is that the output of the average firm rises as one firm 
leaves the industry. In other words, as long as there is some exit, surviving firms can 
increase their output considerably without great damage to their price-cost margins. 
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TABLE 6.3: WELFARE EFFECTS OF LIBERALISATION WITH FREE ENTRY/EXIT OF 
FIRMS(% CHANGE COMPARED WITH BASE YEAR) 
Industry Code Output Price cs PS Subtotal GS Total 
31152 11.73 6.2 -5.68 7.25 l.57 7.23 8.80 
31175 14.42 9.13 -9.21 8.92 -0.29 4.42 4.14 
31214 11.44 3.42 -4.63 4.12 -0.51 5.73 5.23 
31226 15.15 9.92 -8.56 9.80 1.24 4.71 5.95 
32322 16.24 5.62 -5.45 5.86 0.41 3.81 4.22 
32334 14.78 9.92 -9.10 9.73 0.63 2.56 3.19 
35122 12.63 14.8 -13.65 13.52 -0.13 7.71 7.58 
35142 13.76 1().3 -10.66 9.81 -0.86 2.17 1.31 
35143 13.64 13.3 -11.13 12.46 l.33 4.27 5.61 
35154 16.07 4.37 -4.51 4.59 0.08 5.13 5.22 
35213 12.19 3.24 -3.62 4.01 0.40 2.58 2.97 
35296 17.03 4.96 -4.61 5.30 0.69 3.42 4.11 
35298 17.07 6.9 -5.70 7.25 1.55 0.91 2.46 
36207 13.43 10.7 -11.43 10.14 -1.29 2.20 0.92 
36943 13.22 14.5 -11.40 13.43 2.(l3 2.32 4.35 
37121 12.28 14.4 -15.40 13.04 -2.37 2.47 0.10 
37122 12.65 3.82 -3.45 4.75 1.31 1.50 2.81 
37131 14.87 10.3 -9.03 10.11 1.08 1.67 2.75 
37212 14.44 9.67 -9.45 9.42 -0.03 4.07 4.04 
37214 16.1 s 8.72 -7.13 8.87 1.74 7.17 8.91 
37222 19.63 3.48 -2.73 3.99 1.25 3.52 4.77 
37224 12.13 5.26 -4.58 6.31 1.72 2.20 3.92 
38252 11.50 4.48 -5.97 5.33 -0.64 0.94 0.30 
38253 13.54 11.6 -11.56 10.96 -0.60 3.32 2.73 
38261 14.48 9.77 -9.44 9.53 0.09 2.02 2.10 
38265 11.64 6.42 -6.36 7.47 1.11 2.52 3.63 
38323 13.27 13.9 -11.87 12.93 1.06 2.37 3.43 
38391 12.38 6.21 2.10 7.41 9.51 0.84 10.35 
38431 13.99 12.6 -10.48 11.99 1.51 4.37 5.87 
38442 14.37 11.4 -9.95 11.00 l.05 4.54 5.58 
38523 11.19 3.37 -4.83 4.03 -0.80 1.74 0.94 
38527 13.71 9.62 -10.40 9.23 - l.17 2.49 1.32 
38546 13.86 12.1 -10.96 11.51 0.56 2.85 3.41 
38547 12.96 14.2 -12.78 13.07 0.29 3.06 3.35 
Notes: 1. The figures in the columns denote percentage change in output, price, consumer surplus (CS), 
producer surplus (PS) and government surplus (GS) compared to the base year. 
2. The subtotal column denotes the aggregated effect of CS and PS. The last column of the table 
indicates national welfare effect. 
3. Sec Table 6.1 and Appendix 6.4 for the industry names. 
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There are two possible explanations for the increase observed in price. The first 
derives from theory. According to Buffie and Spiller (1986), in the long run, after 
allowing for exit of firms from the industry, the domestic price in an oligopolistic 
market will rise. The long-run outcome turns simply on how the conjectural variations 
parameter relates to the number of firms in the industry. If firms hold consistent 
conjectures and the industry demand curve is locally linear, prices must rise over the 
long term. Although this explanation has implications for our results, we have to keep 
in mind the differences with our model, which requires strong assumptions of consistent 
conjectures and elasticity of demand. In additon, the results shown in Table 6.3 are not 
based on long-run time data.24 Rodrik (1988) provided another explanation for the 
increase in price, based on the assumption of integer constraint on the number of firms. 
Initially, with the number of firms unchanged, average firm output and price both 
decline. This means that at least one marginal firm has to leave the industry or suffer a 
loss. At existing output levels, the firms that survive now make large profits as price 
recovers. Firms respond by increasing output, but with the kind of elasticities assumed 
here, the domestic price remains higher than it was initially. In the final equilibrium, the 
surviving firms make sizable profits, but entry is blocked by the fact that a discrete 
jump by one in the number of firms would yield losses for all. Domestic prices will 
eventually fall as import quotas rise further. 
Implications for Industry Policy 
A positive welfare effect in most oligopolistic markets implies that an increase in 
foreign competition is necessary to increase national welfare, even in industries with 
scale economies. The results thus limit the applicability of strategic government 
intervention. In contrast to the more traditional approach, some economists argue that 
strategic policy intervention in trade by government can increase national welfare 
(Katrak 1977; Brander and Spencer 1984; Venables 1984 ). They criticise the 
assumption of perfect competition and focus instead on how to shift pure profit (rents) 
24 
Theoretically, the possibility of prices increasing with quota relaxation in a Cournot type of imperfect 
competition is explained by Buffie and Spiller (1986). Empirically, it is also shown by De Melo and 
Urata (1986) and Aw (1991). 
174 
from foreign firms to domestic taxpayers in an imperfectly competitive market. They 
thus regard subsidies and tariffs as important policy variables. 
With strategic trade policy, the idea is that government policy (protection or 
export subsidies) will shift competition in favour of domestic firms, thereby enabling 
them to reap some of the rents that would otherwise have gone to foreign producers. 
The literature on trade, imperfect competition and strategic trade policy has been 
something of a developing area in recent years. The information requirements of 
successful policy action of this type are especially severe. When there is more than one 
domestic firm in an industry, assistance to that firm is equivalent to a tax on all other 
firms in all industries in the economy. The nature and degree of government 
intervention is highly sensitive to the way in which each firm forms its conjectures 
about its opponents' responses (including those of foreign competitors), and hence a 
clear strategic policy prescription cannot be made (Eaton and Grossman 1986). Again, 
export subsidies can exacerbate an existing market distortion and, thus, X-inefficiency 
(Vousden et al. 1993; Dixit 1984). GATT, of course, prohibits industrial subsidy 
policies. A strategic trade and industry policy is formed from the point of view of the 
local economy. If all nations adopted strategic policy, a trade war between countries 
would result. 
The results seem to suggest that there is a conflict between competition and 
efficiency. If the number of firms declines (possibly through mergers) as a consequence 
of liberalisation, domestic markets will tend to be less competitive.25 In general, firms 
with a limited number of competitors tend to exploit their market power, resulting in a 
drop of allocative efficiency in resource allocation and a rise in X-inefficiency. 
However, foreign competition brought about by trade liberalisation can prevent 
domestic firms from exerting their market power in a small open economy. As shown 
in Chapter 4, the discipline of imports alleviated allocative inefficiency in the case of 
Korean manufacturing industry. Chapter 5 demonstrated that an increase in foreign 
competition reduced X-inefficiency in Korean industry. Thus competitive pressure from 
foreign firms can per se justify trade liberalisation in an imperfectly competitive 
market, whether or not economies of scale are a feature of its structure. In an autarky, 
the conflict between production efficiency and allocation efficiency resulting from 
25 As part of its process or microeconomic reform, Australia decided to reduce both the number of firms 
producing passenger motor vehicles and the number of models produced (Albon and Falvey 1992). 
175 
economies of scale cannot be resolved. It can be argued that inefficient marginal firms 
should be allowed to exit from the market when trade is liberalised. The efficient firms 
that survive would then be able to enjoy economies of scale in an enlarged domestic and 
foreign market, while competition from foreign firms would prevent them from 
1 . . h . k 26 exp 01tmg t eir mar et power. 
Mergers have been prohibited by law in many countries because they can lead to 
the development of monopolies. Efficiency enhancement and the other potential 
advantages of mergers have also been recognised recently.27 Traditionally, monopoly or 
the exercise of market power is regarded as bad or harmful, and hence competition 
needs to be fostered or protected so as to supplant the exercise of monopoly power. 
While anti-merger sentiment has a basis in economic theory, the polarised view of 
competition and monopoly has been embraced (Sheard 1992). One argument is that 
competition needs to be viewed in dynamic rather than static terms as a process that 
tends to increase efficiency. 
Long et al. (1994) show that mergers, in a Cournot-type oligopolistic market, 
can significantly reduce costs under bilateral tariff reductions, while unilateral tariff 
reductions have the opposite effect. A liberalisation of international trade in 1962 
allegedly prompted Japanese corporations to merge in order to enlarge their size and 
extinguish competition among themselves, the better to defend themselves against 
foreigners (Caves et al. 1976). In particular, the rapid increase in mergers in 1967-69 
has been attributed to a similar reaction by larger firms faced with the liberalisation of 
controls over foreign investment in Japan, but also to efforts to improve the productive 
technique and capital facilities of smaller firms through rationalisation and 
d . . 28 mo ermsat1on. 
26 
27 
There are three possible policies to promote industry with significant economies of scale. First is a 
policy for an oligopolistic firms to guarantee a minimum efficient scale of production by patent 
systems or barriers to new entry. Second is a free competition policy. The last one is a policy, ex post, 
encouraging mergers or reducing facilities to exploit economies of scale. 
In the UK, mergers have tended to be regarded as welfare-enhancing; EC policy implemented in 1990 
recognises that mergers may promote efficiency (Ferguson et al. 1994). Following the 1950 Celler-
Kefauver amendment to Section 7 of the 1914 Clayton Act, the USA adopted a comprehensive and 
strict approach to horizontal mergers. However, the 1984 Horizontal Merger Guidelines indicated a 
softening in attitude: efficiency advantages could now be balanced against competitive risks. In 1992, 
the Department of Justice revised the Guidelines: mergers would not be challenged unless they were 
likely to enhance market power, while the 'safe harbours' remained unchanged. 
28 The average number of corporate mergers in Japan was I ,059 in 1967-69 and 876 in 1964-66. 
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Alternatively, it can be argued that the number of domestic firms should 
increase to ensure that the market is competitive. However, inefficient entry can affect 
welfare negatively. For example, our simulation model showed that the entry of an 
additional firm, with the given import quotas, to the passenger car industry brought 
about a fall in national welfare of 3.75 per cent compared to base year consumption, 
mainly due to losses on the producer side. 
In addition, analysis of the welfare effects in the subtotal column of Table 6.3 
raises the interesting question of who benefits from trade liberalisation. In contrast to 
the case of a fixed number of firms, most consumers seem to lose from trade 
liberalisation if exit and entry of firms is unrestricted and without cost. If the number of 
firms is fixed, producers lose and consumers and the government benefit (Table 6.2). If 
inefficient firms are allowed to exit from the market, consumers become the losing 
group and producers and the government gain (Table 6.3).29 Identifying the groups that 
benefit and lose from trade liberalisation may be of use in formulating income 
distribution policy. According to Kim (1991), the rate of import liberalisation 
(measured in terms of the ratio of automatic approval items to total tradeable items) for 
commodity items produced by large monopoly-oligopoly firms was lower than that for 
other items as of the second half of 1982. The average rate of import liberalisation for 
the commodity items produced by monopoly-oligopoly firms was about 45 per cent in 
1982, compared with the average rate of 77 per cent for all tradeable i terns. If this figure 
is correct, large-scale enterprises were the relative gainers while small-scale enterprises 
were losers. 30 
The problem of industrial adjustment also has implications for industry policy. 
Our results were based on the assumption that inefficient marginal firms exit from the 
market without restriction or costs. However, industrial adjustment associated with 
trade liberalisation raises controversial issues, socially and politically. The problems of 
unemployment, sunk costs and domino effects on other companies arise. 
29 
30 
However, if we allow the value of variety of product (Dixit and Stiglitz 1977; Krugman 
1980,1982), the welfare of consumers should be greater than the case based on the assumption of 
perfect substitution between domestic and imported goods. 
In reality, it is difficult to judge whether the agricultural sector gained or lost from liberalisation. As 
of 1982, the rate of import liberalisation for the agricultural sector was about 76 per cent whereas the 
rates for the manufacturing and mining sectors reached 95 per cent and 77 per cent respectively. 
However, the legal tariff rates on agricultural products were generally lower than those on other 
commodity items (Kim 1991). Unionised activities accounted for only a small share of all economic 
activities until the late 1980s in Korea. 
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In Korea, adjustment was not an important social problem until the early 1980s 
because protection and rapid growth created a shelter for marginal firms and industries. 
The government has been confronted with the problem of industrial adjustment since 
the mid 1980s. The coal mining industry, for example, developed under heavy 
protection (import quotas) since the first oil crisis, is facing adjustment problems 
because of decreasing demand and increasing labour costs. Protection brought about an 
increase in price. As protection decreases, how to absorb those who are out of work in 
the industry is a vital issue.31 The Korean shipbuilding industry, protected and receiving 
various subsidies under the heavy and chemical industrialisation policy, has a similar 
problem (Kim 1989).32 
In order to increase efficiency in the economy, government needs to reduce 
intervention and protection. Despite the externalities generated by the exit of marginal 
firms, the economic case for government intervention to help industry through its 
temporary difficulties is dubious. A government subsidy results in inefficiency and an 
increase in social costs in the longrun. This is because financial support enables 
management, which has demonstrated its incompetence, to retain control of the 
company (Ferguson et al. 1994). This is compounded by the reduced pressure on 
management and unions to adapt and change.33 
Summary and Conclusion 
Based on a partial equilibrium framework, the chapter evaluated the effects on national 
welfare of an increase in import quotas in oligopolies in Korean manufacturing 
industry. In general, the results confirmed that trade reform in an oligopoly with 
economies of scale has positive effects on welfare. 
31 The coal mining industry employed 68,800 workers in 1986. 
32 
33 
Australia has also experienced a similar failure in specifying a target industry in both Victoria and 
Western Australia (Albon and Falvey 1992). 
Evidence on the performance of many industries assisted by the state supports the point (Ferguson et 
al. 1994). For example, the National Enterprise Board in the UK made a loss of £40.3 million in 1978 
on its assets of £1.4 billion. Similar experiences were recorded by the IRC in the UK and the Institute 
per la Riconstruzione Industries in Italy. The estimated cost of support for the European steel industry 
for the 1970s was $70 billion. 
I 
i 
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In particular, the results were more positive when the exit and entry of firms was 
unrestricted and costless than when the number of firms was fixed. This indicates that 
when inefficient marginal firms are allowed to exit from an industry, some 
rationalisation occurs and the firms that survive can increase their production efficiency. 
A positive welfare effect was not universal, however; some industries experienced a 
welfare loss. 
Some implications for industry policy can be drawn from the results. Positive 
welfare effects in most oligpolistic industries suggests that strategic intervention is 
unlikely to wipe out the necessity of an increase in foreign competition, particularly for 
a small open country such as Korea. 
Second, it may be advisable to permit the exit of inefficient marginal firms in 
view of the fact that an increase in foreign competition per se alleviates the conflict 
between between efficiency and competition in a small open economy. The withdrawal 
of marginal firms can strengthen the rationalisation effect of an increase in foreign 
competition. At the same time, an increase in competitive pressure from abroad can 
reduce domestic firms' monopoly power. 
Third, it is important for income distribution policy to identify the groups that 
will benefit from an increase in foreign competition. The results were based on an 
assumption of homogeneity between domestic and imported products. They indicated 
that if inefficent firms were allowed to exit from industries characterised by oligopoly 
with economies of scale, surviving firms and the government would benefit at the 
expense of consumers. Consumer groups may need to be compensated for these losses. 
Fourth, policy needs to address the problems caused by industrial adjustment. It 
was assumed that marginal firms could exit without cost or restriction. Industrial 
adjustment constitutes a significant cost, however, with important social and economic 
consequences for developing countries in particular. This is a complex issue requiring 
further examination. Nonetheless, the government needs to reduce its intervention in the 
market. As the OECD (1989) argued, competition and blurred market signals delay 
necessary adjustments and create unexpected distortions. 
It should be noted that the results may be affected by differences in assumptions. 
The choice variable for the oligopolies in the model is quantity of output (Cournot-type 
competition). However, oligopolies can compete in price, as in the case of the Bertrand 
model. Stackleberg's leader-follower model can be more appropriate because large 
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firms dominate in Korean manufacturing industry. The results are also based on the 
assumption of constant elasticity of demand. The response of oligopolistic firms in price 
and output is different if the elasticity of demand varies. Further research is needed 
using a more sophisticated model reflecting these limitations to estimate correctly the 
effect of trade liberalisation on national welfare. 
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APPENDIX 6.1.: WELFARE EQUATION IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY CHARACTERISED BY 
OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET 
Assume the expenditure function in a small open economy is: 
(A.6.1) 
where pis price and Wis an index of welfare. Compensated demand function (C) for 
good i is derived from partial derivation of (A.6.1) with respect to its price: 
C. = aEi = E.(·) 
I a I Pi 
(A.6.2) 
Assume n identical firms in the industry. Thus, total supply (X) is the sum of each firm's 
output (x): 
(A.6.3) 
Unit cost function is assumed as a function of the vector of factor price (w) and the 
firm's output (x). Economies of scale at the firm level can then be written as: 
(A.6.4) 
Factor demand per unit of output (v) is derived by Shephard's lemma: 
(A.6.5) 
Net imports (M) are the difference between consumption and domestic supply: 
(A.6.6) 
Assuming that national income is composed of pure profit, factor income and quota 
rents and/or tariff revenue, then the initial equilibrium between income and expenditure 
can be written as: 
(A.6.7) 
where p* is world price. To check what kind of resource reallocation will increase 
welfare, we need a total differentiation of equation (A.6.7) (Rodrik 1988): 
(A.6.8) 
APPENDIX 6.2 (a): WELFARE EFFECTS OF TRADE POLICIES ASSUMING PERFECT AND 
IMPERFECT COMPETITION (PERCENT AGE CHANGE IN REAL CONSUMPTION) 
Study/ 
Experiment 
Calculated Economic 
Welfare Impact 
Perfect Imperfect 
Competition Competition 
Brown and Stern (1988a), Canada-US Free Trade Area 
Canada -0.015 1.177 
us 0.045 0.027 
Rest of World -0.005 -0.004 
Effects on 
Calculation 
of 
Imperfect 
Competition 
1.192 
-0.018 
0.001 
181 
Harris (1984 ): Effects on Canada of unilateral liberalization, reciprocated liberalization 
Unilateral 0.0 4.1 4.1 
Reciprocated 2.4 8.6 6.2 
Rodrik (1988): Effects on Turkey of a 10 per cent relaxation in import quotas 
No entry/exit 
Autos 6.3 2.6 -3.7 
Tires 2.9 0.6 -2.3 
Electrical appliances 1.0 -0.5 -1.5 
Free entry/exit 
Autos 6.3 5.2 -1.1 
Tires 2.9 4.1 1.2 
Electrical appliances 1.0 1.2 0.2 
Smith and Venables (1988): Effects on EC of 2.5 per cent cut in transport/transfer costs 
No entry/exit 
Cement, lime, plaster 
Pharmaceutical products 
Artificial, synthetic fibres 
Machine tools 
Office machinery 
Electric motors, generators 
Electrical household 
appliances 
0.04 
0.25 
0.91 
0.56 
0.59 
0.22 
0.49 
-0.10 
0.29 
0.99 
0.84 
0.88 
0.29 
0.64 
-0.14 
0.04 
0.08 
0.28 
0.29 
0.07 
0.14 
Source: Richardson, J.D., 1988, "Empirical Research on Tracie Liberalisation with Imperfect 
Competition: A Survey", OECD Working Papers. 
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APPENDIX 6.2 (b): WELFARE EFFECTS OF TRADE LIBERALISATION UNDER IMPERFECT 
COMPETITION 
Research and Policy Change 
Digby, Smith and Venables (1988) 
Policy change: 
Removal of Japanese VERs 
a) in Britain 
b) in all EC members 
Data base: 1985 
Sector/markets: passenger automobiles/5 EC 
markets, Japan, 1 rest-of-world market 
Pricing rule: Cournot pricing modified for VER 
Entry/exit: none 
Product variety: differentiation across firms 
Dixit (1988) 
Policy change: 
Replace $100 US tariff with optimal tariff 
and/or production subsidy 
Data base: 1979, 1980 
Sector/market: US passenger car 
Pricing rule:variable mark up over marginal cost 
Entry/exit: none 
Product variety: differentiation by nation of 
supply 
Baldwin and Krugman ( 1988) 
Policy change: 
a) Removal of alleged Japanese closure of 
internal market( about 27 per cent of tariff) 
b) Retaliatory US closure of internal market 
(trade war, about 100 per cent tariff in each) 
Data base: 1976-1984 
Sector/market: 16K RAM chips in US and 
Japan 
Pricing rule: markup over marginal cost 
Product variety:none 
Nguyen and Wigle (1988) 
Policy change: 
Eliminate tariffs and selected NTBs 
a) among all regions 
b) among developed countries (DCs) only 
Data base: 1977 
Sectors:6, Primary sectors:2, Regions:8 
Pricing rules:virtually monopolistically 
competitive in manufacturing, competitive 
otherwise 
Entry/exit:free 
Product variety:differentiation by nation of 
SU ply 
Effects on Welfare 
Proportional change: 
a) 2.1 (Britain) 
b) 2.0 (Britain), 2.5(France), 
-0.9(Canada), 4.2(Italy), 2.5(Japan) 
Proportional change: 
1979: 0.14(optimal tariff of $570 
with zero subsidy), 0.55(optimal 
tariff of $408 with optimal subsidy) 
1980:0.03(optirnal tariff of $298 
with zero subsidy), 0.14 (optimal 
tariff of $211 with optimal subsidy) 
Proportional change: 
a) >O(US) 
>O(Japan) 
Number of firms falls from 9(6 US, 
3Japan) to 7 (all US), average cost 
falls 
b) >O(US) 
>O(Japan) 
Number of firm increase from 9(6 
US, 3Japan) to 12(7US, 5 Japan), 
average cost rises 
Proportional change: 
a) 1.5 (large DCs), 0.7(small DCs), 
-0.0(others) 
b) -0.2(large DCs), 0.3(small DCs), 
2.9(others) 
Source: Richardson, J.D., 1988, "Empirical Research on Trade Liberalisation with Imperfect 
Competition: A Survey", OECD Working Papers. 
APPENDIX 6.3: PROGRAMMING FOR THE SOLUTION (FORTRAN LANGUAGE) 
double precision x, p(2), c, epsilon, err 
integer m, n, k, count 
write(*,*)' Please enter values for n, M, K, c and epsilon:' 
read(*,*) n, m, k, epsilon 
write (*, *) ' Please enter initial value for p: ' 
read(*,*) p(l) 
write (*, *) ' Please enter error limit: ' 
read (*, *) err 
count= 1 
write (*, 9999) 
x = (dexp ( (-ldO/epsilon)*dlog (p (l) I dble (K))) - dble (rn) In 
p (2) = c* (dble (n)*x + dble (m)) I ( (dble (n) - epsilon )*x + dble (m)) 
write (*, 999) count, x, p(l ), p(2) 
dowhile (dabs (p(l) - p(2)). gt. err) 
count= count + 1 
p(l) = p(2) 
x = (dexp ( (-ldO/epsilon)*dlog (p (1) I dble (K))) - dble (m) In 
p (2) = c* (dble (n)*x + dble (m)) I ( (dble (n) - epsilon )*x + dble (m)) 
write(*, 999) count, x, p(l), p(2), dabs (p(l) - p(2)) 
enddo 
write (*, 9) count 
write (*, 99) x, p(2) 
9 format ('After', i3,' iteration, the final estimated x and p are: ' ) 
99 format (3f15. 8) 
999 format (i5, 5x, 4f15.8) 
9999 format(' iteration', 9x, 'x', 14x,' p(l) ', llx, 'p(2) ', 8x,' different') 
end 
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APPENDIX 6.4: NAME OF INDUSTRIES AND OTHER BASIC DATA FOR SELECTED 
OLIGOPOLIES 
Code 
31152 
31175 
31214 
31226 
32322 
32334 
35122 
35142 
35143 
35154 
35213 
35296 
35298 
36207 
36943 
37121 
37122 
37131 
37212 
37214 
37222 
37224 
38252 
Name of industry (unit) 
rice bran oil(kl) 
ramyon(mt) 
ground pimento(kg) 
fructose(kg) 
artificial fur(sm) 
leather cases 
sodium hydroxide(mt) 
monofil and strip(mt) 
super polyesters(mt) 
composite and complex 
fertilizers( mt) 
lacquers(kl) 
developers(kg) 
mix. of odoriferous subst. rn 
food industries(kg) 
glass fibres(mt) 
refractory materials(rnt) 
heavy plates and sheets-
plain(rnt) 
cold-rolled sheets-plain(mt) 
straight tubes and pipes of cast 
iron or cast steel(mt) 
unwrought alurninium(mt) 
zinc-un wrought( mt) 
unwrought aluminium 
alloys(mt) 
zinc powder(mt) 
desk automatic calculating 
machines 
copying and duplicating 
machines 
automatic merchandising 
machines 
gas range 
monitor TV 
Consumption Import CR3 H-index 
30238 3023.76 0.77892 0.27962 
421833 42183.32 0.93176 0.3642 
2356758 235675.8 0.76802 0.25864 
175979 17597.92 0.98436 0.48066 
833106 83310.58 0.93956 0.37075 
604717 60471.65 0.87284 0.35753 
226265 22626.51 0.77788 0.43118 
8388 838.8461 0.84047 0.40555 
140610 14061.03 0.98593 0.38225 
1908283 190828.3 0.84919 0.41706 
20487 
1906718 
1539781 
39352 
54498 
1980440 
878250 
64989 
39043 
176485 
31451 
43727 
1107711 
3908 
10212 
2671734 
495497 
2048.7 0.83265 0.31238 
190671.8 0.83094 0.42279 
153978. l 0.95546 0.35221 
3935.175 0.76869 0.334 
5449.761 0.87336 0.42943 
198044 0. 7 421 0. 34494 
87825.03 0.93259 0.29402 
6498.92 0.83475 0.40175 
3904.276 0.82871 0.46414 
17648.46 0.98988 0.49943 
3145.1 0.8672 0.45034 
4372.713 0.86007 0.30732 
110771.1 0.84379 0.2697 
390.8 0.42676 38253 
38261 
38265 
38323 
38391 communication wire and cable- 76584 
insulated (mt) 
1021.2 0. 807 56 0.46329 
267173.4 0.79874 0.27463 
49549.74 0.83859 0.33594 
7658.437 0.76708 0.26588 
38431 passenger car 
38442 motorcycles 
38523 cameras,general purposes 
38527 refracting telescopes 
38546 speedmeters and tachometers 
38547 watt hour meters 
360526 
135083 
991098 
450066 
671729 
730795 
36052.61 0.87619 0.39298 
13508.33 0.8854 0.35265 
99109.75 0.78414 0.27496 
45006.61 0.85788 0.46156 
67172.86 0.81435 0.42278 
73079.49 0.7901 0.46035 
Source: Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey, Economic Planning Board, Korea. 
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7 Summary and Conclusion 
Traditionally, the welfare loss resulting from monopoly power in an imperfectly 
competitive market has been an important issue shaping domestic competition policy. 
The importance of market structure has recently been incorporated in international trade 
theory to explain the causes and effects of trade. Increasing returns to scale of 
production technology and imperfect competition, as well as differences in relative 
endowments of factors of production between countries, are becoming more important 
in explaining international trade (Feenstra et al. 1993; Helpman et al. 1985). 
This thesis has examined the efficiency and welfare effects of an increase in 
foreign competition in the imperfectly competitive market structure of Korean 
manufacturing. In contrast to strategic trade policy, the results showed that an 
imperfectly competitive market structure enforces the necessity of free trade and 
competition to increase efficiency and welfare. An increase in competition, particularly 
foreign competition, reduced monopoly power (hence weakening the argument of 
strategic trade policy for shifting rents) and decreased unnecessary slack in production 
in a small open economy, Korean manufacturing industry. The empirical results in 
particular showed that quantitative restrictions increased welfare loss in an imperfectly 
competitive market. 
Until the early 1980s, prohibition of free trade was justified in Korea under 
various arguments. During the period of rapid economic development, the Korean 
government intervened in the market, and free competition in the home market was 
suppressed. However, government intervention also made Korean manufacturing 
imperfectly competitive, resulting in inefficiency. The government's heavy and 
chemical industry policy and the perceived need to achieve economies of scale in the 
small Korean market led to highly concentrated oligopolistic or monopolistic market 
structures, conducive to anti-competitive collusion between firms. Various entry 
barriers, including financial subsidies, enabled domestic firms to hold monopoly 
power. Protectionism, in the form of tariffs and import quotas, reduced opportunities for 
externally introduced competition. The results indicate that the policy of sheltering 
industry from foreign competition, in particular the quantitative restrictions associated 
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with imperfect competition, increased inefficiency in Korea and reduced national 
welfare. 
Korean markets do not satisfy the assumption of atomistic perfect competition. 
Indeed, this assumption is not likely to be met more generally. A review of Korean 
manufacturing using both the three-firm concentration ratio (CR3) and the trade-
adjusted three-firm concentration ratio (ACR3) found a high manufacturing 
concentration by international standards. Three important findings emerged from this 
review of the structure of Korean manufacturing industry. First, big business groups, 
called chaebol, have dominated Korean manufacturing. As a result, CR3 overstates the 
real competitivenes of Korean manufacturing industry. Second, Korean manufacturing 
was characterised by an oligopolistic market structure during the recent period of rapid 
economic development. Between 1970 and 1987, the average share of oligopolistic 
manufacturing industry was around 43.6 per cent in terms of shipment value and 40 per 
cent in terms of number of commodities. The classification of the market by 
concentration ratio can only be used as the upper boundary of imperfect competition. 
Concentration ratios do not reveal firms' behavioural characteristics, an essential 
characteristic of oligopoly, and hence the rate of oligopoly may be exaggerated. As 
Odagiri (1994) argued, competition may have to be understood in a behavioural rather 
than structural context. Irrespective of market concentration, competition is fully 
maintained if rivals compete fiercely with each other or if actual/potential entrants are 
actively seeking opportunities for entry. In Korea, however, some industries are 
notoriously monopolistic or collusive (Uekusa 1987). Modern oligopoly theory states 
that tacit collusion is possible without formal arrangements in oligopolistic markets. 
Anti-trust policy may be necessary to reduce the occurrence of such collusion. Third, 
because a high ratio of trade dependency is another important characteristic of Korean 
manufacturing, ACR3 was recalculated. The results revealed once again a high 
concentration ratio for Korean manufacturing by international standards. All the ACR3s 
for the 4-digit level of KSIC industry classifications for 1974 and 1986 were smaller 
than similar results obtained for the traditional three-firm market concentration index, 
CR3. This suggests that the traditional measure of producer concentration (CR3) is 
upwardly biased and that foreign trade is an important factor in industry policy in a 
small open economy such as Korea. 
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The thesis examined allocative inefficiency caused by imperfect competition, in 
the context of competition from foreign firms. Economic theory states that an increase 
in foreign competition in an oligopolistic market will affect not only the price behaviour 
of domestic firms but also other market factors such as market concentration and 
elasticity of demand. The theory thus implies the necessity of using a system approach 
to analyse allocative efficiency in an imperfectly competitive market. Estimation 
results, based on a two-stage least-squares regression, indicated that, in Korean 
manufacturing, the discipline effect of imports was applicable and that financial 
subsidies accelerated the concentration of market structure. Increased foreign 
competition, proxied by import intensity, considerably restrained the market power of 
domestic firms. Imports seem to have provided an avenue for enforcing more 
competitive market behaviour and increasing the allocative efficiency of Korean 
manufacturing. 
The results showed that barriers to new entry caused by government intervention 
in the financial sector in the mid 1970s were an important factor in the increase in 
market concentration in Korean manufacturing. Coupled with the policy of sheltering 
manufacturing industry from import competition, this brought about inefficiency in the 
allocation of resources. Although the structuralist model, characterised by the structure-
conduct-performance framework, seemed to have limited direct application to the 
Korean economy, the results obtained from applying it supported the view that the 
increase in concentration distorted efficiency of resource allocation. Economies of scale 
were another important factor in accelerating market concentration in both the 1970s 
and the 1980s. Efficiency in the form of economies of scale may lead to a market being 
supplied by only a few low-cost firms. In such circumstances competition between 
market rivals is necessary in order to ensure that firms operate efficiently. Although 
government intervention in the 1970s on behalf of heavy industry and chemicals should 
be judged in terms of general equilibrium analysis over a long-term period, the results at 
least imply that the government's trade policy had costs. 
The effects of trade protection, associated with an imperfectly competitive 
market structure, on X-efficiency were also examined. Linking theories of international 
trade and industrial organisation, it seems that an increase in quantitative restrictions on 
trade would yield a higher level of X-inefficiency. Empirical evidence confirmed that 
this was so for Korean manufacturing, as the group of ind us tries with a high level of 
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quantitative restrictions, coupled with an imperfectly competitive market structure, had 
higher X-inefficiency than the group with a lower level of quantitative restrictions. The 
results thus implied that guaranteed shelter from foreign competition causes even 
greater inefficiency than other forms of protection in an imperfectly competitive 
market. 
Like export subsidies, quantitative trade restrictions are strictly prohibited under 
GATT rules. Nevertheless export subsidies and quantitative trade restrictions are 
common, particularly in markets for agricultural products and capital goods. According 
to EPAC (1991), in the 1980s the proportion of imports subject to non-tariff barriers 
(import quotas, local content schemes and voluntary export restraints, for example) 
grew by 17 per cent in the European Community and by 22 per cent in North America. 
This thesis showed that import quotas, when associated with imperfect competition, 
accelerated the X-inefficiency of domestic producers. Empirical evidence in this study 
also confim1ed that trade protection intensified X-inefficiency in Korean industry in the 
mid 1970s and in the 1980s. Thus the empirical evidence for Korean manufacturing 
implies that an increase in competition from foreign firms increases not only allocative 
efficiency in the output market but also X-efficiency in production costs in a small, 
open, developing economy. 
The study estimated the direct effect of an increase in foreign competition on 
national welfare, taking into account the conflict between competition and efficiency 
resulting from economies of scale. Simulation results for selected oligopolistic 
industries generally confirmed that an increase in foreign competition, proxied by a 
relaxation of import quotas, could have a positive effect on national welfare. In 
particular, if the exit and entry of firms were unrestricted and costless, the positive 
effect seemed to be strengthened in these industries. Combined with the empirical 
evidence of Chapter 4 (on the discipline effect of imports) and Chapter 5 (on a 
reduction in X-inefficiency due to foreign competition), the simulation results suggested 
that the exit of inefficient marginal firms from the market removed the conflict between 
competition and efficiency in a small open economy. Even if the concentration ratio is 
high and stable, a small number of domestic firms may be vigorously competing with 
each other and in particular with potential entrants from abroad. In such a situation they 
will be unable to exploit fully their market power. In general, the empirical evidence of 
this study indicated that an oligopolistic market with economies of scale cannot per se 
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negate the necessity of increasing foreign competition in a small, open, developing 
economy. 
The results again deny the validity of strategic trade policy based on government 
intervention in trade. The new trade theorists argue that if the assumption of perfect 
competition under the Ricardo and Heckscher-Ohlin theorem is relaxed, it is possible to 
justify some level of protection. If economies of scale take place at the firm level, 
international trade policy at the empirical level and the welfare effects of such a trade 
policy become complex (Rodrik 1986; Krugman 1984). However, the empirical results 
here suggest that an increase in foreign competition can bring about a positive national 
welfare effect in an imperfectly competitive market structure with economies of scale. 
Theoretically as well, new trade policy can be criticised. In particular, the results of 
new trade policy are very sensitive to the assumptions of the model. In contrast to 
Brander et al.'s (1981, 1984) assumption of Cournot behaviour, Eaton and Grossman 
(1986) showed that an export tax (not an export subsidy) is the appropriate policy under 
the Bertrand assumption of firm behaviour. New trade policy requires strong 
assumptions about the response ofrival fim1s (TAC 1989; Krugman 1988). In particular, 
it argues that government intervention which causes a firm to increase its market share 
will cause its overseas rivals to reduce their production. This is a highly restrictive 
assumption. If, for example, there is retaliation from other countries, a quota war will 
result in autarky (Vousden 1990), and all countries may be worse off. Even if 
significant economic rents exist in a small open economy, closing a domestic market 
will place major constraints on attempts by that market to achieve international cost 
competitiveness. Consequently, the costs to other, non-assisted industries may be 
greater than any economic rents captured. In actuality, it is also costly for governments 
to identify correctly firms' behaviour in an oligopolisic market. 
The results need to be interpreted with care because an oligopolistic model of 
Korean big business groups, or chaebol, was not explicitly included. How an increase in 
foreign competition affects the efficiency and behaviour of chaebol affiliates is also an 
interesting area for further study. In addition, a more developed model reflecting 
various firms' strategic behaviour in an oligopoly (Stackleberg's leader-follower model, 
for example) may be needed because Korean manufacturing is dominated by large 
firms. As the Korean economy becomes more internationalised, there is a general 
expectation that its imperfectly competitive market structure will decline in importance 
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that its imperfectly competitive market structure will decline in importance but that the 
strategic behaviour of firms, both domestic and foreign, will become more important.1 
The study did not tackle the problem of structural adjustment costs resulting 
from trade and competition. As Rodrik (1988) said, adjustment costs can be important, 
particularly in developing countries. 
The following policy implications can be drawn from the results of the thesis. 
The primary implication for industry policy is that trade and competition need to be 
emphasised. The results suggest that trade liberalisation is necessary to increase 
competition in a small open economy, regardless of its market structure. An imperfectly 
competitive market structure, associated with foreign competition, should be the source 
of a possible increase in efficiency rather than the basis of a strategic trade policy. The 
necessity for an increase in foreign competition in Korea is becoming more urgent. With 
the discipline of foreign competition, the level of concentration per se in the home 
market, and the extent to which this rises due to mergers and takeovers, probably 
becomes much less important. In Korea, the possibility for firms to exert market power 
in a concentrated market should not be ignored; chaebol can exert their market power 
regardless of market concentration. Modern oligopoly theory uses non-cooperative 
game theory to model interactions among the firms in an industry, investigating the 
circumstances under which the joint monopoly outcome emerges as an equilibrium of 
that game. The theory suggests that a collusive outcome may obtain without any direct 
communication between oligopolistic firms. Both an anti-trust policy to inhibit 
collusion among domestic firms and an increase in foreign competition are therefore 
desirable and necessary. 
The results also have implications for microeconomic policy. Because the key to 
improving production efficiency and the allocation of goods and services lies in 
providing sustained pressure or incentives for efficiency, a reduction in both trade 
barriers and regulation would is recommended (Albon and Falvey 1992; Smith 1992).2 
If perfect competition in all industries is the best solution, monopoly in all industries 
may be the next best solution for achieving efficiency of resource allocation. This is 
1 An increase in foreign competition generally tends to improve the flow of price information among 
sellers in the home market. Modern oligopoly theory, however, says that this improvement in price 
information can facilitate tacit collusion if firms follow Bertrand price competition, by preventing 
firms from cutting prices and thus obtaining a higher market share. 
2 Deregulation (or liberalisation) is often used to describe the process of change of ownership from the 
state to the private sector (privatisation or denationalisation) and the removal of regulatory constraints 
on the market mechanism. 
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because there would be no imbalance in each industry's use of resources. From the 
dynamic perspective of competition as a process, natural monopolies may face 
competition from new products and processes, although governments can slow down 
the speed of new entry. Successful regulation of a natural monopoly requires accurate 
data on costs and demand, but these are difficult to obtain because of imperfect 
information and transaction costs. Many state-owned firms are not subject to market 
discipline and hence competitive pressure, especially in developing countries. One of 
the benefits of increased competition is the elimination of cross-subsidisation. 
Competition forces prices into closer alignment with costs. Goods and services formerly 
subsidised by revenue generated elsewhere will either be discontinued, or methods will 
be devised to produce them at lower cost. Either way, society gains as resources are 
switched to more highly valued uses. 
The government needs to reduce its involvement in industries in order to make 
better use of the market mechanism. Barriers to mobility and entry should be lowered. 
Industrial policy should be designed, not to specify and enforce particular outcomes, but 
to alter market processes by attacking the rigidities which impede both the force of 
market selection external to the firm, and the pressures for change from within the firm 
(Geroski et al. 1990). The objective of industry and trade policy should be to create a 
competitive environment in which resources can be used in those areas where the 
returns are greatest. Competitive markets rather than government intervention will best 
determine which areas will attract and which will lose resources. Microeconomic policy 
should have as its objective the removal of anti-competitive barriers. Greater 
coordination of industry and competition policy is needed to improve industry 
efficiency and national welfare. In addition, competition can increase dynamic 
efficiency: the process by which industries make timely changes to technology and 
products in response to changes in consumer tastes and in productive opportunities. The 
general conclusion is that competition, especially foreign competition in a small open 
economy, is an essential prerequisite for efficiency and welfare. Competition itself is 
not the goal of competition policy (Hilmer et al. 1993). Rather, policy seeks to facilitate 
effective competition in order to promote efficiency and economic growth, while 
accommodating situations where competition does not achieve efficiency or is in 
conflict with other social objectives. In addition, as McKinnon (1993) argued, the 
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stabilisation of the macroeconomy is important to ensure that any increase in 
competition will be effective. 
Trade and competition policy is also an emerging issue as national economies 
become more integrated (Drysdale and Gaurnat 1992; Gaurnat and Drysdale 1994). 
Although the GA TT negotiating agenda has expanded over time, the focus has always 
been on market access through a reduction in trade barriers and the abolition of 
discrimination among products. Free trade may not be sufficient if foreign firms have 
global market power, if foreign suppliers collude with each other and/or with domestic 
producers, or if the relevant markets are local and there are restrictions on inward 
foreign direct investment (Hoekman et al. 1994; Lawrence 1994). The results imply that 
industry policy should aim at increasing competition and reducing barriers to trade. In 
order to increase overall welfare, industry policy needs to integrate a variety of policy 
measures in a coherent approach. Adopting a common policy to ensure fair competition 
in markets is important for an integrated industry policy. Trade theory about conditions 
of imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale provides some clear-cut 
indications of the effect of multilateral reductions in barriers to trade. It predicts that 
such reductions will lead to increased competition in each market, with a consequent 
rise in allocative and X-efficiency in each country. After trade liberalisation, the firms 
that survive will operate on an increased scale, at lower average cost. These reductions 
in price and average costs constitute an increase in welfare, indicating that substantial 
gains can be obtained from a policy of removing trade barriers. Any increase in 
regulation, intervention in the market mechanism or protection from foreign 
competition results in inefficiency as well as barriers to the integration of national 
economies. Competition policy is frequently mentioned as an area that should be on the 
agenda of the next round of multilateral trade negotiations. Competition policy can be 
seen, on the evidence provided in the thesis, to be closely related to trade policy. 
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